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Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) is a market-based conservation approach that 
has attracted significant attention in academic and policy circles. PES is appealing for its simple 
market logic of incentives: it is a mechanism by which land users, who may not be motivated to 
protect nature on their land, are encouraged to do so through direct payments (incentives) from 
buyers interested in ecosystem services provided by said nature. PES programs have increased in 
the last decade as an alternative to reduce native ecosystem loss. They are especially promoted in 
developing countries as a way to alleviate and combat poverty. My dissertation integrates 
political ecology, historical geography, indigenous geography, and Napo Runa cosmovision 
(sacha runa) to examine the case study of the community of Wamaní, which participates in the 
Programa Socio Bosque (PSB) in the Northern Ecuadorian Amazon, an established and high 
profile PES program in Ecuador. PSB enrolls indigenous peoples with the aim to contribute to 
the protection and conservation of forests and biodiversity, and to promote cultural survival 
through monetary support for housing, education, and other needs. While much attention has 
focused on the effects of neoliberal ideals and private property used by PES on indigenous 
communities, less has been said about how indigenous peoples’ experiences and their struggles 
for survival within (and despite) settler systems of assimilation and dispossession, matter to the 
workings of PES programs. Drawing on my identity as a Napo Runa, I combine interviews, 
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storytelling, autoethnography, and archival research to show how sacha runa in Wamaní 
contests, challenges, adapts and appropriates market-based conservation approaches. I argue that 
Napo Runa is not a static, ahistorical category, but one that challenges how PSB works. In other 
words, PSB is as a much a result of ideas of market integration and neoliberal valuation as of 
how communities use their collective vision of forest life to challenge the terms and mechanisms 
of engagement, incorporation, and participation. My dissertation is sympathetic with the proposal 
that local socio-political processes shape how PES contributes to the consolidation of existing or 
emerging social transformations that promote cultural self-determination, but also cautions 
against westernized conservationist approaches that foster geographies of power that erase local 
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In 2015, while visiting the city of Archidona, in the Amazonian province of Napo, 
Ecuador, I ran into an old friend, a Shuar leader, Juan Carlos Jintiach. At the time, Jintiach was a 
former representative of the indigenous organization COICA (Coordinator of Indigenous 
Organizations of the Amazon Basin). He shared with me his excitement about a Payments for 
Ecosystems Services (PES) program called Programa Socio Bosque (PSB). Socio Bosque is part 
of the Ecuadorian incentive-based policy REDD+ (The United Nations Collaborative 
Programme) strategy, which focuses on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, and on conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks in developing countries. The PSB began in 2008 under the initiative of the 
Ministry of Environment of Ecuador (MAE) and aims to guarantee protection of native forests 
over the medium to long-term by giving economic incentives to landowners (de Koning et al., 
2011).  
Several indigenous communities of the Ecuadorian Amazon have participated in PES 
programs, some of these for decades. For example, communities from the nacionalidad 
(nationality, used for political recognition by indigenous organizations) Kichwa, Shuar, Sápara, 
Siona and Shiwiar have participated in PSB. The territories (Figure 1) held by these indigenous 
nationalities have native forests that meet PSB’s criteria: 1) communally-owned lands, 2) threat 
of deforestation, 3) ecosystem services provision of carbon storage, water cycle regulation and 
habitat for biodiversity; and 4) high poverty levels (de Koning et al., 2011).  
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In Napo Province, where I met Jintiach, twelve Napo Runa (Kichwa language speaking 
peoples of the Napo Region) comunas (communities) have participated in PSB since 2008, 
affecting 68,878 hectares of forest designated to that program (Manuel Shiguango, personal 
interview, January 28, 2019). Among these communities, Wamaní (Figure 2) is the oldest, with 
10 years in the program, while the Community Pucuno Chico is the most recent, with 4 years of 
participation. However, not all Napo Runa communities participate. In 2019, while some 
communities applied to enter Socio Bosque, others preferred to stay away from PSB. According 
to leaders of the indigenous organization FOIN (Federation of Indigenous Organizations of 
Napo), communities agree to participate in PSB because of the benefits promised (PSB offers 
monetary incentives that can help financially meet food, services, education, and health needs 
(de Koning et al., 2011), and because it is seen as a proyecto de moda (a popular project) (Cerda, 
personal communication, June 22, 2019). However, while PSB takes into account some needs, it 
is unclear to what extent Napo Runa valuation systems of forests are represented through the 
monetary equivalents at the heart of PSB.  
Jintiach was excited about the opportunities and benefits for indigenous communities 
participating in PSB. However, he also was concerned about how Amazonian peoples might 
change their sacha runa (socioenvironmental) practices and values with the implementation of 
PSB. As a Shuar leader, Jintiach has defended indigenous socioenvironmental practices at the 
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. There, and through his participation at 
meetings with other indigenous leaders and in PSB in Ecuador, he learned about the implications 
of PES programs. For example, PES programs could be a new form of (neo)colonialism or a way 
for other to take over indigenous peoples’ territories through the logic of conservation (Van 
Hecken, Bastiaensen, & Huybrechs, 2015). As an indigenous leader of FOIN explained, areas 
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“under conservation” (áreas bajo conservación -ABC) could become “prohibited areas” (áreas 
prohibidas), with local owners feeling as if their “hands are tied” (manos atados) because, under 
PSB, they are forbidden from carrying out traditional socioenvironmental activities on the land 























This concern led me to ask: How does the Programa Socio Bosque cohere, contest, or 
transform indigenous ways of knowing and existing? This dissertation is the result of seeking 
to understand how the logics, design, and value schemes of Payments for Ecosystem Services 
work in the Ecuadorian Amazon, specifically, in relation to the Napo Runa and the Market-
Based Instruments (MBIs) associated with the PSB. This dissertation draws on multi-year, 
empirical analyses of my experiences and observations in the Upper Ecuadorian Amazon, living 
in a Napo Runa Comuna, Huiruno, and volunteering with grassroots indigenous organizations 
such as FCUNAE (Federation of Indigenous Communities of the Ecuadorian Amazon), 
CONFENIAE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon), and 
COICA (Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin). 
 




The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. First, I introduce some of the 
key terms and propositions elaborated in this dissertation, specifically, the relationship between 
PES and Napo Runa socioenvironmental values or sacha runa. Second, I provide an overview of 
the method of data collection and analysis, which emphasizes participatory practices, indigenous 
storytelling and autoethnography. The final section offers an overview of the dissertation 
chapters. 
What is PES? 
In the context of deepening environmental degradation, PES is a conservation approach 
that has attracted significant attention in academic and policy circles. The main premise of PES 
is appealing for its simple market logic of incentives: it is a mechanism by which land users, who 
may not be motivated to protect nature on their land, are encouraged to do so through direct 
payments (incentives) from buyers interested in ecosystem services provided by said nature. PES 
works by translating external, non-market values of the environment into real financial 
incentives for local actors to provide such services (Engel, Pagiola, & Wunder, 2008). PES is 
also an appealing conservation approach because it works with voluntary transactions, where an 
individual consents to sell a well-defined environmental service to be bought by a buyer desiring 
said service, if the provider secures service provision (ibid. p. 664). Market-based instruments 
(MBIs) (Pirard, 2012) such as incentives are fundamental to these voluntary transactions. They 
aim to entice landowners consent to behaving (or stop behaving) in ways that make ecosystem 
services more attractive to potential buyers. The expected outcome of these MBIs is the 
reduction of native ecosystem loss, decrease in rural poverty (Pattanayak, Wunder, & Ferraro, 
2010), and mitigation of climate change through reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (Wunder, Engel, & Pagiola, 2008). 
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PES has its challenges. First, PES has failed to alleviate poverty (Alix‐Garcia & Wolff, 
2014). Secondly, power relations can shape PES programs, reconfiguring social diversity and 
values, as well as state-market-community relations, in ways that reproduce (neo) colonial 
legacies (Van Hecken, Bastiaensen, & Windey, 2015). For example, there is a distantiation 
between those who buy “the service,” typically in places beyond the communities that engage 
with PES, and those who “provide the service” (Alix‐Garcia & Wolff, 2014). This distance 
reproduces domination and colonialism when outsiders “dictate” the outcomes of the expected 
services. Other researchers argue that forest economic valuation and financial incentives might 
not represent local individual and collective motivations to benefit from PES (Farley, Anderson, 
Bremer, & Harden, 2011). Similarly, PES programs require formal property rights (Alix‐Garcia 
& Wolff, 2014) which is turn has become a tool to regulate or standardize variegated forms of 
nature, diminishing intrinsic local cultural values within its surrounding environment, remaking 
new nature-society relations (Nicolas Kosoy, Corbera, & Brown, 2008; McAfee & Shapiro, 
2010; McElwee, 2012; Shapiro-Garza, 2013). 
The major problem identified with PES programs is that they do not pay attention to 
dimensions of value that are incommensurate with price (Van Hecken, Bastiaensen, & 
Huybrechs, 2015), and so the dominant financial schemes of PES fail to translate the complexity 
of services and their degradation into monetary figures (Gómez-Baggethun, de Groot, Lomas, & 
Montes, 2010; McAfee, 1999; McAfee & Shapiro, 2010; Pokorny, Johnson, Medina, & Hoch, 
2012; Shapiro-Garza, 2013). Moreover, indigenous scholars and political ecologists point to how 
indigenous cosmovision, that is, the thinking-being of indigenous peoples that is inextricable 
from living ecologies (Braun, 2002; Cadena, 2010, 2015; Kohn, 2013; Uzendoski, 2005; 
Whitten, 1985), is not taken into account in PES evaluations. They also point to the need for 
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moving away from a singular, market-based approach to conservation and towards both 
recognizing the complexity of local socio-environmental-institutional realities (Corbera, 2012; 
Shapiro-Garza, 2013; Van Hecken, Bastiaensen, & Huybrechs, 2015) and non-economic 
valuation schemes that reflect the complexity of human and nonhuman interrelationships 
(Norgaard, 2010).  
PES in the Ecuadorian context 
For leaders like Juan Carlos Jintiach, the problem is not that the logic of state-market-
community relations underpinning PES programs is a new challenge for Amazonian Indigenous 
peoples. The Napo Runa, in fact, have been subject to significant social, economic, and cultural 
impacts associated with nation-building throughout the twentieth century (Erazo, 2008; T. 
Macdonald, 1995; Muratorio, 1991; Perreault, 2002; Radcliffe, 2007; Valdivia, 2005; Whitten, 
1975). As part of national development programs, the Agrarian Reform and Colonization Law 
was enacted in 1964, whereby Andean rural families were encouraged to settle the western fringe 
of the Amazon headwaters, from Napo in the north to Morona–Santiago in the south. Indigenous 
peoples, particularly the Shuar and, later on, the Runa, organized the first indigenous federations, 
with support from missionaries, to resist the settlement of their lands and then to be recognized 
as subjects by the State (Rudel, 1993).  
While rights over territories were threatened by land settlement, oil exploration and 
exploitation, another national-building strategy, intensified in the late 1960’s. The Ecuadorian 
government used the rents derived from oil extraction with few environmental regulations, which 
funded approximately thirty-percent of the total income from exports, to propel infrastructural 
modernization (Kimerling, 1993; Valdivia, 2005). When sponsoring these nation-building 
projects, the Ecuadorian government did not consult local indigenous peoples or make them 
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aware of the potential sociocultural impacts (Grefa, 2014). For example, roads were built to 
bring drilling equipment in and to service oil infrastructure, opening up land to more settlers. 
State-sponsored and spontaneous colonization increased at a faster rate and settlers cleared farms 
in long swaths-- sometimes as many as five rows back from the original roads. Deforestation and 
transformation continued as roads proliferated to service not only the oil industry but the 
growing settler population. As a result, lands held under customary tenure for centuries were 
subject to rules and regulations that voided traditional rights and demanded proof of ownership 
through legal status and demonstration of labor and infrastructural investment (T. Macdonald, 
1999; Perreault, 2002) 
All of these changes took place without the consent of communities; sacred places, and 
places used for hunting, fishing, and subsistence farming, were invaded and occupied for 
resource extraction and wealth accumulation. Road construction caused environmental 
impacts—forests were fragmented, and wildlife retreated further into the forest. Conservation 
practices, particularly the delineation of national parks, also affected Amazonian peoples’ 
socioenvironmental relations. When I volunteered with FCUNAE (Federation of Indigenous 
Communities of the Ecuadorian Amazon) in 2001, in Orellana Province, I heard indigenous 
leaders talk about how national parks, such as the Yasuní National Park1, were created without 
the consent of indigenous peoples. The national park schemes disenfranchise traditional 
territorialities from hunting, fishing, harvesting, and disconnect people from their forest 
societies. In other words, the settlement of lands, opening of roads, extractive programs, and the 
creation of national parks are examples of state policies that have sought to control and 
disenfranchise indigenous peoples such as the Napo Runa. For some indigenous leaders of 
                                                          
1 Created on July, 26, 1979. 
9 
 
FOIN, PSB constitutes yet another form of state policy to control and appropriate indigenous 
lands.  
In 2008, following political instability and decades of protests led by indigenous peoples 
and social movements, the Ecuadorian Constitution was redrafted to include conceptualizations 
of an intercultural and plurinational Ecuadorian state, economic autonomy, and environmental 
rights under a political vision of Sumak Kawsay or Buen Vivir, which translates into “living 
well” (Radcliffe, 2015). To put Buen Vivir in motion, the Constitution attributes legal 
responsibility for environmental management, and a constitutional linkage of environments and 
the people who live in them, to the Ministry of the Environment, making this agency responsible 
for overseeing and enhancing environmental rights be protected under the national development 
plan. Various national development plans (Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir) for each of the last 
three government periods (2007-2010, 2009-2013, 2013-2017) have built on this constitutional 
mandate to establish national environmental objectives, including goals to reduce deforestation 
rates, decrease the country’s ecological footprint, reduce poverty in urban and rural areas, 
promote biodiversity and water resource conservation, and promote programs to mitigate and 
prevent climate change. In this sense, the state assumes a key role in the wellbeing of the 
population (SENPLADES, 2009).  
Leaders like Juan Carlos Jintiach are concerned by what is not valued by PSB. The Napo 
Runa value forests in complex temporal and social ranges, drawing on resources and human-
nonhuman kinship to appease feuding relatives, establish distance and create common spaces, 
strengthen heritage, or to meet the costs for life changing events that regulate affective life. For 
the Napo Runa, socioenvironmental relational values, or sacha runa (discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4), are rooted in forms of kinship such as muntun (groups akin), randi - randi (giving 
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and giving, equity), or pariju causana (reciprocity or sharing). Furthermore, Unai (time-space), 
suma (sense of beauty) (Muratorio, 1991; Uzendoski, 2005; Whitten, 1975) and sumac causana 
(respect for each other) are ethics valued as part of the Runa life not accounted for in PSB. PES 
programs such as PSB don’t account for these types of place-identity dynamics (Van Hecken, 
Bastiaensen, & Huybrechs, 2015) and encourage to consider only capitalistic economic value. In 
some cases, PSB logics of private property and the financialization of nature are in conflict with 
Runa struggles over cultural survival, sovereignty, and self-determination, which strengthen 
indigenous peoples’ rights, nurture community activism, and build recognition of political 
agency (Coombes, Johnson, & Howitt, 2012).  
In communities were PSB is already established, socios (comuna associates) are 
concerned with how to make sense of market values and Napo Runa values. In the community of 
Wamaní, for example, where I focused my research, different community members see and 
experience different impacts through the PSB. In some meetings about PSB, members of 
Wamaní engaged in heated discussions about how to use the PSB’s fund resources. At times, it 
seemed that the community was “breaking apart”. To cool down heated discussions, elders asked 
members to maintain a sense of community, otherwise PSB could “break” their strength. Socios 
were urged to think about benefits in terms of the whole community, not only on individual 
terms. Similarly, others were concerned with the loss of rights. Some areas under conservation or 
áreas bajo conservación (ABC) of Socio Bosque are now “prohibited” or “restricted,” meaning 
that those areas no longer belong to them but must comply with PSB’s contributors. As a result, 
those areas have become objects to be conserved, rather that nonhuman subjects interacting and 
contributing to Runa life. In other words, the attentive relationship that the Runa have with the 
environment through the ongoing process of signifying and interpreting between living (human 
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and non-humans) beings is being pulled apart (Kohn, 2013). Yet, for other socios, the PSB is a 
welcomed opportunity. With money-incentives of USD $26,905 annually, the community can 
invest in water provision and scholarships; support entrepreneur initiatives; and promote 
capacity-building in environmental monitoring and community strengthening.  
As a Napo Runa, I have first-hand experience with PES schemes and have witnessed 
their failures. Various indigenous nationalities in Ecuador have applied and participated in the 
PSB. The rationale for connecting PSB and indigenous communities is that these programs 
contribute to the protection and conservation of the forest and biodiversity, while also allowing 
indigenous peoples to promote cultural survival and providing monetary support for housing, 
education, and other needs (de Koning et al., 2011). However, Amazonian peoples have based 
their existence in small-scale agricultural practices, hunting and gathering, which has allowed 
them to keep a balanced use of nonhuman natures while the tropical forest provided them food, 
clothing and medicine (Muratorio, 1991; Uzendoski, 2005; Whitten, 1975, 1985). These 
practices rely on the transmission of traditional forms of knowledge over generations, with elders 
drawing on memory and lived experience to teach children and grandchildren about caring and 
forming kin with nonhuman entities. While Amazonian peoples like the Napo Runa have 
traditionally referred to practices of resource use in non-capitalist terms, such as sacha kawsai 
(living forest), sumac causana (respect for each other) and muntun (affinities), market-based 
environmental initiatives such as PES translate these in terms of commodifiable goods, e.g., 
“environmental services”. 
Case Study: PES among the Napo Runa of Wamaní 
Different case studies have provided insight into the interaction of PES programs with 
local socio-politics and values (Nicolas Kosoy et al., 2008; Shapiro-Garza, 2013). The Wamaní 
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community was a propitious case study location to analyze how PSB has been altered or walks 
with local indigenous values on nature and its forms of living due to: 1) proximity to the area that 
is familiar to me, as I understand the social, political and cultural dynamics of the Napo Runa. 
The area of research is based in the Napo Province, which is part of the Ecuadorian State 
territory, 2) the community is one of the leading communities that signed the agreement with 
PSB ten years ago, 3) the community is close to the Sumaco-Galeras national park, which 
enhances the conservation of natural rainforest and its cultural value, 4) this community has been 
leading in conservation, and planning programs to defend its forms of living and incentivizing 
local economic development.  
My research draws on empirical data, including participant observation of meetings of 
PES and the Napo Runa valuation schemes to examine how the frictions between these schemes 
play out in territorial, cultural and political outcomes. I conducted structured interviews with 
members of Wamaní (n=10), indigenous leaders (n=4), and government officials (n=4). I also 
conducted informal interviews at Wamaní, Tena, Loreto, Coca, with indigenous people (n=20) 
when fishing, cultivating or while participating in marches organized by FOIN. I spent one year 
doing this research in Ecuador. I visited Wamaní frequently and participated in activities such as 
community meetings, sport events, and political meetings. I also used interviews and personal 
communications with indigenous leaders from previous personal experiences, such as when I 
volunteered with indigenous organizations, to contextualize the analysis.  
Indigenous storytelling and autoethnography as methods: Close to the fire or ‘tullpa’ and 
“break” the system 
 
In academic spheres, indigenous scholars propose using alternative research methods as a 
form to resist or decolonize western methodologies and hegemonic thinking on academic 
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research (Smith, 1999; Whitinui, 2014). As an Indigenous geographer, I feel my methodological 
approaches need to recognize the ethical dimensions of conducting research among peoples who 
don’t often have an academic voice. As I see it, my accountability derives from sorting out 
questions about how to negotiate “giving voice” to the Napo Runa in an academic context as a 
member of these people, and from how to address the conflict that this position poses to keeping 
an academic “distance” or objectivity, which is ontologically distinct from a Runa way of being. 
Also central to this question is how to promote alternative ways of research inquiry that do not 
repeat the same epistemic violence already documented by indigenous scholars (Uzendoski, 
2016).  
For this research, I use storytelling and indigenous autoethography as my primary 
methods of data collection and analysis. Storytelling among Napo Runa teaches us about 
language, communication, culture, and experience (Uzendoski & Calapucha-Tapuy, 2012). I 
grew up in a culture that did not have a writing system, so storytelling became important to 
support our way of thinking and relating with the forest because stories also produce values, 
meanings that connect personal or people’s (thinking or feeling) experiences with the forest. 
Storytelling (in the form of stories, anecdotes, metaphors, songs) are transmitted in gatherings of 
people (home intimacy or in communities) and create social identity. In other words, it has value 
not only because it creates a profound connection between the listener and the storyteller, but 
also because it reinforces time-space values (beliefs and social practices) that define the Napo 
Runa identity.  
Similarly, autoethnography is a method of inquiry that incorporates the voice, the notions 
of being indigenous, making visible subjects and reinforcing how we want to live across an 
interrupted flow of indigenous interactions (Whitinui, 2014). Autoethnography is a powerful 
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method because it breaks from the dominant western understanding of the world by intentionally 
situating the voice in the social relations examined, and thus constituting alternative views of 
cultural complexities, reconnecting the academic observation with time-space values and lived 
realities. I argue that this method can provide information about the knowledge and life of Napo 
Runa and their intrinsic relationship with nature. Importantly, it can provide a new form of 
inquiry among other Napo Runa researchers, one in which the Runa are integral part of research 
inquiry and work towards dismantling the creation of Napo Runa as objects of research.  
Among indigenous scholars, autoethnography has become relevant and critical. I see 
myself in a unique, privileged obligation to speak from the position of and as a Napo Runa. This 
gives me the opportunity to observe, practice, and bring up Napo Runa’s beliefs and social 
practices and explain some of the complexities and uniqueness of the Napo Runa world. Using 
indigenous autoethnography, I focus on how the Napo Runa make sense of PSB as well as 
transmit my personal experiences, and combine them with other’s experiences and knowledge to 
explain sacha runa, so that the Napo Runa people can open doors to other forms of 
understanding our life and aspirations. 
Let me offer a concrete example of how this works. When I was child, during class recess 
or vacations, I used to visit my grandparents in Puerto Murialdo and “Cañón de los Monos” in 
Orellana Province. Both of these places related to my mother and father respectively. I enjoyed 
going to visit my grandparents. I enjoyed the landscape, the rivers, the food, and the cozy 
atmosphere of life. What I liked most, however, and is still vivid to me, is the wayusa morning 
ritual. After the first songs of the rooster, around 3 a.m., I would hear my grandmother and my 
aunts starting to prepare the fire. I listened to them wash the pots, and put water to boil along 
with wayusa leaves to make wayusa upina (a form of tea drinking made of wayusa leaves). 
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While the wayusa boiled, and until they finished drinking, I would take a blanket and approach 
the fire or tullpa. The tullpa is more than a kitchen; it is a space that revolves around the fire, 
where women prepare and cook food.  
Multiple generations combine in the tullpa, without hierarchy, without distinction of 
space or time. It is a space in which multiple teachings and multiple possibilities are generated. 
For example, some women weave their shigras in this space, while older people, like my 
grandparents, give advice about life through storytelling. These stories are of their own 
experiences or stories they heard from someone else, like their grandparents, a relative, or 
acquaintance. My uncles and aunts would ask my grandparents about the meaning of their 
dreams. My grandparents explained that each dream, according to certain characteristics, has a 
meaning. That meaning can influence the activities of the present day or of future days. Dreams 
are a preparation space, so that the day’s activities are done safely, without the possibility of 
harm or adverse consequences for the person. Also dreams promote organization and influence 
social relations among members of the community (T. Macdonald, 1999). I loved listening to the 
interpretation of my grandparents’ dreams and stories, although now I do not remember them 
exactly. I marveled at them. I felt at that moment that I was traveling to the past and that I was 
connecting with the people who experienced it. More importantly, I realized that I was being 
taught about the value of life in the forest.  
I share one personal experience to illustrate this point. On a sunny afternoon, in the 
Comuna Huiruno, in Loreto, after returning from school, at age of 9, my mother asked me to 
accompany her to go to our parcel to sow small coffee plants. My job was to make a small hole 
on the ground using a stick, while my mother sowed the small coffee plants on it. As it got late in 
the afternoon, the natural forest surrounding the space opened for the new coffee plantation cast 
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its shadow on the inside environment. The plantation became dark quickly before the sunset. My 
mother directed me to make the last line of holes on ground. I did, while she continued to sow 
the last holes with the small coffee plants. I was close to a large, fallen tree with its large roots 
facing up. I moved to stand up over the trunk of the fallen tree. From there, I began to enjoy the 
amazing environment. It was the first time I was doing that kind of job and the environment was 
somehow new for me. I saw the cut trees fallen on the ground, although some trees where still 
standing. Other trees were dragged by the cut trees, exposing their roots. Later, I saw some black 
birds playing on trees’ canopy. They were playing, flying over each other and suddenly, the 
black birds chased to peck a white one, whose showed up from nowhere. Those black birds 
pecked the white one and the bird fell to the ground vertically. Instantly, I moved my sight 
straight down to look for the white bird. I looked for the bird because I thought it may be ill and 
maybe I could rescue her. However, straight on the ground where that white bird had fallen was 
a big snake, just few meters behind my mother. The snake mutulu (bushmaster) was in a position 
to attack my mother and ready to jump over her. At that moment, I wanted to warn my mother 
about the snake. I yelled to my mother about the snake, but I didn’t tell her where the snake was. 
Fortunately, my mother slowly approached me and asked me where the snake was. I told her, the 
snake was just behind her. Later on, the snake moved from its attack position and rolled itself. 
Meanwhile, my mother asked me to run quickly to call my aunt or my uncle for help. 
I continue to wonder about the meaning of that experience or “encounter” in my life, and 
the value I received with the “white bird and the snake”. If the snake bit my mother, I am sure I 
would not be here writing these lines. Was nature (forest) communicating with me, in the 
materialized body of a white bird to warn of a danger? Experiences like this one are at the center 
of how I value nature and try to understand how nature communicates with humans, and how 
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humans don’t listen or are even breaking their relationship with nature. As Descola (1996) 
asserts on communications across species boundaries, where there is communication, there is 
intentionality and there is consciousness. Where there is consciousness, there is life (I discuss 
this in detail in Chapter 4).  
I also have been educated in a Western model of learning and thinking, where the 
dominant way of knowing negates the other’s way of life, or just engage with what they 
understand and ignore what they cannot (Cadena, 2010). How can I explain experiences such as 
the “white bird and the snake”, or how can an experience of the Napo Runa of Wamaní be 
translated to other people? Can others capture that experience as their own and for what purposes 
will they use it? I have been afraid to tell or explain people about “earth-beings and humans” 
experiences because I felt afraid of being the object of bullying or being laughed at in the 
“modern” or “civilized” world. However, there is abundant research disrupting the western 
thinking monopoly, such as analyzing the earth-beings, trans-specific communication, dialogical 
animacy, beyond the human, and sentient entities (Cadena, 2010, 2015; Descola, 1996; Kohn, 
2013; Uzendoski, 2005; Uzendoski & Whitten, 2014). Also, the incongruences and 
contradictions of PES programs (Nicolás Kosoy & Corbera, 2010; McElwee, 2012; Van Hecken, 
Bastiaensen, & Windey, 2015) can  “open doors” for the emergence of alternative 
understandings of the world (Cadena, 2010), and towards more localized PES programs (Van 
Hecken, Bastiaensen, & Huybrechs, 2015).  
My grandparents, my parents, and many Napo Runa have experienced and felt the reality 
of what it means to live in a society that is not theirs. The haciendas, the Catholic religion, the 
Independence wars, the exploitation of rubber and quinine, the production of rice, oil 
exploitation, mining, the strong presence of the central state, the processes of colonization, 
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struggles for land tenure, programs and economic projects such as the production of coffee, 
cocoa, the opening of roads, and the creation of national parks and reserves of the biosphere. 
These are processes that have touched life itself and possibly eroded the cosmovision of the 
Napo Runa. PES programs such as PSB can exist only among the Napo Runa because of the 
connections of their western understanding of disassociation nature from people, or its equivalent 
to their materialistic and monetization process of the forest. In this sense, storytelling also 
represents a powerful tool that breaks and resists the PES model of materializing the forest and 
converting it into an object that can be abstracted for circulation. Storytelling transmits the vivid 
aspect of socioenvironmental values necessary to continue conserving the forest not only for the 
life of the Napo Runa, but to conserve the forest for Life. 
Sacha Runa and PSB 
In previous sections, I talked explicitly about my identity and association with indigenous 
organizations. I am a Napo Runa. I grew up in the City of Coca and live in the City of Loreto (45 
minutes from Coca by car) in the Province of Orellana in the Northern Ecuadorian Amazon. 
Framing this research from a Napo Runa perspective entails a big responsibility, transparency, 
and an expectation of justice. I asked for authorization from indigenous leaders at FOIN to allow 
me to enter the communities they represent, and to speak with members of communities such as 
Wamaní. In Wamaní, I asked and received authorization from its members to do my research in 
their community. I believe that the Napo Runa must begin to speak strongly about our rights to 
decide our own future in the terms according to our realities, the history, the territory, the myths, 
the songs, the spirits, the nature, and the socioenvironmental values or sacha runa.  
In the Napo Runa world – pacha, or human-nonhuman interrelationships, are transformed 
by experiential knowledge (ricsina), with cultural knowledge (yachana), and visioning 
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experience (muscuna) (Whitten, 2008) all them linked by affiliations (muntun) (discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4). I base my analysis on observations of everyday life in Napo Runa 
communities such as Wamaní, and on my understanding of the values that my grandparents have 
taught me through storytelling, about their relationship with forest, and about human-nature 
practices, in the form of hunting, fishing, harvesting, singing and others social activities, cultural 
struggles, and forms of survival. For Napo Runa, sacha runa informs the complex relationship 
that they have with the environment. Specifically, those reveal that there is not a divide among 
them, but a world that emerges from complex arrays of associations between living and non-
living beings (Kohn, 2013). For example, this human-nonhuman experience was shared by a 
member of Wamaní Community, where PSB is today implemented:  
“Sometimes also in the rivers, it is like people [beings] walk, in the Rumipanga estuary. 
Then, as a person-like comes [who has a footprint like] horse -truc, truc, truc-, stones 
were turning -tric, tric, tric- and [after that] I see, it does not appear and there is no more, 
it is finished [everything is silenced], then there is a [being] “alive” who walks, like 
taking care of [life]. There is that “power”, but thus getting to contact the forest itself. 
Everything has been here, “previously” [ancient times] that is why they [the grandfathers] 
have known to be great “bosses” but now they [people] have all thrown [forgotten]. In 
ancient times, more straight [more obvious] was. People [beings] revealed there. A 
“person” looked out when I was young, in a farm that was going to be mine, I saw him. 
There was a “little man” dressed in pure green, green, green. It looked [this being], from 
afar [I] see him as 20 meters he walked, there is a stick [dry tree] that stands, arrives 
[there] and [I wait] when he will pass by me to say hello, “pun” is over [never happened]. 
Then I saw [a being] alive in the forest. There are living beings in the forest that can be 
contacted with [the] human. If [we destroy] the forest, [those beings] would end forever” 
(my translation).  
      Lino Licui, Napo Runa, Wamaní, 2019 
This statement is about experience-stories in the Napo Runa socioenvironment or sacha 
runa. It reflects the complex non lineal process of creating, being and transform involving space-
time. Runa people experience the life of the forest as something that can sometimes materialize 
or embody in the form of a being, animate or inanimate. Lino’s story embraces the life and 
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livelihoods in the Ecuadorian Amazon, as it connects with the life itself among the forest and the 
earth-beings. It connects with the lands, the water, the winds, and that is one way of create value.  
If I were listening to this storytelling in the tullpa (close to the fire), as many people do in 
the forest, I can be connected easily, as if it were me experiencing that. Storytelling becomes 
vivid like that; it becomes a powerful process to continue valuing the forest and all its 
configurations and expressions that it entails. Lino’s story, paraphrasing Rose (2008), is in 
motion; it connects the present, the past and the future, and it is all around us. Storytelling allows 
it to become your own experience, to be shared and later to be appropriated. In the shadows of 
powerful explanations of hegemonic projects, as used by westernized peoples and governments, 
indigenous peoples use a ‘familiar image’ to tell a tale that encompasses the complex forms of 
seeing the world. The forest is not only the land, it is something else; it is the engagement of 
actual, past and future conditions conceptualized into a being.  
This dissertation amplifies these experiences by engaging with the life of the Napo Runa 
people of Comuna Wamaní. Putting my experiences and those of the people of Wamaní together, 
my goal is to make visible the intrinsic relationship between the Napo Runa of the forest and the 
living forest. This dissertation seeks to understand whether PES, as a top-down strategy of 
conservation, could articulate with the grassroots efforts towards strengthening indigenous rights 
and under what conditions. It is critical to analyze how the Napo Runa understand their own 
relationship with nature and how they work with different framings of nature valuation, as these 
are the foundations of management that produced the territories valued by PES programs. This 
dissertation thus analyzes how the intrinsic value of the forest has influenced Napo Runa ways of 
living, specifically at Wamaní, where PSB is currently operating, and how this intrinsic value 
resists or is being molded or transformed. If misrecognized and undervalued, indigenous 
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knowledge and practices of nature protection could disappear, allowing more ecological and 
cultural devastation, and undermining desirable forms of grassroots knowledge (Redford & 
Stearman, 2003). 
As the subsequent chapters illustrate, I argue that PSB is not built to recognize how the 
Napo Runa value kinship and respect as a way of ‘seeing’ nonhuman natures. The Napo Runa 
often feel they have to adopt other forms of relating with nature, i.e., other identities, to generate 
spaces for survival. They might also feel that they must contest these and forge other identities 
and forms of social empowerment and persuasion, to secure access to resources, and secure 
lands.  
Is PES problematic to the Napo Runa? At first glance, yes! However, in this research, I 
don’t want to explore a binary of good or bad PES programs. Rather, I explore the expressions of 
Napo Runa people with PSB, in terms of their multiple identities, actions, strategies that they 
adopt to continue existing as culture – muntun. The multiplicity of identities, strategic actions 
taken by the Napo Runa people of the Ecuadorian Amazon that I describe in this dissertation 
have allowed them to continue exercising their traditional forms of existence, as well as to 
continue adapting and exploring others strategies to achieve their way of living. My dissertation 
is sympathetic with the proposal that local socio-political processes shape how PES contributes 
to the consolidation of existing or emerging social transformations (Van Hecken, Bastiaensen, & 
Huybrechs, 2015) that promote cultural self-determination, but also cautions against westernized 






Outline of chapters 
 
This dissertation in organized in five chapters.  
Chapter 1, Programa Socio Bosque, describes the sociocultural entanglements of this 
voluntary conservation agreement and monetary recognition.  First, I analyze PES theory and its 
current critiques. I describe how the concept of Ecosystem Services became hegemonic under 
neoliberal logics of environmental governance, and how PSB is linked to PES schemes. Then, I 
describe how the Socio Bosque Program works, focusing on its technical design and rationalities. 
The chapter concludes with an analysis of how PES works in place, that is, the technologies and 
mechanisms through which PES takes root in a community, and how (and whether) its 
mechanisms are challenged and adapted to fit local dynamics.  
Chapter 2, Community Adaptation/Appropriation and PSB, examines how the Napo 
Runa in the community of Wamaní, where the state-sponsored PES program Socio Bosque 
(PSB) is currently implemented, articulate indigenous valuations of nature with the logics, 
design, and value schemes of PES. Communities, for example, talk about Community 
Environmental Services as an alternative to PES, which signals how they bring together different 
ways of recognizing socioenvironmental values and how they understand PSB in their own 
terms.  
Chapter 3, (Neo) Colonial Practices of Land Appropriation and PSB, provides an 
overview of how a series of property regimes have shaped current forms of land ownership in the 
Amazon, particularly for the Napo Runa. While for some, property defines rights and obligations 
under the law, property can also be seen as a scheme of land appropriation. I draw on property 
scholarship to provide a genealogy of the role of the idea of property in the Ecuadorian Amazon. 
I use a historical geography approach to map how property has been changing or adapting its 
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meaning to historical, cultural, political and environmental contexts in the Ecuadorian Amazon. 
Then, I reflect on how these settlement schemes shape the settlement of the Napo Runa. Finally, 
I turn to how technical environmental narratives and requirements associated with Programa 
Socio Bosque are operationalized through historical practices of enclosure, control, and spatial 
reconfiguration that have shaped the settlement of the Ecuadorian Amazon.     
In Chapter 4, Disentangling Narratives of Sacha Runa, I explore how the life in the forest 
is not lineal. The Napo Runa are the coming together of multiple identities and forms of 
adaptations in order to survive. The Napo Runa have been exposed to the Western life, but the 
life or the mode of living in the forest is not disconnected when it moves across different worlds. 
In this sense, it seems that people form assemblages with different forms that create, move, and 
permeate in response to and to create multiple possibilities. The connections with the past, and 
the connection with the future is present in their life. The chapter moves away from a critique of 
the singular Ecosystem Service Metaphor based on monetary evaluations, and towards 
recognizing valuation schemes that take into account the complexity of human and nonhuman 
interrelationships (Kosoy & Corbera, 2010; Norgaard, 2010). The chapter introduces the concept 
acto sutil de repetición or “subtle act of repetition,” to discuss how PSB works, discusses notions 
of indigenous territorialities –indigenous property regimes-- and further develops muntun as a 
form of political action. 
Chapter 5 provides a Conclusion that connects the chapters and opens a space for future 




CHAPTER 1: PROGRAMA SOCIO BOSQUE: ENTANGLED VOLUNTARY 
CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS AND MONETARY RECOGNITION 
 
Introduction 
One of the best known conservation initiatives in the Amazon Basin is Payments for 
Ecosystem Services (PES), which stands for schemes where landowners receive monetary 
compensation for setting aside native forests to preserve ecosystem services (de Koning et al., 
2011; Pokorny et al., 2012). The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) report defines 
ecosystem services as services that benefit the common good, including services that support life 
(e.g., nutrient recycling), provide resources (e.g., food and water), regulate life (e.g., carbon 
sequestration and decomposition), and support wellbeing (e.g., cultural and spiritual) 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Different societies around the world are called to 
participate in these programs and asked to adapt their land uses to address challenges associated 
with climate change (Dowling, 2010) and conservation. However, local social and political 
dynamics often are not taken into account in the construction of climate change adaptation 
programs and natural resource management (Coombes et al., 2012). Moreover, though PES 
programs are promoted to both protect biodiversity and combat poverty (Pattanayak et al., 2010), 
some have failed to fulfill expectations due to weak financial incentives, high costs, inability to 
promote intergenerational equity and property rights, and the weak incorporation and recognition 
of local conceptions of socioenvironmental relations (Bakker, 2010; Nicolas Kosoy et al., 2008; 
Pokorny et al., 2012).  
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In this chapter, I investigate how PES works in the Ecuadorian Amazon. I focus on the 
technologies and mechanisms through which PES takes root in communities, and how (and 
whether) these technologies and mechanisms are challenged and adapted to fit local dynamics. 
I base my analysis on observations of the experience of the Napo Runa of the community of 
Wamaní with a PES program called Programa Socio Bosque (PSB), and on my own 
experiences as a Napo Runa. In Ecuador, PSB has sought to enroll different indigenous 
peoples, with the aim to contribute to the protection and conservation of the forest and 
biodiversity, and to promote cultural survival through monetary support for housing, education, 
and other needs (de Koning et al., 2011). The Napo Runa, or “human being” of Napo (referring 
specifically to the peoples settled on the Napo River basin), live mainly in the Amazonian 
Provinces of Orellana and Napo. For them, forest and biodiversity ensure cultural survival and 
support local livelihoods (Lu, Bilsborrow, & Oña, 2012; T. Macdonald, 1999; Uzendoski, 
2005). However, while much attention has focused on the effects of neoliberal ideas of value 
and property of PSB on indigenous communities, less has been said about how the Napo Runa 
positionality, their experiences with Ecuadorian nation-making, and their struggles for survival 
within (and despite) settler systems of assimilation and dispossession, matter to the workings of 
PSB. The Napo Runa is not a static, ahistorical category, but one forged through a long history 
of colonial encounters. I argue that environmental discourses and moral ecologies tie these 
colonial histories to environmental management programs, shaping how PSB is established and 
managed, and ultimately adapted to the local socioenvironmental dynamics of Napo Runa 
communities.  
At the onset of my research, I sought to map and account for the differences between 
neoliberal and indigenous conceptions of environment, and how these distinct ways of valuing 
26 
 
and knowing environments become entangled in the technologies and ideologies of PSB. I asked: 
Does PSB challenge how indigenous peoples relate to nature’s services or vice versa? Like other 
PES programs, PSB uses a neoliberal version of environmental economics to address ecological 
degradation (Heynen, McCarthy, Prudham, & Robbins, 2007; McAfee, 1999) and equity in 
valuation methods (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). I used ethnography, autoethnography, and 
archival research to collect empirical evidence on how Napo Runa people understand PSB. As I 
furthered my study, I found out that how PSB works is also challenged by Napo Runa 
socioenvironmental values, or sacha runa. In other words, PSB is as a much a result of ideas of 
market integration and neoliberal valuation as of how communities use their collective vision of 
forest life to challenge the terms and mechanisms of engagement, incorporation, and 
participation. 
The next sections contextualize and deepen this proposition. First, I outline how 
Indigenous scholars studying PES are seeking to re-orient these programs towards greater 
attention to local dynamics, in general, and Indigenous rights, more specifically. I draw from 
Political Ecology and Indigenous Geography to examine how technical environmental narratives 
are enrolled in political and economic momentum for enclosure, control, and reconfiguration of 
indigenous spaces (Coombes, Johnson, & Howitt, 2013; Heynen et al., 2007). Second, I describe 
PSB in Ecuador, tracing its formative moments and shifts as it was forged through legislative 
contexts and political agendas, arguing that PSB is a flexible program, but that this flexibility is 






Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) and Indigenous Geographies 
Theoretical and disciplinary foundations of the original concept of PES 
The concept of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) has evolved over time. It has 
been adapted to different local conditions (historical, institutions, social justice, and researchers). 
PES has been contested and promoted in different ways by local practitioners, the government 
and by scientists. The idea of Payments for Ecosystem Services originates from neoclassical 
economic ideas, especially how to deal with the market failure problem, in which the market 
does not include the value of environmental services. The development of Environmental 
Economics (which focuses on developing valuation methods) supported the idea of giving 
monetary value to environmental services. The goal is to include these externalities in the cost of 
production, so people that use Environmental Services pay or contribute to secure the 
Environmental Services. In this sense, PES has its origin in the idea that the Earth’s nature 
provides “services” to sustain life, especially human life. Gómez-Baggethun et al. (2010) argue 
that the origin of the ecosystem services conceptualizations dates back to the 1970s, based on a 
utilitarian perspective of nature’s services to call public attention. Later, the development of 
nature’s services valuation methods increased public attention more broadly. Later, the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2003, brought international attention to the programs 
around the world. With the idea that nature provides services, later came the concept to pay or 
give gratification to those local landowners through an “agreement”.  
As Erik Gomez-Baggethun et al. (2010) argue, the concept of ecosystem service was a 
pedagogical effort to call the attention to conserve Earth’s resources to sustain life, but that 
conceptualizations have moved to different directions and appropriations. Over time, PES has 
evolved rapidly to different conceptualizations and sometimes without much critical discussion. 
The book Nature’s Services, edited by Daily (1997), provides insight and a call for action, 
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demanding that “something” be done to protect “ecosystem services” (Earth’s natural ecosystem 
services). Ecosystem Services are “conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, 
and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human life (Daily, 1997, p. 3). This 
seminal book calls attention to the benefits that natural ecosystems provide to humans, and raises 
questions on how those benefits can be valued and how to communicate this knowledge to the 
general population. Daily acknowledges the complex arrangement of species needed to sustain 
human life. However, in an effort to translate those complexities to general audiences, she 
simplifies these when enclosed within the concept of Ecosystem Services. The concept captures 
and communicates conditions and services, for example, the purification of air and water, 
mitigation of floods, climate stabilization, pest control, and natural aesthetic and cultural relief, 
among others. This “translation” via conceptual simplification aims to demonstrate the value of 
nature’s ecosystem services using the language of environmental and ecological economics.  
Later on, Heal (2000), based on Daily’s arguments, developed a more market-based 
approach to justify the protection of ecosystem services. According to him, the market can serve 
to repair and maintain basic environmental systems intact and functioning well. He uses the idea 
of “earthkeeping” (similar to housekeeping) and the notion that “someone” has to pay for it. Why 
the market? He argues that the market is a sophisticated and versatile social institution, with little 
bureaucracy and the ability for self-management. He illustrates his argument with the metaphor 
of the house.  Houses, he says, function as natural ecosystems. Houses supply local climate 
services, and their infrastructures supply water and energy. Similarly, according to Heal (2000), 
natural ecosystems provide “essential low-level infrastructure upon which human activities and 
built systems rest” (p. 3). In order to protect them, Heal suggests using the idea of the market 
system. These services are “business opportunities” that increase people’s income by providing 
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goods and services that others need and want. In this analogy with housekeeping, ecosystem 
services can function be sustained via the market. He also introduces concepts such the “free 
rider problem”, public vs private goods, private costs vs social costs, property rights, the 
commodification of natural services, and the institutions needed to operate the Ecosystem 
Services Market to describe how market-based mechanisms can be used to address the protection 
of ecosystem services.  
Pagiola, Landell-Mills, & Bishop (2012) further develop ideas of Market-based 
mechanisms for forest conservation and development, focusing on watershed protection, 
biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration. They sought to understand the different 
market based environmental services initiatives, how they worked, how they succeed, and make 
to create a general framework on the value of this mechanism. One of their main points is that 
markets can fail to adequately value forest services –leading to their undervaluation-- because 
forest services are perceived as externalities or public goods. Rather than thinking about the 
market value of crops, they argue about the value and benefits that forests represent when 
avoiding to be converted in crops. For them, the market failure in forest valuation is due to the 
lack of information about which natural services are important, the lack of funds for conservation 
programs, political pressures, and the lack of education programs that communicate the benefits 
of forests. One of their proposed solutions to market failures is to create a market for these 
services, which allows “selling” the services provided by forest in order to increase private 
benefits of conservation to individuals. This, they argue, may result in changing their natural use 
behavior, and may generate funding to support conservation programs.  
According to Pagiola, Landell-Mills, & Bishop (2012), market based mechanisms emerge 
over time and according to local circumstances. Their analysis pivots around showing different 
30 
 
“successes.” Some case studies examined are FONAFIPO (Costa Rica), FONAG (Quito), Shade-
grown coffee (Chiapas, Mexico and Salvador), and Scolel Te (Chiapas, Mexico). They also 
argue that marked-based mechanisms provide efficiency, effectiveness and equity in the 
distribution of cost and benefits, as a “win-win” with a supply and demand process.  
Taking a different approach to market-based ideas, Wunder (2005) provides a more detailed 
conceptualization of Payment for Ecosystem Services, as a voluntary, well-defined 
environmental service, which is bought by a minimum of one buyer, from a minimum of one 
provider, with defined conditions. The basic ideas is that beneficiaries of ecosystem services 
make direct conditional payments to local landowners and practitioners for practices that secure 
the conservation of ecosystems. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder (2008), further argue that the 
beneficiaries pay for the services they get, though scale, local social, cultural, political dynamics 
play an important role in the implementation of these payments for ecosystem services. 
Therefore, the critical point for the success of PES programs is its design, the service and the 
institutions (formal law).  
It is not easy to trace a direct or linear evolution of PES. For understanding how PES 
work, it is best to follow what Engel, Pagiola and Wunder (2008) argue, which is that place-
dynamics play a crucial factor in how PES programs function. PES can be hybrid because they 
can include “command and control-regulations,” or PES can be part of a large policy mix, etc. 
There are also PES-like programs, which do not cohere with the definition proposed by Wunder 
because they involve government-led proposals (as opposed to private ones), as in the case of the 
Socio Bosque program in Ecuador. Some programs, like in Mexico, just moved from 
conservation programs toward PES like. Moreover, there are no guarantees to how a PES 
program might function. Sometimes, PES is appropriated by practitioners, or sometimes it is 
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rejected by local landholders. The evolution in theory also depends on how PES performs in 
practice, the availability of funds, and the institutions supporting this kind of market based 
conservation program. Regardless of these particularities, PES appears to be adapting and 
moving away from the neoclassical model that prioritize a pure market based approach to a more 
local based adapted policy. 
Critical Scholarship on PES 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) has increased worldwide in the last two decades 
as a pathway for reducing native ecosystem loss. In developing countries, PES has also been 
promoted as a way to alleviate and combat poverty and provide economic alternatives 
(Pattanayak et al., 2010; Pokorny et al., 2012). While PES is offered as an economic alternative 
through conservation, its implementation often responds to concerns of property and market 
function, and less as a “tool” to challenge dispossession (Mansfield, 2009, p. 496). I am 
sympathetic to Coombes, Johnson, & Howitt's (2013) proposal, which urges geographers to 
better understand the consequences of formal environmental governance arrangements—such as 
PES – on Indigenous rights. For instance, while environmental geographers pay attention to 
questions of environmental transformation of Amazonian spaces at regional and global scales 
(e.g., the relationship between deforestation and climate-vegetation changes) (Cuenca, Robalino, 
Arriagada, & Echeverría, 2018; Holland et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2010; Mena, Bilsborrow, & 
McClain, 2006) or the contentious political economy of such landscape transformations (Lu, 
2007; Perreault, 2003), the emphasis on these “broader scale” questions often obscures how 
proposed localized “solutions” affect indigenous communities. As Coombes et al. (2013) stress, 
geographical practice must include the conflation of Indigenous and local, and towards analysis 
of the broader discursive and political implications of environmental activism. As they suggest, 
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ignoring this sticky conflation of Indigenous as local—and, therefore, as particular—in 
questions of environmental change reproduces long-standing ignorance about how historically-
sedimented resource alienation and poverty are connected to barriers to Indigenous participation 
in environmental management such as PES. Indigenous Geography scholarship thus stresses the 
need for taking into account how these histories intersect with indigenous motivations to 
participate (or not), and how such decisions are shot through with deeply-rooted reclamation for 
sovereignty, dignity, and justice (Frantz & Howitt, 2012; Larsen & Johnson, 2012; Palmer, 
2016). 
In the context of these interventions by Indigenous geographers, I see PES as an 
opportunity for understanding and learning how different systems of knowledge can co-exist and 
influence each other in ways that respect the dignity and agency of Indigenous knowledges. 
Geography, with its emphasis on comparative and interdisciplinary approaches, can hold space 
for wider debates in the emergent indigenous sub-disciplines and areas of research such as 
Indigenous Geographies. For Panelli (2008, p. 807), “rather than continuing to replicate 
modernist traditions and compartmentalized specialisms, Indigenous geographies are especially 
valuable for pointing to the complex intersections between what might previously have been 
considered the separate environmental, social, economic, political, cultural and legal geographies 
of an issue or place”. Indigenous Geographies, pushes for accountability and ethical clarity in 
how knowledge is produced, by whom, and for whom (Coombes et al., 2013; Larsen & Johnson, 
2012; Tuck, 2015), and how the construct of “resource management” smuggles deeply colonial 
logics (Whyte, 2018). I believe it is important for indigenous and non-indigenous geographies to 
join efforts for a new form of geographic inquiry and knowledge that complement traditional 
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forms of knowledge generation and formation (Panelli, 2008). Next, I outline three areas that I 
see as fruitful for this joint engagement in matters of PES. 
How should ‘the local’ be engaged? 
Over the last decade, scholars have emphasized the need for PES to be attentive to local 
environmental relationships. As Muller (2008) observes, environmental service provision needs 
to be recognized and valuated in different contexts, circumstances, local realities and historical 
backgrounds. Otherwise, it risks causing more harm than benefits. Dressler et al. (2012, p. 10) 
argue, for example, that “[d]espite carbon credits and payment schemes being based on 
standardized measurements, reporting and verification, the socio-political, economic and 
environmental context in which carbon and its resources are commodified informs who stands to 
benefit and lose by the ways in which REDD plus unfolds in context.” In some cases, PES is 
designed and implemented according to social frameworks and political realities (Corbera, 2012; 
Shapiro-Garza, 2013; Van Hecken & Bastiaensen, 2010). When analyzing the local impacts of 
PES, for example, Alix-Garcia and Wolff (2014, p. 376) argue that those programs “impact both 
the owners and the purchasers of these services, and the information currently available does 
little to help us quantify the welfare effects of these new relationships.” In a case study analyzed 
by Pokorny et al. (2012) in the Amazon region, including Southern Ecuador, PES programs were 
not seen as attractive to indigenous people because they preferred other more lucrative forms of 
land use, such as timber harvesting. In this sense, PES programs “have failed to fulfil 
development expectations: the financial attractiveness of the proposed management schemes has 
been limited and implementation was expensive” (p. 397).  
As Coombes, Johnson, & Howitt (2013) propose, including indigenous worldviews into 
the implementation of PES programs can be one way to start addressing these concerns. For 
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them, “[c]ontextualized in approaches to understanding Indigenous peoples’ sense of place as 
connection and belonging, this work emphasizes the distinctiveness of local ontologies and 
reframes national-scale policy initiatives and local actions for self-determination in both 
relational and postcolonial terms” (p. 694). In other words, the agency and history-making 
processes of indigenous peoples’ are relevant. Instead of romanticizing connections between 
nature and community, researchers should consider how Indigenous peoples’ negotiate and 
conceptualize alternatives that bring hope to their communities (Coombes et al., 2013). In this 
sense, indigenous adapting and changing knowledge, such as the concepts of responsibility and 
autonomy, may offer lessons about how to ground activism in place-based politics, alliance-
building, and alternatives views and proposals for decolonization. In other words, proposing new 
concepts as alternatives to “development”, such as the Sumak Kawsay or Good Living, will not 
be fulfilled if indigenous rights and ways of living are not structurally embedded in PES 
programs. Otherwise, PES is a mere monetary and environmental program and indigenous 
territories are sites for reproducing postcolonial extractive development (Coombes et al., 2012). 
Pattanayak et al. (2010) suggest a more optimistic analysis that focuses on the potential 
for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation program -REDD+ to 
improve PES system, as its adaptability, large international resources, and development of 
technological tools can serve to measure and monitor processes related to carbon storage. 
However, Dressler, McDermott, Smith, & Pulhin (2012) argue that giving monetary incentives 
for participants to avoid deforestation on ‘carbon-rich’ forestlands “will only facilitate local 
social differentiation, reinforcing the economic standing of the relatively wealthy, whilst 
potentially undermining the income of land and forest poor farmers” (p. 11). The inconsistence 
of the PES programs, they suggest, create institutional and social outcomes render illegitimate 
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processes and allow renegotiations. In other words, participants are able to renegotiate 
conditionalities or appropriate the PES according to their own terms and objectives.    
Incentives or motivations? 
Scholars also have critiqued the reliance on “incentives” and propose that PES move 
towards the notion of “motivations.” Kosoy et al. (2008), for example, suggest that PES move 
away from a “matter of compensating for opportunity costs” and towards “how non-monetary 
individual and collective motivations, such as the need for technical capacity training, 
biodiversity conservation for intergenerational equity, and reaffirmation of property rights 
among others, can be strengthened and supported through PES programmes” (p. 2081). In other 
words, PES can be seen as an opportunity for indigenous peoples. In this sense, Muller (2008), in 
a case study of Indigenous Peoples of Australia, considers PES as a good opportunity to improve 
the livelihood of Indigenous participants, especially of those who are members of one the poorest 
and most disadvantaged sectors of society. Similarly, Coombes et al. (2012) argue that 
indigenous peoples’ motivations in environmental litigation and disputes are connected to 
broader objectives of realization such as the reclamation of sovereignty over indigenous 
territories, and the resistance to capitalism and colonialism in which those reclamations do not 
need to be considered as simple mere means of conflicts. The indigenous people’s motivations 
are those objectives that allow them to gain autonomy over natural resources in order to maintain 
cultural heritage, values, and the use of local or indigenous knowledge to encounter other 
alternative ways to the “development” processes.  
On the other hand, for Kosoy et al. (2008, p. 2082), payments, in the form of “monetary 
compensations through PES, provide a moral incentive for forest conservation but may not 
necessarily improve the overall economic efficiency of the resource management system” 
36 
 
because the root causes of poverty are not eliminated. For McElwee (2015), a PES program 
needs to ‘add value’ to environmental protection or local livelihood benefits. Communities and 
indigenous peoples with larger forest areas may not get promised economic benefits due to its 
internal governance dynamics, and because the minimal financial return as payments need to be 
divided between the families or its members (Pokorny et al., 2012). In this sense, where large 
communities manage PES programs, the benefits in creating employment or economic 
opportunities may go to a select few families (especially leaders), reproducing the exclusion to 
those people who participate of the program but the benefit is still insignificant.  
How should participation and access to benefits look? 
PES programs set up the following condition: to participate, a community must choose 
what they wish to emphasize-- economic or environmental conservation values. Several issues 
arise in relation to this trade-off. First, one of the biggest pressures that Amazonian peoples face 
is the need to secure economic resources to meet needs such as food, health and education 
services (Lu et al., 2012). At the same time, among these societies, the elder population, that is, 
those with expertise in non-capitalist forms of valuing nonhuman natures, is declining (Grefa, 
2014). Moreover, many young generations do not necessarily recognize indigenous heritage as a 
valuable part of their identity; traditional ecological knowledges are not transferred across 
generations the way they used to, due to increased access and connection to non-indigenous 
worlds and to decreased dependence on forest relations. Thus, while some scholars see PES as a 
good opportunity to improve living and environmental conditions, the fact that PES programs 
focus on the conservation value of the forest rather than on its socio-cultural embeddeness, can 
be problematic to cultural survival. For example, participation in PES programs has implied a 
reduction in the use of locally-adapted production schemes, while at the same time creating new 
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relations of dependency with markets and other non-local relationships, reinforcing and 
developing new existing paternalistic structures (Pokorny et al. 2012). 
Second, the inequities associated with how benefits are distributed within participating 
communities can increase over time. Pokorny et al., (2012, p. 398), for example, question 
whether markets are contributing to sustainable development “considering the extreme social 
inequalities at local, national and global level and the claim for additionality and effectiveness of 
invested payments strongly limiting the possibilities for establishing mechanisms enabling a fair 
share of costs and benefits.” Pattanayak et al. (2010) also explore the segregation and exclusion 
processes reproduced under PES programs, including the conditions and metrics under which 
participants are eligible to the program; how the ratio of payments to provision costs is 
distributed, and how insecure property rights matter to and are affected by participation in PES. 
Exclusion is not only related to the direct participation; its direct or indirect impacts also need to 
be addressed. The implications are on the farm size of the participants; the increase in food 
prices as a result of the implementation of PES due to the considerable farmland reduction; and 
the issues of available land for crops which may be translated to other places or territories.  
Third, related to the bounding of participation, is the question of already existing 
relations of market-state-communities. “PES is not first of all about moving from public policies 
to market allocations. It is more about a reconfiguration of state-market-community 
relationships” (McElwee, 2012, p. 422). Is the State attempting to achieve hegemony by 
boundary-making through both cultural elements and economic power? In this case, PES could 
also be another form of domination to maintain political and economic hegemony in indigenous 
territories. Sletto (2009, p. 272) argues that Indigenous “cultural displays, such as the symbolic 
representations of boundaries, are in fact ‘complex, heterogeneous, and possibly even contested 
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at the local level’ and the purposes of such displays ‘may not correspond neatly with 
anthropologists’ or other outsiders’ expectations.” PES programs need to consider the means of 
indigenous people in relation to state boundary-making because the boundaries are inherently 
informed by inequalities in power, the market relationship of power, the integration into 
capitalist economies, and the competing narratives of the history, place and belonging that 
characterize indigenous peoples (Coombes, Johnson, & Howitt, 2012). 
Programa Socio Bosque – PSB in Ecuador 
Ecuador is one of the world’s mega-diverse countries (Bass et al., 2010) but, in the last 
decades, deforestation has deteriorated natural ecosystems because of limited or inadequate 
environmental regulations (Mena et al., 2006). From 1990-2000, the country’s deforestation rate 
was estimated at 198,000 ha per year (De Koning et al., 2011). Investment in environmental 
projects in the 2000s had been marginal relative to total state spending. For example, in 2003, the 
environmental investment was 0.39% of the PGE (presupuesto general del estado) 
(SENPLADES, 2009). By early 2007, the Ministry of the Environment (MAE) was plagued by 
institutional weakness, and subject to continuous budget reductions and deregulatory policies 
that put the country’s environmental sector in a serious governance problem (Lascano, 2015). To 
strengthen environmental regulation, the MAE proposed management decentralization. 
However, this instrument has not been fully implemented; in many cases, decentralization has 
met problems defining roles and responsibilities, and has struggled to create funding allocation 
mechanisms. According to Lascano (2015), most of these applied coercive and top-down 
environmental strategies, which in turn made systems susceptible to corruption.  
PSB exemplifies a shift in Ecuador’s history of command-and-control environmental 
programs brought about through political interests and intense social mobilization. Since 2007, 
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with the election of President Rafael Correa, conservation programs have been embedded into 
state conservation practice via the Plan Nacional Para el Buen Vivir (PNPBV) and later, through 
constitutional mandate. The 2008 Constitution made Ecuador one of the first countries to 
establish the constitutional rights of nature. For example, Objective 4 of the 2009-2013 national 
development plan seeks to “guarantee the rights of nature and promote a healthy and sustainable 
environment” (SENPLADES, 2009, p. 11). The new administration urged the drafting of a new 
constitution that included the explicit naming of the rights of nature, the elaboration of Sumak 
Kawsay or Buen Vivir (Living Well) as a guiding national principle, and a reorienting of 
international and economic policies. In that context, according to Lascano, former PSB manager, 
the President asked to the MAE Ministry, Marcela Aguiñaga, the creation of a system of 
monetary compensation for people who hold forest (Personal interview, April 6, 2018). While 
previous PES programs had existed at smaller scales under the direction of private entities such 
as in Pimampiro municipality and with the Indigenous Chachis reserve (Albán, Suárez, & 
Morales, 2010), PSB was the first government-operated, market-based environmental program in 
Ecuador.2 While PSB was based on previous “pilot” experiences of PES programs, the program 
was created as a political decision – top down, marking a radical shift in environmental 
management in Ecuador.   
The PSB is a single-payer, government-operated monetary incentive that seeks to 
preserve and conserve the remnants of native forest via voluntary participation (De Koning et al., 
2011). The PSB’s design began in January 2008, and its implementation in September the same 
year. In the design process, the MAE received support from specialists working on PES 
programs in Mexico and Costa Rica, and with the support of people from the World Bank, such 
                                                          
2 In these payment for conservation pilot project, the Chachi community center decided to invest their benefits in 
social programs such as: access to water, education, and micro-enterprise initiatives (De Koning et al., 2011). 
40 
 
as a PES proponent Pagiola (Lascano, personal interview, April 6, 2018). Interestingly, 
according to Lascano, Pagiola argued against, first, paying schemes in the Amazonian forest if 
there is not any menace to ecosystem involved and, second, for the need to consider analysis of 
opportunity costs. To implement the program, the MAE assigned 1 million dollars in 2008. It 
assumed a top-down approach, due to internal political pressure (especially from President 
Correa) that launched the program without a consulting and participative process from affected 
communities. According to Lascano, if the MAE had decided to follow the path of social 
participation, Socio Bosque would never have been born (personal interview, April 6, 2018). 
PSB was created as a Ministerial Agreement, which means that it bypassed congressional or 
public debate, a condition that allowed the PSB flexibility and the ability to reformulate 
according to emerging pressures. It was established as a program with good intentions and with 
the idea of making adjustments in the process. Until 2019, PSB has invested about 70 million 
dollars, of which about 90% correspond to government funds and the rest comes from 
international cooperation. The goal is for PSB to be funded by 50% of government funds 
combined with 50% funds from international cooperation.  
How PSB works 
In its original design, PSB assumed that communities would see incentives as an 
opportunity for livelihood improvement, and that through the management of incentives they 
would become more experienced. PSB is one of the first state-led programs to provide direct 
monetary incentives to communities participating in forest conservation. The program was not 
conceived of as mere cash transfer but as a direct allocation of funds, and its logic is based on the 
idea of building community capacities. It also assumed that communities would learn to manage 
the incentives, would designate these for internal benefit.  
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To achieve agreements, all collective landholders of PSB are required to generate and 
adhere to a Social Investment Plan, intended to “collectively plan the efficient use of payments 
(incentivos)” (Ministerio del Ambiente de Ecuador, 2015, p. 8). PSB organizes investment types 
into four categories: Conservation and Territorial Strengthening; Social and Cultural 
Development; Economic Development and Subsistence and Commercial Production; and 
Organizational Strengthening and Administrative Expenses. The program assumes that these 
Investment Plans will guarantee participation rights across communities, avoid elite capture or 
other types of unequal distribution of funds, and create a grassroots community development 
built out of local and culturally particular goals.  
PSB does not aim to restrict or influence investment decisions and only uses these 
categories for data collection and analysis (Daniel de la Fuente, personal communication, April 
10, 2017). However, the Social Investment Plan begins a process of financial accounting and 
monitoring. In completing the Plan, communities and individuals create a budget listing their 
expected and agreed-upon use of PSB incentive payments. Participants must then report and 
document their expenses, at least once annually, receive approval from the community’s General 
Assembly, and then report to the program. In this case, participation has multiple interpretations. 
On the one hand, the Social Investment Plan may be a time-consuming, cumbersome, or socially 
fraught process that brings a new degree of state oversight to community financial affairs. It also 
may be an instrument that ensures equitable and inclusive decision-making, promotes 
community participation, encourages effective livelihood improvement strategies, or builds 
useful relationships with powerful intermediaries. 
The program has a scale of procedures for insufficient reporting, potentially resulting in 
payment deductions. The program uses this approach as an “instrument for internal tracking and 
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control” within the community organization (Ministerio del Ambiente de Ecuador, 2015, p. 26). 
These Investment Plans also reflect the challenges of monitoring a livelihood improvement 
program, always susceptible to inefficiency, unintended consequences, and unequal access, as 
mentioned previously. In practice, according to Lascano, community’s issues to manage 
program’s incentive, was principally due to the lack of good monitoring process in the form of 
“accompaniment” by PSB and due to community’s institutional capacity (personal interview, 
April 6, 2018). Many communities were concerned on how their leaders mismanaged the 
incentive, and asked PSB to intervene. For Lascano, mismanagement of PSB’s incentive in the 
hands of community representatives was not PSB’s problem, but a community’s problem. Also 
according to Lascano, PSB had more “issues” with indigenous communities from the Ecuadorian 
Amazon in comparison to the indigenous peoples of the Andes. This, according to him, 
represented the degree of organization experiences and learning capacity. For example, in the 
case of the Sápara nationality (another indigenous nationality of the Ecuadorian Amazon), the 
interviewee argues, they had a communal land but with two leaderships, and each of them 
wanted to participate in PSB. After, PSB’s suggestions, they had a massive assembly and 
decided to elect one leadership which allowed them to participate in PSB. Three years after the 
launch of the program, these efforts were translated to monitor the fulfillment of the social 
inversion plan of beneficiaries (Lascano, personal interview, April 6, 2018). Although this was 
limited because of staff resources; only about 47 people working at PSB. To fill that gap, the 
program allows for the assistance of outside actors like NGOs, Foundations, and Universities in 
co-constructing Investment Plans, suggesting an otherwise unscripted role of these actors in 
Socio Bosque programs on the ground.  
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Conditionalities to participate in PSB are stipulated by the contract terms. While specific 
activities and agreements seem to accommodate a degree of variation in each case, PSB does 
have a set agreement of conservation activities for participants. For forested land, landowners 
agree to protect and preserve the natural environment by refraining from clearing, changing, 
burning, grazing, or hunting the land. In Socio Páramo, a sub-program focused on Andean 
grasslands, participants must agree to refrain from agriculture, burning, semi-intensive or 
intensive grazing, hunting, or other activities that will negatively affect biodiversity. In these 
cases, Socio Bosque determines an acceptable degree of grazing. The same agreement outlines 
responsibilities of the MAE for monitoring and evaluation, as well as technical assistance 
participants require for executing the agreement (Ministerio del Ambiente de Ecuador, n.d.). A 
polemic part of the conditionalities is the issue of the return of the incentive. For example, if 
participants did not fulfill the contract or incurred any serious faults, for example, cutting down 
trees inside the Área Bajo Conservación (ABC), they are expelled from the program and must 
return the incentive.   
A flexible program design 
The PSB originally included Amazonian and coastal forests, as well as páramo high 
grasslands, and later mangroves. The project agreement in November 2008 listed three goals: 1) 
conserve forests, páramos, and other native ecosystems; 2) reduce greenhouse gases caused by 
deforestation; and 3) contribute to the improved living conditions of rural populations living in 
these areas (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2008). The program was available to individual land 
owners as well as indigenous or peasant communities and Afro-descendants who collectively 
own land (Daniel de la Fuente, personal communication, April 10, 2017). The mechanism that 
PSB uses to deliver its combined conservation and livelihood improvement goals is a direct 
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monetary incentive, given by the government to individual landowners and communities who 
agree to regularly monitor ecosystem conservation responsibilities (Lascano, personal interview, 
April 6, 2018), and legally binding through an agreement or convenio.  
The first version of PSB was destined only for individual landowners and did not 
consider communal landholders. Indigenous peoples of Ecuador keen to participate in PSB 
lobbied for changes to the Ministerial Agreement. Their lobbying was successful; PSB was 
adapted to allow indigenous peoples living in protected areas to participate by showing land 
titling before the creation of the protected area (e.g., national park) or have a management 
agreement with the MAE (Lascano, personal interview, April 6, 2018). Legally recognizing 
communal landholders in protected areas means that PSB has flexibility and can adapt it to local 
socio-political dynamics. This is important on two levels. First, expanding who PSB recognizes 
as a legal participant, indigenous movements forced the government to recognize that many 
indigenous peoples, indeed, live in National Protected Areas. Second, that recognition also opens 
the political possibility for indigenous peoples to assert their presence in protected areas as 
original peoples, meaning they were there prior to the creation of these protected areas.  
Indigenous peoples also changed the terms under which PSB programs are managed. For 
example, the use of terms such as “voluntary” and “under conservation” as characteristics of 
participation agreements came from the push back from indigenous organizations. At the 
beginning of the program, indigenous organizations had criticized the program claiming that the 
“State wants to take away lands from indigenous peoples,” impede their traditional activities, etc. 
(Lascano, personal interview, April 6, 2018). To address such accusations, PSB embedded the 
term “voluntary” in its discourse. The logic behind the change in the narrative was that people or 
communities agreed to voluntarily participate in the program; they were not pushed to 
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participate, and they assumed the responsibility of analyzing whether the program is beneficial to 
them or not. 
PSB also made changes to the operations of the MAE itself. The MAE was initially 
oriented for regulatory oversight (fiscalización). Before PSB, the connection that the MAE had 
with people was for the procurement of logging license (licencia de aprovechamiento forestal). 
PSB had a more intense connection in the field (communities) by extension officers or 
promotores (Lascano, personal interview, April 6, 2018). However, effective implementation 
required a spatial targeting framework. At the beginning, PSB did not have information about 
land tenure, forest cover information, or about the everyday and intergenerational needs of 
participants. The program used pre-existing research to estimate deforestation rates across 
Ecuador from 1990-2000. Krause & Nielsen (2014) claim that, in these measures, vegetation 
cover was used as a proxy for ecosystem service provision. Giving greater weight to 
environmental factors, PSB then generated a map listing high, medium, and low priority areas 
throughout Ecuador. Through these parameters, PSB was able to quickly define measures of 
efficiency and identify worksites for targeted implementation (de Koning et al., 2011). Spatial 
targeting entailed a ranking system including three factors: 1) deforestation threat; 2) importance 
for ecosystem services of carbon storage, water cycle regulation, and biodiversity; and 3) poverty 
levels.  
However, PSB needed a friendlier scheme with people. Using a prioritization of areas of 
intervention map, PSB officers went to “the field” to promote the program. According to 
Lascano, to prevent external criticism, PSB staff added place-relevant safeguards in the terms of 
“incentives” used (personal interview, April 6, 2018). Transparency and ease of understanding 
thus became guiding principles in this aspect. PSB opted to base incentives on the size of the 
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conservation area, with diminishing returns as landholdings grew (Lascano, personal interview, 
April 6, 2018). Thus, small plots (0-50 ha) received US $30/ha annually; 51-100 ha plots 
received $20/ha; 101-500 ha plots received $10/ha; 501-5,000 plots received $5/ha; etc. The new 
scale disaggregates individual and collective contracts as well as forest and páramo ecosystems, 
paying higher rates per hectare for smallholdings, collectively owned land, and páramo lands 
(Table 1). Payment amounts reflect the quantity under conservation agreement rather than the 
landowner’s total holdings, and payments per hectare diminish as the landholder conserves more 
land. Thus, an agreement for 75 hectares of conserved land would generate 50 x $30 + 25 x $20 
= $2000 per year. Participants could choose how much of their land to enroll based on this 
calculus, and agreed to twenty-year commitments with biannual payments. Mechanisms were put 
in place to accommodate broken contracts. After 3 years of promoting these logics, the PSB did 
not need a promotion team anymore; people interested in the program reached out to the PSB 
offices by themselves (Lascano, personal interview, April 6, 2018). 
PSB participants also quickly noted the socially-conditioned biases in payment schemes. 
In its original design, payment schemes were biased toward benefiting individual landowners 
with greater monetary recognition than communal landholders (Lascano, personal interview, 
April 6, 2018). PSB staff responded to these critiques as well. In 2011, the monetary recognition 
for indigenous peoples doubled in value, mainly as a request from indigenous communities 
holding communal property. For communal landholders, as opposed to individual owners, the 
incentive had to be distributed among a larger group of people, or distributed in development 
projects. The program’s monetary incentive for collectives and communities is still low, 
however, in comparison to what indigenous peoples expected (Juan Shiguango, personal 
interview, February 12, 2019). Later on, PSB proposed to national authorities to increase the 
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monetary retribution based on inflation indicators; however, this has not been approved due to 
national budget restrictions (Lascano, personal interview, April 6, 2018). As Krause and Loft 
point out (2013), the original incentive structure served multiple purposes: it was transparent and 
simple; it navigated the political criticisms; it operationalized the assumption that large areas 
decrease transaction costs for practitioners and opportunity costs for landowners; and it 
maximized the program’s limited budget.  
Original Incentive Scale 
(2008) 
Revised Incentive Scale (2011) 
All Contracts  
(Individual and 
Collective) 
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Table 1. Incentive scales, 2008 and 2011 
 
Room for improvement 
As an adaptable program, PSB could continue to improve and change. According to 
Lascano, the community’s Social Investment Plan needs to be contextualized in terms of 
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community development programs, decided by the same community, such as access paths 
improvements, airstrip improvements, scholarships, health, ecotourism, etc. (personal interview, 
April 6, 2018). Community development efforts are evident when reviewing where the 
incentives are designated. In that context, while PSB focuses on securing that the agreement 
works, secure the designation of the ABCs (area under conservation), provide training for forest 
monitoring and report accountabilities, its weakness was the limitation to integrate community 
development programs. PSB was expecting the support of different NGOs to move forward and 
create with the PSB’s incentive a more articulated community development programs. In some 
cases, the NGOs helped, but in others, the help was limited. In other words, communities’ 
development programs need the support of other institution for its implementation. In many 
cases, PSB’s incentive, as a public fund, is the only available source for community 
improvement projects, and is insufficient to attend larger projects demands of the community. 
For example, communities might decide to invest the program’s incentive in ecotourism projects, 
but PSB support has not gone beyond the incentive. PSB could not help in market analysis for 
such ecotourism projects because directly supporting community economic initiatives funded by 
the PSB incentive– or whether these are economically sound – is seen as beyond its competence. 
Instead, PSB administrators point to productive managing institutions such as the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Tourism, etc. It comes down to community responsibility to scale the 
projects up. One alternative could be to articulate and jointly work with other institutions and use 
PSB’s incentive as counterpart capital for projects.  
 Other areas of improvement include the conditionality related to landownership and investing 
in organization capacity. Indigenous peoples’ land tenure varies in Ecuador. In the case of the 
Waorani and Sápara, the landholdings belong to the whole indigenous nationality. However, 
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some of their members did not know that PSB was operating within their large territories (Daniel 
de la Fuente, personal communication, April 10, 2017). Also according to Lascano, other larger 
groups such as the Shuar-Arutam are organized territorially in 6 associations that conform 45 
centers or centros. However, the landholder is its large umbrella organization, the Consejo de 
Gobierno del Pueblo Shuar-Arutam. In this case, PSB signed an agreement with the larger 
holding organization representatives but PSB was not socialized in each of the 45 centros 
(personal interview, April 6, 2018). According to my interview, one alternative will be to provide 
training to indigenous leaders to socialize the PSB to the other members.  
Finally, the conditions to return the incentive has been a major concern for indigenous 
leaders about to sign agreements with PSB. The duration of agreements is 20 years. According to 
Lascano, the program has to review the conditions on returning the incentive (personal interview, 
April 6, 2018). According to him, a good alternative could be that from year one to year five, if 
incurred in fault, a participant would need to return 100% of the incentive; from year six - 10, 
75%; year 11 - 15, 50%; and year 16 – 20, 25%. More of these cases have happened with 
individual landowners compared to communal landowners. One communal case that I am aware 
of is the case of the community Chachis. Loggers motivated the community to sell timber, even 
though they were part of PSB. The community asked to the loggers to pay the incentive received 
from PSB and return it, and they did it.  
The conditions also allow some participant communities to designate themselves small 
ABCs, as a way to experiment with the program. After some years, the same participants were 
able to increase the ABCs. In other words, the community was experimenting their relationship 
with PSB. One of the limitations of participation was not to reduce the ABC but to increase. 
Moreover, PSB considered circumstances of force majeure, such as wildlife fire and timber theft, 
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that might increase use of the ABC. In those cases, the program analyzed the context to avoid 
participants being expelled from the program. 
Programa Socio Bosque: Discourses, moral ecology, and moral economy  
The previous section drew on a top-down perspective to describe how PSB works, with 
attention to the logics of implementation of the program (e.g., economic incentives), how it 
responds to push back from participating communities, and some of the areas that are still in 
need of improvement. The program’s response to community challenges, and its flexible design, 
still remain within a context of economic valuation schemes: how much is land valued in 
monetary terms, who will receive monetary compensation, what can be invested in with 
incentives. Can the operations of a PES program such as Socio Bosque be understood beyond 
economic logics?  In this section, I propose a deeper reading of environmental, economic, and 
cultural dynamics to contextualize how PSB works. 
PSB’s creation and its focus on conservation and livelihood improvement reflect 
Ecuador’s larger economic, political, cultural, and discursive context. After Rafael Correa 
became President, and to achieve a new matrix of economic relationship (Vallejo, Burbano, 
Falconí, & Larrea, 2015), PSB aimed to support diversification of production and market value 
chains (Daniel de la Fuente, personal communication, April 10, 2017). This involved changes 
throughout the economic cycle- production, reproduction, distribution and consumption- to a 
model that favors diversified and eco-efficient production, as well as services based on local 
knowledge and biodiversity. Biodiversity became an important source of science, technology and 
derived economic activity. According to the State, it guarantees sovereignty and food security, 
acts as a source of national and international tourism, and is a potential source for the carbon 
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bond market and global source of oxygen (SENPLADES, 2009). PSB thus clearly fit in the 
constitutional mandate and national development efforts.  
Can PSB move away from ecosystem service metaphors built on monetary valuations, 
and consider the incorporation of non-economic values? Such an analysis requires a shift away 
from traditional western discourses of management and accountability and towards the 
discourses present in the concepts of Sumak Kawsay (Buen Vivir), Patrimonio Natural, and 
Plurinacionalismo. In order to understand those shifts, an environmental discourse perspective 
framework can provide some explanations. “Discourse” refers to the terms and concepts that 
shape meanings and find expression in daily practice, material impacts, and embodied experience 
(Fairclough, 2011; Feindt & Oels, 2005). Discourse analysis examines the connections on how 
nature is produced in environmental policy for the reconfiguration of power (Feindt & Oels, 
2005). With this analytical framework, PSB can be seen as part of a significant effort to create a 
new Ecuadorian political and social discourse.  
As described earlier, plurinationalism is a political discourse that attempts to reframe the 
relationships among state and citizens, and the role of identity in nationalism. Sumak Kawsay can 
be viewed as a related shift in national political and economic discourse. Adopted and 
appropriated from the Kichwa concept of good living, Sumak Kawsay emphasizes a “rights-
based articulation of individual capacities and wellbeing, nature, and resource distribution” 
(Radcliffe, 2012, p. 240). The concept of Patrimonio Natural- or natural heritage- emphasizes 
how this discourse conceptualizes intrinsic links among nature, people, identity, and justice. 
Patrimonio Natural values ecosystems simultaneously for their high biodiversity, and for nature’s 
role as a source of knowledge and identity. The concept embeds implications for conservation 
and management in natural areas, especially in land and sea areas declared protected by the 
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State. It fundamentally linked land and ecosystems to the people who inhabit, depend on, and 
contribute to them. These intertwined discourses of plurinationalism, Sumak Kawsay, and 
patrimonio natural entailed a conscious “departure” from both liberal individualism and 
neoliberal economic and political premises.  
Discourses put into practice, however, are not free from historical and structural contexts. 
Lansing (2014) examines the way that new policies and discourses in Costa Rica’s PES program 
were shaped by “the disjointed and contradictory stream of laws and institutions that comprise 
the state apparatus, and their critical role in rendering property legible” (p. 1327). In Ecuador’s 
case, Radcliffe (2012) argues that post-neoliberal discourse put into practice has had to rely on 
both neoliberal state institutions and postcolonial patterns of exclusion (2011). Thus, a study of 
PSB as an alternative discourse in PES must not only examine the related discourses of 
plurinationalism, Sumak Kawsay, and patrimonio natural, but also the messy and entangled 
territorial, cultural and historical dynamics that form when these discourses are put into practice. 
One moment to examine these entanglements is how PSB has been hotly contested since 
its establishment (Lascano, personal interview, April 6, 2018). The program explicitly aimed for 
livelihood improvement. It specifically reached out to indigenous and otherwise marginalized 
communities for enrollment and sought to connect its broader implications to a larger political 
discourse linking ethnic identity, economic justice, and national policy. As a result, PSB 
carefully considered political viability and perceptions of incentives when discussing payment 
plans. According to Lascano, PSB does not fall under the PES neoclassical economic model 
(personal interview, April 6, 2018). However, he recognizes that PSB, in its beginnings, was 
considered as a PES, but after some analysis, staff acknowledged that paying for natural 
ecosystem services was not the correct path. This means that PSB was considered to fit to a more 
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locally appropriate design. There were two reasons: the law and technical restrictions. First, the 
Ecuadorian Constitution Art. 74, states that “[t]he people, communities, peoples and nationalities 
will have the right to benefit from the environment and natural resources that allow them good 
living. Environmental services will not be subject to appropriation; its production, provision, use 
and exploitation will be regulated by the State.” Thus, if under the Constitution, landowners are 
not the owners of ecosystem services, then an explicitly PES program, which pays landowners 
for not exercising their rights to use the land for economic production, risks the unconstitutional 
appropriation of nature. In the same interview, the former PSB manager argued that people are 
not the owners of forest (Lascano, personal interview, April 6, 2018). In order to benefit from the 
forest, the landowner needs a logging license emitted by the State. If PSB is to be implemented 
as a PES program, then, what do landowners own that can be exchanged for payments to 
conserve? In other words, what is to be recognized and by whom, in exchange of conservation? 
The second restriction begins to address this issue, and is related to the technical capacity 
of PSB to measure what is to be conserved, for example, the difficulties of evaluating the amount 
of CO2 captured by a forest, or the quantity of water production for a new and small program 
such as PSB (Lascano, personal interview, April 6, 2018), as measures of Ecosystem Services. In 
order to avoid an unconstitutional mandate in term of Buen Vivir, PSB considered to use the 
word “incentive” rather than “payment.” Making this shift in terms re-orients our understanding 
of what is being exchanged via PSB. According to Lascano, the logic for this shift relates to the 
fact that people had already been investing effort in delimiting, cleaning, signaling the 
boundaries and content of forested lands before PSB even started. They had trained local peoples 
as forest rangers to protect their forest, long before the implementation of PSB. Thus, actions 
prior to the implementation of PSB, rooted in already established ways of managing 
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environments, are the reason why forested landscapes existed in the first place. The program thus 
works to recognize the value of people’s environmental management efforts as conservation 
efforts. And, in order to support their decision to continue investing those efforts, the State 
provides them with an incentive, in the form of monetary recognition (Lascano, personal 
interview, April 6, 2018). The difference between incentive and payment might seem a matter of 
linguistics but for PSB, it made the difference necessary to become a legally-operating program 
that supports national discourse and political commitments. In this sense, PSB entangled 
connections, blurring the lines between whether people protect ecosystem services for the public 
good or protect the land because of the personal incentive, or because they have always done so 
as part of their cultural practices. 
PES programs are contested, adapted and transformed to incorporate local dynamics 
(Shapiro-Garza, McElwee, Van Hecken, & Corbera, 2020), as the case of Programa Socio 
Bosque shows. In a sense, one could also think of this as a moral ecology: the rejection of 
payment discourses inscribes a moral stance on how people, the state, and nature should all 
interact (Dove & Kammer, 2015; Saxena, Chatti, Overstreet, & Dove, 2018). This perspective 
sheds light on the ways that PBS’s plurinational goals reached across local values and concepts 
of nature. A moral ecology framework highlights the interconnectedness, mutualisms, and 
competitions that define plurinational value systems. At the same time, thinking in terms of 
moral ecology serves as a reminder that concepts of nature entail moral principles and require a 
definition of values (ibid.). The concepts of moral economy and moral ecology help us better 
analyze the changes that Socio Bosque strives for, those it enacts “unintentionally,” and the types 
of experiences that participants may face. Let me elaborate this through the concept of cash 
transfers, in terms of sale and recognition.  
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Local communities have different conceptualization of cash transfer. One person 
described a number of ways in which indigenous collective landholders who had enrolled in PSB 
viewed the program (Marjorie Vargas, personal communication, April 12, 2017). In one case, 
these communities were said to experience cash transfers as a sale, and think of themselves as 
selling management practices. This example complicates the official stance that the program is 
not a payment and that ecosystem services must not be appropriated. In other cases, communities 
were described as viewing cash transfers as the government’s long-overdue recognition of 
indigenous forest management. This case suggests that PSB participants may view their new 
relationship with government programs on quite different terms than the practitioners and 
policymakers themselves.  
Finally, it was noted that many communities enroll in the program with the explicit 
expectation that it will serve as a gateway to increased governmental services such as health and 
education. Though such services might not seem directly connected to enrollment, this 
expectation demonstrates ways that local participants both understand and attempt to use the 
program for their own goals, such as the recognition from the state. In discussing local 
perceptions and uses of PSB, it is also important to note cases, such as that of the Sápara nation, 
in which enrollment in the program marked the creation of a defined community (Lascano, 
personal interview, April 6, 2018). As described before, the now-established Sápara had not 
existed as a distinct community before the program. Acting on pre-existing disputes within a 
larger community, a group of individuals signed a PSB contract in order to establish autonomy 
and gain official recognition as a separate community (Marjorie Vargas personal communication, 
April 12, 2017). This example suggests the unscripted and immeasurable ways in which PSB can 
be a mechanism of local change in political, economic, spatial, and cultural spheres. 
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The territorial autonomy discourse also explains how indigenous communities, on the 
other hand, also can choose to refuse to PSB. The Sarayaku community, for example, refused to 
participate in PSB, which provides insight into the political, cultural, and historical messiness of 
land use and conservation. Territorial autonomy is a primary factor in this refusal, a fact that 
makes clear the tense and historically informed suspicion that some indigenous people may feel 
towards the Ecuadorian state. In this case, such suspicions come not only from history but from 
present legal frameworks of land use. As mentioned above, the 2008 Constitution retains state 
patrimony over non-renewable resources, and thereby controls extraction. The Sarayaku feared 
that by enrolling in the program they would bring the community and the land into regular 
contact with state administrators and into official jurisdiction by the state, which would put them 
at risk of oil extraction. The Sarayaku have not only resisted Programa Socio Bosque but also 
autonomously put forth their own proposition for traditional forest management. Kawsak Sacha, 
or the Living Forest, would create a locally derived theory of management and of human-
environment relations, and would explicitly prevent any extraction of oil or other large-scale 
resources (Daniel Santi, personal communication, April 12, 2017). This example offers a contrast 
to the participant communities above. While participating communities view PSB through their 
own values, needs, and expectations and enroll accordingly, the Sarayaku refuse the program 
based on reasons that link land tenure to historical patterns of domination and local autonomy. 
How do we delineate the differences between cash transfers that are incentives and those 
that are payments? And, what does this discursive shift mean for involved parties? The 
opposition of incentives and payments, and the political discourse that led to Ecuador’s 
constitutional prohibition on appropriating environmental services, suggest that a moral economy 
is at play in these discourses of money-nature relationship. Moral economy refers to the value 
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systems that organize a society and influence people’s emotional and collective responses, 
particularly in relation to state economic decisions (Scott, 1976). In particular, a moral economy 
will set the conditions on which resistance and rebellion may take shape. Effectively, a group’s 
moral economy is one aspect of the embeddedness in which any PES-like scheme operates 
(Osborne & Shapiro-Garza, 2018). Insistence on incentives rather than payments demonstrates a 
direct attempt to shape the terms of a new moral economy, one designed to accompany new 
political and economic contexts. Recognizing this helps us understand why this detail of verbiage 
is so important to PSB stakeholders, and it also helps elucidate the scope of change that PSB’s 
designers sought to enact.   
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CHAPTER 2: COMMUNITY ADAPTATION/APPROPRIATION AND PSB 
In May 21, 2018, I witnessed a marcha pacífica3, or peaceful march, organized by the 
Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo (FOIN).4 Hundreds of Napo Runa, including 
women, men, elderly, youth and children, marched peacefully. During the intervention of 
indigenous leaders, Patricio Shiguango, president of the organization stated “as FOIN we deserve 
respect. We demand compliance [of FOIN] resolutions for the benefit of our communities.” 
Among their demands –translated into a resolución (document)- was the legalization of 
indigenous territories, restitution of bilingual education system, fellowships, jobs, and programs 
to improve indigenous livelihoods, etc. Perreault (2002) calls this a traditional-modern dialectic, 
referring to how Amazonian indigenous peoples resist colonial domination and occupation by 
using the very language of the modern, settler state.  
Among several banners at this march, one called my attention. It read: “FOIN exige 
pagos por servicios ambientales comunitarios, Socio Bosque, Red más” (“FOIN demands 
payments for community environmental services, Socio Bosque, Red plus”) (Figure 3). Using 
the settler’s language of occupation, the context of this claim was to demand that Programa 
Socio Bosque (PSB) fulfill the disbursement of incentives to communities participating in the 
program. This statement made me think about how neoliberal views of the environment become 
embedded in the claims of local peoples. It signals community sacha runa (socioenvironment) 
and how they understand PSB in their own terms. In other words, it fosters not only a 
Community-Forest relationship incorporating various ontological human-environment 
                                                          
3 This march was as a political act against process of marginalization and isolation by the State.  
4 FOIN is an indigenous organization that affiliates Kichwa-speaking communities established along the Napo 
province. Indigenous organizations as FOIN coordinate local and regional indigenous efforts to achieve indigenous 
rights. It is a social and political representation of indigenous communities.    
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relationships, but also recognizes the support for life that communities “provide.” In this context, 
I believe that it is important to analyze how Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are 
understood by program participants, as it appears that PES is being appropriated, shifted, 
challenged or changed according to local cultural, geographical, and economic realities 
(Muradian, Corbera, Pascual, Kosoy, & May, 2010; Van Hecken, Bastiaensen, & Windey, 2015; 
Van Riper et al., 2017).  
 
Figure 3. Napo Runa communities march. Source: Author photo 
 
In this chapter, I examine how the Napo Runa in the community of Wamaní, Province of 
Napo, where the state-sponsored PES program Socio Bosque (PSB) is currently being 
implemented, articulate indigenous valuations of nature –sacha runa- with the logics, design, 
and value schemes of PES. Specifically, I investigate how PES is conceived by the Napo Runa 
on a daily basis. My goal is to evaluate the potential of PES as an alternative that supports 
indigenous peoples’ valuation, and as a proxy to support indigenous people’s rights (Coombes et 
al., 2012; Jackson & Palmer, 2015). I argue that Indigenous peoples in the Ecuadorian Amazon 
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have been changing and adapting to the “oportunidades que aparecen” (opportunities that 
“appear”), for example adapting the commune governance system and adapting to the PSB’s 
logic of use of space. Adaptation, however, does not mean abandonment of self-determination.  
Adaptation is a strategy that has served the long-term objectives of individual communities. 
Community-level strategies can combine with national scale strategies, such as the coordinated 
efforts of organizations and the mobilizations of indigenous peoples for their rights, which have 
been influential in the development of new, more representative national politics (Perreault, 
2001; Uzendoski & Whitten, 2014). For example, as a result of the pressure of indigenous 
peoples’ mobilizations, Ecuador’s 1998 Constitution incorporated the collective rights of 
indigenous peoples as a guarantee for the respect of indigenous rights. Similarly, the 2008 
Ecuadorian Constitution acknowledges Ecuador as a plurinational and intercultural state, as a 
way to recognize the millenary roots and the existence of indigenous groups in order to rebuild a 
new Ecuadorian society and to promote a new form of social coexistence, in diversity and 
harmony with nature, in order to achieve Good Living or “Sumak Kawsay” (Asamblea Nacional 
del Ecuador del Ecuador, 2008).  
The Napo Runa have been changing or adapting to political, social and cultural situations 
(Perreault, 2002, 2003; Whitten, 1985), specifically those related to sovereignty over natural 
resources. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, extractive activities that 
commodify nonhuman natures, such as oil, timber, palm plantations, tourism, road construction, 
and agricultural expansion have transformed the everyday environments of Amazonian peoples 
(T. Macdonald, 1999; Whitten, 2008). These capitalistic activities have changed access to 
subsistence resources and practices of knowledge reproduction across generations of Amazonian 
peoples (Lu, Silva, Villeda, & Sorensen, 2015), through the redefinition of who has access rights 
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to resources and according to production-centered metrics, which have led to the accumulation of 
wealth for capitalist entrepreneurs. Amazonian peoples thus are pressed to respond: they have 
changed their subsistence activities (T. J. Macdonald, 1979; Perreault, 2002); incorporated 
production activities into their livelihoods to be recognized as competitive actors who make 
economic uses of the land; and have engaged in political fights to defend and preserve their right 
to land, food, wood, and local resources (Erazo, 2008; Radcliffe, 2015; Redford & Stearman, 
2003; Valdivia, 2005). This in turn, means that the Napo Runa are facing not only the loss of 
their ancestral territory but also the loss of ancestral identities.  
The Programa Socio Bosque follows this history of adaptation and change, what 
Indigenous scholar Whyte (2018, p. 138) calls “insidious loop” of indigenous-settler relations. 
Several indigenous peoples in Ecuador have been “seduced and attracted” to participate in 
Programa Socio Bosque (PSB). According Lascano, former PSB manager, PSB contributes to 
the protection and conservation of the forest and biodiversity, while both allowing indigenous 
peoples to promote cultural survival and providing monetary incentives to be used for housing, 
education, and other needs (personal interview, April 6, 2018). In order to understand that 
connection, we must understand how the Napo Runa evaluate nature’s services. What logics, 
spatiotemporal schemes, and valuation metrics do the Napo Runa use to characterize “nature’s 
services”?  
As anthropologists who have worked closely with the Napo Runa suggest, Runa 
ontologies of “environment” and “human” are different from Western ones. Kohn (2013), for 
example, suggests that the Runa of the community of Ávila, not far from the community where I 
grew up, conceptualize social relations or sacha runa as being part of a forest society; the human 
is not an organizing node of social relations but always already a bundle of obligations and 
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responsibilities with intergenerational stories, non-human spirits and beings, and others. Forests, 
in Runa cosmovision, are more like a “thinking” or “being” space and less like a bounded 
container to be categorized or parsed out into smaller segments of being or value. Being in a 
forest society, thus, is not captured by the categorical, symbolic divides of environment and 
human that allow PES to function. Yet Runa communities actively participate in PES programs. 
If PES requires the abstraction of “nature’s services” into monetary incentives, how do people in 
communities such as Wamaní, where I conducted my research, articulate these demands with the 
Napo Runa obligations and responsibilities of forest societies? How are these different from 
those used by PSB? Does PSB challenge how indigenous peoples relate to the forest or vice 
versa?  
In the following sections, I analyze how the community of Wamaní makes sense of PSB. 
First, I give a historical contextualization of the Napo Runa, drawing on anthropological 
scholarship, and focusing on Napo Runa sense of place. Knowing the stories of the indigenous 
people who live in the Upper Amazon of Ecuador is also knowing the history, the life of this 
land, Napo Runas’ aspirations, dreams, concerns, and more importantly -knowing the reason for 
their existence. Then, I describe the community of Wamaní, which is where I conducted my 
main field study and offer examples of events that I witnessed in the community, to illustrate 
how Runa communities interact with, adapt, and challenge the categorical limits of PSB.  
The Napo Runa sense of place in the Ecuadorian Amazon 
The Napo Runa are the coalescence of complex intercultural dynamics among different 
ancient native Amazonian peoples who continue to exist in the Northern Ecuadorian Amazon. 
They self-identify as ‘Runa’ (fully human beings in Kichwa)  and are part of a linguistic-ethnic 
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cultural group known as a ‘nacionalidad’ Kichwa de la Amazonía5 (Kichwa nationality of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon) (Erazo, 2008; Muratorio, 1991; Uzendoski, 2005; Uzendoski & Whitten 
2014; Whitten, 1975). There are about 150,000 Amazonia Kichwa speakers in Ecuador, most of 
whom live in the provinces of Pastaza, Napo, Orellana and Sucumbíos (Uzendoski & Whitten, 
2014). As many other indigenous peoples in Ecuador, the Napo Runa have adopted and changed 
the meaning of Spanish words to describe themselves. For example, they use the term 
‘nacionalidad’ (nationality) to challenge Ecuadorian hegemonic notions of nationhood and to 
strengthen their right to self-determination (Viatori & Ushigua, 2007). For indigenous leaders, 
the use of the term “nationality” brings attention to the multiple cultural dynamics related to 
territory, history legacies, language and transformations that have shaped indigenous peoples’ 
relationship with the Ecuadorian state.   
When writing about the making of places, Massey (1991, p. 28) says: “What gives a 
place its specificity is not some long internalized history but the fact that it is constructed out of a 
particular constellation of social relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus.” 
This is indeed the case for the Napo Runa. The Northern Ecuadorian Amazon is a place with 
many historical, cultural connotations, intermingled with processes of social injustice, racism, 
cycles of poverty, processes of citizenship, and socio-cultural embeddedness that have 
influenced power dynamics that have shaped the life of indigenous populations. During colonial 
times, and from the standpoint of colonizers and ‘developers,’ this region was not fit for 
permanent settlement, other than for its indigenous inhabitants, due to its climatic conditions and 
geographic isolation. Throughout the colonial and republican period, this region was taken over 
                                                          
5 The Amazonian Kichwa language is spoken in the Pastaza and lower Napo regions, and is believed to have spread 
from Amazonian Perú early before the arrival of Spanish Colonization (Whitten, 2008). It belongs to the Quechua 
language family, with approximately twelve million speakers in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina. 
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by criminals, missionaries, landlords, and adventure-seekers. Indigenous peoples of this region 
managed to survive and maintain some of their cultural traditions despite these waves of 
extractive and settler colonization (Gianotti, 1997; Muratorio, 1991). Over the years, the 
expansion of the non-indigenous society has changed the social and cultural make up of its 
ancestral inhabitants and appropriated traditional lands (Esvertit, 2008). 
My own family experienced this dispossession and occupation. My grandparents (from 
my mother’s side) experienced land tenure loss, which forced them to leave their ancestral lands. 
These experiences are part of our sense of place. My mother tells the following story of 
dispossession when she connects to the callary timpo, or beginning time place. Around the 
1960s, my grandparents lived in the sector of Tzatzayacu in the Napo Province. One day, a 
colono (settler) came to my grandparents and showed official state documents saying that my 
grandparents lived on land that he now owned. My grandparents had to move elsewhere. They 
had to migrate along the Napo River, to the lower Napo, in search of land, where nobody 
“bothers” them, and where they can live safely and can raise their children under their ancestral 
customs. My mother calls this place a place where they can live free, as callary uras: as in 
ancient and traditional times and ways. However, in reality, those lands were land that my 
grandparents’ grandparents had given to them in the Sector of Talag and Serena in the Napo 
province. My mother’s memories become powerful as she reassembles her life and her family in 
a time-space where the Napo Runa life was being challenged and stressed by colonization. These 
memories are not only hers; they are my memories too and those of my children, as it is through 
this callary timpo or time-place that I can make sense of and explain claims to territoriality and 
belonging in my family. Runa experiences of colonization and belonging is in continuous 
motion; such experiences resemble what Whyte (2018, p. 130), in a different context, calls a 
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“spiral” or “accordion conception of time (or temporality) that can make transformation possible 
in different respects.” 
For this reason, as a Napo Runa, I resist the idea that indigenous knowledge and socio-
cultural relationships are being lost. Relationships lost implies that their configuration somehow 
was fixed to start with and that once they are removed from a place they no longer exist. 
Recognizing the continuum of callary timpo as a way of knowing self and place, I argue that this 
knowledge exists within the living forest, in the forest society (Kohn, 2013), which deserves to 
be recognized and revalued. For example, I still sense these entangled relationships in my own 
family experience, when we relate to the forest as “home” linked with complex human-
nonhuman relationships. For the Runa, ancestral wisdom about the forest society is about making 
sense of the world as entangled with the animals (e.g., boas, jaguars, monkeys) and plants of the 
Amazon forest, the spirits of the forest, and the white-mestizo world beyond individual 
communities. The Runa use these ancestral connections and habits of thinking with forests of 
ancestors (e.g., dreams and storytelling) to negotiate new challenges in the present and future. As 
my mother’s memory suggests, the stories we maintain as Napo Runa often convey the 
importance of adaptation to change. Napo Runa nationhood is not static or fixed. Indeed, no 
nationality can survive without undergoing change? As Indigenous scholar Gerald Vizenor 
(2018) argues, this is not survival but “survivance”, an orientation towards renewal and 
continuity that renounces dominance, tragedy, and victimry. 
My mother’s ancestral memory – and now my memory—is an example of how 
Amazonian Indigenous peoples’ collective memory is embodied and circulated. Indigenous 
societies like the Napo Runa use this knowledge-legacy to mediate daily actions within their 
land, the forest and modernity. In my own case, my ancestors fought against Spanish domination, 
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adopted new forms of identity to continue existing, transmitted knowledge that has been passed 
down from generation to generation to understand the value of nature, to understand life in the 
forest (Grefa, 2014). For example, the Runa appropriated government sponsored Agrarian 
Reforms and Colonization programs to defend and legalize ancestral territories (T. Macdonald, 
1999) and as a strategy to nurture dignity and continuity. That is why the Napo Runa have 
adopted concepts such as “Comuna”; it is a settler term that allows the possibility of protecting 
indigenous rights to land, which is very different from the traditional cultural organization of the 
“ayllu” or “muntun” (I explore these ancestral continuities in social organization in Chapter 4). 
Similarly, Napo Runa are adapting, shifting, and molding global conservation concepts for 
survivance. In my research, I found that Napo Runa evaluate and use strategies and their way of 
living to shape and create new alternatives for the life in the forest. This is also replicated in how 
global processes, such as Payment for Ecosystem Services are managed by the community. 
Though the Runa configure external ideas according to their aims and objectives, indigenous 
leaders permanently remind us of the link to ancestral past, and of the importance of the idea of 
Nations to exercise indigenous traditional ways of life.  
To sustain indigenous ways of life, indigenous peoples have had to partially “give up” 
their autonomy to the State. Indigenous meetings offer an opportunity for analyzing this point. I 
would like to explain this through an experience I had while conducting this research. In 2018, I 
participated in a meeting6 in the Amazonian settler town of Lago Agrio, organized by 
CONFENIAE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon), and 
COICA (Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin). There, indigenous 
peoples from the Ecuadorian Amazon discussed a Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
                                                          
6 This meeting was held on June 12, 2018, organized by COICA and CONFENIAE 
67 
 
Forest Degradation (REDD+) program and other local initiatives to counter external 
conservation programs. In the process, they situated their own positionality in relation to 
conservation programs. They positioned themselves as the “protectors of the forest” and argued 
for the promotion of internal values of forest conservation. One participant said: “the community 
[itself] has to protect the forest, otherwise it will disappear.” Moreover, they argued for the need 
to disassociate from institutions such as the Ministry of Environment of Ecuador (MAE) because 
they are outsiders that “cannot be trusted.” According to participants, the MAE repeats processes 
that dismantle the right of indigenous peoples to ancestral lands and disassociates their 
socioenvironmental values. Indigenous leaders at the meeting also offered a series of proposals 
for action to protect the forest that emphasized local ways of living as a forest society rather than 
thinking about the forest as an economic resource. For example, they proposed a new REDD+ 
Indígena Amazónica (Amazonian Indigenous), or RIA, a REDD+ that emphasizes indigenous 
worldviews and local initiatives for conservation. They also proposed a project called ‘Cuencas 
Sagradas’ (Sacred Watersheds), which promotes environmentally friendly economic initiatives 
with the idea to protect forest and life in the entire Amazon (Tuntiak Katan, COICA leader, 
personal communication, June, 12, 2018). Another example is the use of ‘planes de vida de las 
nacionalidades y pueblos’ (life planning programs of nationalities and peoples), or indigenous 
community planning initiatives to promote local ways of life according to their specific 
socioenvironmental dynamics.   
The proposals mentioned in this meeting are examples of the philosophies and ontologies 
of Napo Runa political action. Among the Runa, the power of sense of place is performative and 
pragmatic, evident through actions expressing “playful discourse, song, melody, rhythm, and 
ceramic, into strong consciousness and endeavor to educate people ‘of other cultures’ to the 
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durability and even adaptability of the ways of life” (Whitten, 2008, p. 24). In this 2018 meeting 
with COICA and CONFENIAE leaders, I witnessed how leaders indigenized “modernity by 
placing themselves and their cultural orientations into coeval juxtaposition with the dominant 
system” (ibid.) In other words, indigenous communities are aware of the “risks” of external 
program. The next section, on the community of Wamaní, showcases this dynamic of coeval 
juxtaposition. Specifically, it shows how Napo Runa can indigenize external, market-based 
conservation programs, such as Programa Socio Bosque, to continue producing a Runa sense of 
place. In the case of Wamaní, Napo Runa have adapted to and challenged Programa Socio 
Bosque to adapt it to the structures of the way of life of the Napo Runa people.  
Wamaní  
Wamaní is a Kichwa-speaking Napo Runa community on the foothills of a volcano called 
Sumaco, in the Napo province (Figure 4). The name comes from the Kichwa word wamak, 
which means bamboo, as there is a significant presence of bamboo in the area. There are 450 
people in this community, 151 of which are socios7 (legally recognized members), living in a 
total area of 5054 hectares (Juan Shiguango, personal interview, February 12, 2019). Wamaní is 
under the political jurisdiction of the Municipality of Archidona and the Parish Hatun Sumaku 
(Kichwa name in reference to the big Sumaco Volcano area) (Izurieta, Zambrano, & Tapia, 
2014). The community is organized in four sub-centers called barrios (neighborhoods), which 
are: Llaucana Pacha, Shipawa Urku, Wayusa Urku and Rumi Panka (the central area) (Figure 5). 
The forests of Wamaní fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Environment due to the 
protected area Bosque Protector Hollin-Loreto (adjudicated by the Ministry of the Environment 
as “ancestral communal lands” to Wamaní in 2008), an area that influences the Sumaco-Napo-
                                                          
7 Socios as the people who have the right to vote and decide on internal communal matters. Members who are not 
socios and others (children of socios) can express their concern in communal matters but cannot vote on these.  
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Galeras National Park, and the Sumaco Biosphere Reserve, which was declared by the UNESCO 

























Figure 5. Map of Wamaní. Source: (Izurieta et al., 2014) 
 
The formation of Wamaní can be understood from two different visions, from the 
perspective of the settler state and from the perspective of Napo Runa cosmovision of 
territorialities. To the settler state, Wamaní was formed in the 1960s with 28 families as an 
“agricultural pre-cooperative,” (Izurieta et al., 2014) that recognized its residents as people with 
land rights. On August 1, 1973, Wamaní (which included a larger area than the actual 
community) was renamed as a social organization: Production Cooperative Huamaní. According 
to Macdonald (1999), the agrarian cooperative model was used to secure ancestral lands with 
minimal western forms of cooperative organization. Later, around 1987, due to the need for 
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access to services by the sub-centers and the increase of members, the Cooperative was divided 
into different indigenous communities (Izurieta et al., 2014). Wamaní’s communal lands were 
verified and recognized by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1973 and by the Ecuadorian Institute of 
Forestry and Natural Areas and Wildlife (INEFAN) in 1993.  
However, the settlement of the Napo Runa on those territories started long before the 
process of state formation. Under the view of the Runa cosmovision of territorialities, this can be 
explained through the figure of the caru tambo. Napo Runa build caru tambo or small seasonal 
outposts to create temporal chacras or forest gardens to claim rights over land. Once a caru 
tambo is established, it is followed with sowing chonta (a palm tree) to delimit territoriality and 
claim ownership to the land (Esvertit, 2008; T. Macdonald, 1999). These lands were designated 
for hunting activities to be used by the Runa of Archidona and Rukullacta towns, who also used 
to mobilize to those areas before festivities (Carlos Chimbo, Personal interview, February 25, 
2019). Pascual Shiguango, one of the founders of Wamaní, is said to have invited relatives from 
the surrounding areas of Archidona, Tena, and Cotundo towns to settle the area.  
Under colonial settler processes, Wamaní was adjudicated for the first time the legal 
territorial status of “ancestral indigenous community” by the MAE on September 9, 2008. In 
2008, the Development Council of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE) gave the 
community a legal indigenous status (Izurieta et al., 2014). While the MAE adjudicated lands to 
communities contained within the National Protected Areas System, CODENPE recognized the 
social organization as an indigenous community. This is protected under the 2008 Ecuadorian 
constitution, which allows territorial rights for comunas, communities and nationalities. Art. 57, 
literal 4 recognizes comunas “To keep the imprescriptible property of their communal lands 
which cannot be taken away by proscription, seized or transferred.”  
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In this context, Wamaní maintains a legal status as an indigenous community, understood 
as communal landholder. However, inside the community, the land is distributed according to 
how the socios decide. Each receives 50 hectares. Nowadays, due to territorial constraint, new 
socios (mostly old socios’ descendants) get 30 hectares, and some get land in their parent’s 
parcels (Juan Shiguango, personal interview, February 12, 2019). The predominant land uses in 
Wamaní are crops, grasslands, and agroforestry. Naranjilla and coffee are cultivated for 
commercialization while manic, corn, plantains are produced for internal consumption. Wamaní 
territory is distributed 72.74% as native forest; 8.41% as secondary forest; 8.98% as other uses; 
7.81% as pastures; 0.44% occupy rivers and 1.61% correspond to the urbanized area (Izurieta et 
al., 2014) (Figure 6 ). 
Wamaní, signed the initial agreement with PSB in 2008 under the initiative of then 
president Eloy Licuy. At that time, leaders understood the project as an opportunity for 
reconocimiento (recognition) by the Ecuadorian State, whom they understood had “abandoned” 
or “forgotten” indigenous peoples in its policies (Juan Shiguango, personal interview, February 
12, 2019). Similarly, for another socio, “it is a debt of an ‘isolated’ state towards the indigenous 
nationalities”, meaning that the State is not in a continuous relationship with the community 
(Manuel Shiguango, personal interview, January 28, 2019). However, according to Wamaní’s 
president, “[PSB] came from there [outside]. It is not clearly established. They do not meet [the 
agreement] and neither do we. Each time they send new forms. But when they don’t fulfill [the 
agreement] nothing happens to them. But if the community fails, they quickly fall into us [to 




















Figure 6. Map of Wamani’s Land Uses. Source: Izurieta et al., 2014 
 
PSB challenged, adopted, transformed 
On July, 31, 2018, I participated in a communal meeting at Wamaní that allowed me to 
see how socios positioned themselves as subject to PSB’s decisions and actions but also as 
shapers of said decisions and actions. Wamaní signed its agreement of participation with PSB on 
December 10, 2008 (legal agreement MAE-PSB-I-2008-c-007)8. The agreement ties both PSB 
                                                          
8 This agreement has had various addendums. The first, on February, 2, 2011, clarified the hectares designated for 
PSB, from 1285 hectares to 1283.5 hectares. The second, on November 22, 2017, added 340 hectares, as Wamaní 
requested to increase the ABC, for a total 1623.50 hectares.  
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and Wamaní for 20 years. The program disburses the incentive every six months prior to the 
presentation of Wamani’s annual Investment Plan. At the meeting I attended, the socios decided 
how to use the incentive in details for the 2019 Wamaní Investment Plan, though arriving at this 
decision was not easy. Socios had heated discussions over several aspects of their experience 
with PSB. Below I elaborate on these dimensions. 
Areas under conservation, or ABC 
One of the topics discussed entailed the uneven exchanges between the community and 
the Program regarding the currently assigned Área bajo conservación (Area under conservation 
or ABC). This is 1623.50 hectares (Figure 7) that Wamaní is expected to conserve. In exchange 
for respecting the conditions stipulated as “conservation,” the community receives an annual 
incentive of 26905.50 USD. Below are the conditionalities included in the MAE-PSB-I-2008-c-
007 agreement signed by Wamaní and PSB: 
a. Do not cut down the conservation area; 
b. Do not change the land use of the area; 
c. Do not burn the area; 
d. Do not perform intensive grazing in the area; 
e. Not to carry out activities that alter the natural behavior or that threaten the capacity to 
give refuge to biodiversity, alter natural hydrological conditions or reduce carbon storage 
due to cutting trees under conservation. 
f. Do not hunt for commercial or sporting purposes in the conservation area; 
g. Inform, within five days, to the Ministry of Environment about transfers or limitations of 
ownership to the beneficiary of the incentive; 
h. Prevent fires in areas under conservation and report it, within five days, of occurred the 
event to the Ministry of Environment and other competent authorities; 
i. Allow the access to the Ministry of Environment staff to the area under conservation; and 
facilitate their work; 
j. Properly identify the area under conservation, with signs located at convenient distances, 
to be agreed between the Project and the Executor; 
k. Submit to the Ministry of the Environment the information that, on the state of the Area 
Under Conservation, is required; 
l. Deliver until March 31, 2009, the Investment Plan and the Georeferenced Plan. 
m. Comply with the provisions of the Investment Plans; 
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n. Inform to the Project about force majeure or fortuitous events that affect the Area Under 
Conservation, or that could undermine the normal development of this Agreement, such 
as modifications to the Investment Plan, land invasion, etc. 
 
According to the agreement between PSB and Wamaní, the incentive is disbursed 
semiannually. However, in 2018, PSB’s disbursement for the ABC was outdated. The president 
of Wamaní was concerned by the inequalities in their relationship with PSB, specifically, how 
PSB demands the fulfillment of the contract by limiting what the community can do in the ABC, 
but when PSB is delayed with the payment, nothing happens to the program. In his words: “the 
state must fulfill [its commitment], just as the community has its [own] planning for 
implementing water systems, to buy school uniforms, use for lawsuits, support school 
infrastructure, etc.” (Juan Shiguango, personal interview, February 12, 2019). To him, 
communities are not really socios or partners in PSB? If communities were really partners, they 
would be respected and treated equally, and there would be reciprocity in decision-making.  
This feeling of unequal power relations is exemplified in how the community understands 
the ABC. The agreement requires no deforestation and no hunting for commercial or sporting 
purposes inside the ABC, which means that community members are not able to do any activity 
in the ABC. According to Wamaní’s president in 2019, “Socio Bosque demanded to maintain 
intact the area [under] conservation” (Juan Shiguango, personal interview, February, 12, 2019). 
To Wamaní members, the ABC thus becomes “prohibido” (prohibited). “Only by prohibiting it 
can we keep it, otherwise we will be seen as the bad guys against the agreement” (Juan 
Shiguango, personal interview, February 12, 2019). According to another member, “I restrict my 
use [for a better future]” (Manuel Shiguango, personal interview, January 28, 2019).  
Wamaní also assigns forest rangers who monitor the ABC and the community border, as 
required by the conditionalities. Anyone who trespasses the ABC and does not fulfill the 
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community rules has to take responsibility. Wamaní uses sanctions to discipline offenders. While 
for Wamaní the ABC becomes a space of “prohibition”, it is also an area to achieve and 
reformulate the State’s own interest. For example, a small part of the ABC had to be reshaped to 
allow the construction of a large interstate bridge (Puente El Tigre).9 Wamaní is still in the 
process of signing an amending agreement to comply the PSB’s policies and requirements in 
relation to the El Tigre bridge (Juan Shiguango, personal interview, February 12, 2019).  
The ABC has also become an area for wildlife refuge that is easy prey of illegal hunting 
(Manuel Shiguango, personal interview, January 28, 2019). For PSB, the community has to 
protect the ABC because it serves not only the community but also the environment. A socio 
argued: “the way that ABC is identified and managed, for Wamani members, those have become 
isolated hotpots or conservation islands, and need to have some ecological corridors” (Manuel 
Shiguango, personal interview, January 28, 2019). Community members thus propose that the 
ABC be considered part of a network of ecological corridors. However, they are concerned that 
the ABC may then become a “permanent protected area” inside de community, only for the 
production of services (water capture and production along watersheds and disassociated from 
them. Thus, the Runa understand the ABC as “restricted area”: “that area is not my forest 
anymore,” “a minefield”, or something that “they will punish you” if the Runa do not fulfill the 
agreement (Manuel Shiguango, personal interview, January 28, 2019).   
This is a common perception on how the community relates to PSB’s ABC, which is 
distant from the traditional territorial perspective. “The territory is for our survival. Without 
territory we would be nobody” (Juan Shiguango, personal interview, February 12, 2019). And, it 
seems that PSB disassociates the traditional relationship that the Runa had with the forest. To 
                                                          
9 This bridge is an interstate bridge, built by the Ecuadorian State.  
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describe the entanglement of relationships –sacha runa- that the Runa has with the forest, I 
include descriptions offered by a socio of Wamaní: 
“My name is Lino Licui Shiguango, from the Wamaní community. I live 50 years in the 
community. My parents were originally from Talag, but they lived in Archidona. My dad 
had married Pascual Shiguango’s daughter. So here we raised all. Here [he] gave the 
earth [lands] to them to live. Pascual Shiguango is the founder, he was the owner of this 
land. For me the forest is life ... it is a living being, we cohabit, the forest and me. 
Because that’s where I have everything to live. I have seen a life with the forest. 
Comparing with Rukullacta, we used to live there. In Rukullacta 50 years ago, I now see 
that there is a desert. Desert is peeking because there are no trees, there are nothing more 
than people, and they fight a lot ... For a timber they fight...to get firewood, that’s how 
they fight, because people steal, etc. I mean [there are] problems. So, seeing that reality, I 
thought in my own land I have my natural forest. As I have preserved, I have not wanted 
to exploit anything. I have there as 25 hectares of forest [of the 50 assigned hectares]. The 
rest [of the land] I have cultivated but reforested. I have reforested [with] timber and 
edible plants. [I was born to conserve the forest] because I felt seeing reality because 
animals lived there. Animals lived there, trees, some saladeros were there. I did not want 
to destroy it, because it was nice to see that. And there the animals grow. So far I have. I 
have [protected] deer, saino, guanta, armadillo, guatusa, squirrel, everything is there. And 
seeing that now, there’s nothing here. I felt, that clearing [cutting down] the whole forest; 
with money I don’t do anything, [I] told myself. Because the forest is my life. There is no 
other. Because that’s where knowledge comes out too. There are medicinal plants, fruit 
plants, native plants of the forest itself. I know a little about the plants in the forest ... and 
I use it as medicine, as for body aches [I] bathe in it and I’m fine. I don’t spray any 
herbicides; I don’t like those things. 
 
The territory is important to me because it is our life, from the earth I was born and with 
earth I have to be. The territory is more important, we only depend on the territory, 
without territory we are nobody. That is why we are organized in community, for that 
reason, because we do not want to sell to exploit more forest, or anything. Rather now we 
are thinking of all the people to encourage each person to reforest even 1 hectare per 
person each year. Then from here in 20 years, 20 hectares each family would reforest to 
live for 30 to 40 years. Right now, I have this way in my farm, I have one hectare sown 
of all the good woods. We can go see, there are [reforested areas] 12 years, others 
[reforested areas] 20 years. Inside it, everything that serves me is sown, for example, to 
make leaves for maito10, flowers, all the fruits of the area. From the other [next] year they 
are starting to produce, some are already producing. Then, all the animals have begun to 
arrive. I have cleaned [cleared the area] and there are guatusa, squirrel. The others must 
do that so that they live a little healthier after 30-50 years. After that, there will be no 
healthy air. [I see] that little by little [socios] are being contaminated by the [use] of 
chemicals for naranjilla. The [chemicals] are used a lot. And [the] herbicides are sprayed 
in the naranjilla right. Effects, I have seen that in the estuaries there were before those 
small fish and those snails, and now people wash in the estuaries and there are no longer 
                                                          
10 A traditional food which uses heliconia leaves.  
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those, there is only water no more. So, there is no food [fish] diversity, [years ago], we 
used to eat those snails, small fish. That is being lost. I realized. So, I say “let’s do not 
those things.” I am insisting that we change our lives, because the future is not just living 
with money. Money is destruction, destruction in every way. More value has [nature] 
because it is for a lifetime. If we take care of [each other as with nature] we can live 
hundreds of years. 
 
 
Figure 7. Map of Wamaní, PSB- Area under conservation in green. Source: (MAE, 2013) 
Incentives or motivations 
At the 2018 communal meeting that I mentioned earlier, Wamaní members were deciding 
on the Investment Plan for 2019. A power dynamic became palpable, in terms of an intense 
debate over how to negotiate individual and collective interests in matters of the future of the 
community. Here, the president of Wamaní stated: “think what you are going to do with the 
money.” The idea was that socios organize in groups according to their affinity, skills and 
interest in projects to receive part of the PSB incentive. So, participants begun discussing to 
designate the incentive for activities, such as: a poultry project, a local fruit (naranjilla) 
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industrialization project, ecotourism, agrotourism, cattle ranching, seed production projects, 
among others. However, I witnessed tensions between collective and individual views. Some 
community members asked for support (money) for their private initiatives (e.g., 
industrialization of naranjilla). On the other hand, some members stated “we are not propping up 
our children’s future,” referring to how supporting individual projects do not always translate to 
community benefits, and that those ideas need to be framed as supporting the community’s Plan 
de Vida, not short-term investments (5 – 6 months). To manage the individualistic views on how 
to use the incentive, the president and other socios reminded all present at the meeting to be 
aware that none of the members will receive the incentive in cash.  
The example of naranjilla cultivation illustrates some of the tensions. The Wamaní 
community has been recognized as one of the communities that produce a tropical citrus fruit 
called naranjilla (laran in Kichwa) (Izurieta et al., 2014). I observed community members pulling 
each other in different directions, focusing on their own interests to fulfill from the PSB 
incentive, which translated into private project initiatives. For example, as the community 
produces naranjilla, some members argued for the importance to create an enterprise named 
Sacha Laran to industrialize naranjilla production and transformed the fruit into powder. For 
those who proposed this initiative, 2000 US dollars was not enough. However, other socios 
worried about how the communal funds would translate into private initiatives. Some asked: 
“what will happen if the initiative fails? All socios of Wamaní will lose PSB’s money.” Socios 
also argued whether the local production associated with Sacha Laran would be enough for a 
large-scale project. Similar questions were asked about the equipment needed, product seals, 
trained personnel, etc. Socios were concerned with how to move forward with the 
commercialization of naranjilla as a transformed product versus selling the fruit as a primary 
80 
 
product. Here, the question is about whether it is community’s motives or the individual’s 
motives that shapes PSB’s incentive. Does PSB support private initiatives in the name of the 
community? 
Internally, the community is conflicted about whether the funds promote private 
enterprise initiatives over communal interests. To maintain the community figure and avoid its 
cracking by private initiatives, the community relies on particular strategies. For example, they 
transformed the definition of the PSB incentive into the figure of “donation.” In other words, it is 
possible to donate to existing socios’ private initiative but not to allocate a direct monetary 
deposit. The donation is in terms of materials, equipment or seeds bought by the community and 
donated to socios. For Wamaní this is a form of incentive. In the case of seeds (for timber or fruit 
trees), the idea is that the seeds given to the private initiatives are later returned to the 
community, so other members can use these if they are interested in entering that form of 
business. While those solutions are more pragmatic, still other socios ask for a more coherent 
project proposal. These examples show the power dynamics at play in decisions about how to 
manage the PSB incentive and how the community at the end benefits as a whole or not.  
In sum, Wamaní discussed the plan for how to use its annual monetary incentive from 
PSB, USD 26905.50 to be incorporated to the 2019 community investment plan (Table 2). After 
hours of heated discussions, an Investment Plan was approved with the president’s statement: 
“talk now or shut up forever.” In total Wamaní designated about 45%11 of the incentive for 
Economic Development, Subsistence and Commercial Production, 25% for Organizational 
Strengthening and Administrative Expenses, 15% for Conservation and Territorial 
                                                          
11 The objective in this item was to achieve at least 60% of the total incentive. 
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Strengthening, which means that around 16% could be used for Social and Cultural 
Development.  





Forest ranger 800   
Border cleaning 1500 
This activity is done by a 
minga. The money is used 
for community 
improvements. 
Signs making 600   
Monitoring 1100   
Economic Development, Subsistence and Commercial Production 
Poultry 6000   
Sacha Laran 3000   
Forestry 1500   
Technical assistance 1500   
Social and Cultural Development 
Incentive to community’s best students.   
The incentive is translated 
into buying school books, or 
laptop, etc. 
Incentive for community’s founder members or 
socios.  
  
 For leaders in need of 
economic support.  
Purchase of cultural clothing   
Used in festivities by 
community members.  
Purchase of cleaning kits    
 Used for the community’s 
installations. 
Purchase of utensils for community’s kitchen     
Organizational Strengthening and Administrative Expenses 
Food 600   
Utilities 300   
Incentive for community’s leaders 1500   
Incentive for community’s technician  800   
Community’s accountant 1700   
Community’s secretary 800   
Community’s treasurer 1000   
Total 22700   
 





In the same meeting, one of the socios asked: “10 years of Socio Bosque. What have we 
achieved? We have already turned 10, for the next 10 years let’s do something.” Wamaní had 
signed its agreement with Programa Socio Bosque in 2008. After 10 years, the same community 
was wondering what they have done with the funds of PSB. In order to take advantage of the 
incentive, community members prompted each other: “let’s think [now] in big things! for the 
next 10 years to come.” This is evidence of how the community appropriates the PSB incentive 
and translates it into something they know or something they want to achieve. Through the lens 
of community, PSB is as an opportunity to achieve internal objectives and benefits. This is what 
some scholars call “motivations”, which become the center piece for which the community 
decides to participate in the program (Nicolas Kosoy et al., 2008).   
 As I mentioned in previous sections, the socio-political organization of Wamaní has centered 
on the defense and legalization of ancestral territories, as well as on the defense of Runa ways of 
life. In order to be recognized as Indigenous subjects by the State (through CODENPE) the 
community has its own statutes and it has a “constitution” as an indigenous community. 
Community statutes are the “motivations” for the use and designation of the PSB incentive. 
Below are some of the objectives incorporated in Wamaní’s 2011 updated statutes: 
a. Promote the revitalization, development and dissemination of cultural, linguistic, spiritual 
identity, history, legal system, local knowledge, that is, the community’s own 
cosmovision, in order to achieve a harmonious coexistence between its members and the 
natural environment. 
b. Promote own, solidary and community economy systems that guarantee the living 
conditions of its members to reach sumak kawsay; 
c. Caring for and protecting the environment and biodiversity in order to achieve a healthy 
and ecologically balanced life that guarantees sustainable development. 
d. Obtain technical, financial and scientific support from national or international 
organizations, public and private, to execute programs and projects of integral 
development with identity. 
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e. Actively participate in the process of struggle of the local, provincial and national 
indigenous movement in defense and respect for the rights enshrined in national and 
international regulations. 
 
In the first 10 years of PSB, the incentive was used for lawsuits to defend community 
lands from expropriation, improve water systems, school rooms, etc. (Juan Shiguango, personal 
interview, February 12, 2019). According to Wamaní’s President, 15 members managed to 
obtain individual land ownership in Wamaní with the argument that credit access allowed them 
to build their homes. The internal pressure over individual land ownership puts communal 
landholdings at risk and is also discussed in other indigenous spaces. In a regional meeting12 with 
indigenous leaders in Lago Agrio, for example, participants were concerned with how to 
participate in programs without affecting the status of the community. They expressed their 
individual ideas for private business initiatives in terms of agriculture, forestry, ecotourism, etc. 
For those individual initiatives, they demanded that the community endorse individual credit. A 
participant described how his private enterprise initiative failed, and because of the communal 
endorsement, the demand for payment was translated to the community, and in some way the 
community was at risk of losing their territories to cover a private debt. He insisted that in order 
to protect the community, privatization of the communal landholdings should be considered. 
Living inside a community, where the community is the owner of the land but not its members to 
achieve “progress or development” under the promise of life improvement, the availability of 
funding pressure that members look to divide the community and demand for individual land 
ownership.  




                                                          
12 This meeting was held on June 12, 2018, organized by COICA and CONFENIAE. 
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Indigenizing the market 
Another area that illustrates the ways in which Runa positionality and PSB are negotiated 
is the appropriation of market ideas into Runa ways of knowing. My observations, informal 
conversations, and interviews suggest that the community considers PSB’s incentive an 
oportunidad, an opportunity for livelihood improvement, in other words, incentives are a 
motivation. According to the Investment Plan reviewed, people plan to invest at least 60% of the 
incentive to improve local production. For example, they plan to use the incentive to start several 
economic initiatives: a local company, Sacha Laran, poultry, etc. These allocations are evidence 
of community motivations to find resources to support local initiatives. However, the initiatives 
are based not only on the availability of an incentive, but also on what that incentive would 
facilitate.  
In the process of re-categorizing incentives, the community transformed it internally to 
their own benefits. Such a redefinition of terms navigates and deals with internal and external 
pressures and dynamics in order to maintain a coherent, unified, planned community without 
losing their connection to the past legacies and future. Another example of how this idea unfolds 
is how Wamaní assigned costs for border cleaning, where it “captured” the monetary dominance 
in incentives and turned it into other kinds of benefits that are more aligned with reciprocal 
obligations. In the case of border cleaning, the payment is not given to socios who participate in 
clearing activities but it is saved and considered a contribution to the community. The traditional 
indigenous social activity that resembles this process is called the minga, which is a communal 
activity to meet the community’s needs, in terms of housing, water services, school construction, 
etc. In this social arrangement, socios collaborate and monetary payment is not used as the 
primary mode of mediating a relationship with PSB. 
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As these examples demonstrate, there is an internal push towards indigenizing the 
incentive-motivation relationship. In order to minimize the figure of money as the primary form 
of relationship among community members, Wamaní appropriated not only the incentive but 
used terms they know, such as donación (donation) or minga13, to redefine how the incentive is 
invested. Wamaní resolved to not give socios cash transfers individually but rather to give 
support, stimulus, utensils, equipment, health access, food, among others. In other words, 
Wamaní relied on the philosophy of reciprocity and co-dependence to appropriate the PSB 
incentive. 
Capacity building 
Another area of debate was capacity building. Capacity building is often achieved 
through state-endorsed projects, though these are not the only ones. In Wamaní, previous 
programs and relations were implemented to achieve capacity building, such as Gran Sumaco 
Project, PROFAFOR, Net Zero Deforestation Zones, etc. which supported community’s training 
in environmental leadership. According to one community socio, however, the current leaders 
are more dependent on external funds (PBS and others) (Manuel Shiguango, personal interview, 
January 28, 2019). Though, PBS’s incentive is also used for conservation where members get 
training as environmental monitors for the ABC, that skill is also used in other environmental 
matters for the community. So, community’s capacity building is not only translated to the 
efficient use of the incentive, but in how the community build capacity for governance process 
(Manuel Shiguango, personal interview, January 28, 2019). The following example elaborates 
this point.  
                                                          
13 It refers to a community work action in order to seek the common good. 
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Once, when I was visiting Wamaní to interview its president, a young member 
approached me. The President told me that he was one of the community’s environmental 
monitors. I asked him about his experience in monitoring. He said that environmental training 
has helped him to know about how to incorporate the use of drones in environmental monitoring. 
He described the operation, how to use GPS14 coordinates, and the feasibility to use drones. In 
just a short time, the community will be using drone technology for environmental monitoring, 
which can also serve to monitor territorial governance. To me, this is another form in which 
Wamaní appropriates the PSB incentive, combining traditional forms of territorial monitoring 
and internal rules with the technologies and rationalities used to serve the purposes of PSB. 
Political governance 
A final area of contention that I observed is the negotiation of internal political 
governance. Even though Wamaní is one community, it has distinct populated centers, a product 
of internal dynamics: Llaucana Pacha, Shipawa Urku, Wayusa Urku and Rumi Panka (the central 
area). These centers place demands and request attention from the administrative elite of 
Wamaní; many of these demands are negotiated through the use of the PBS incentive. For 
example, in 10 years, these sub-centers have received support for piped water, remodeling of 
local school. These actions suggest that the PSB incentive can be also seen as a political 
opportunity. For Juan Shiguango, the Wamaní president, although PSB was approved in a 
general communal assembly, without any external “pressure” (Juan Shiguango, personal 
interview, February 12, 2019), how PSB attracts and seduces the community represents a form of 
the subtle act of repetition – something that they have already experienced before in the making 
of place. For them, PSB becomes the only permanent source of income to be used for 
                                                          
14 Global Positioning System 
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community’s livelihoods and they can use in local initiatives as described before. However, need 
for utilities, school, food, clothing, equipment, etc. makes it difficult for Wamaní to be isolated 
from the market.  
In this section, I described how Wamaní understand different aspects of their relationship 
with PSB. Next, I examine how indigenous organizations such as FOIN, a grassroots indigenous 
organization based in Tena, Napo province, understand PSB. 
Indigenous organizations, PSB 
In 2004, after finishing my Master’s program at Illinois, I volunteered in indigenous 
grassroots organizations Federation of Indigenous Communities of the Ecuadorian Amazon 
(FCUNAE). This organization is based in the Orellana province and does the similar work as 
FOIN: defend and support indigenous territories and the Runa ways of life. At that time, 
Community members responded to FCUNAE guidelines. The work of FCUNAE was the reason 
why many oil companies were required to request permits to enter and negotiate with 
communities. It was a sort of respect to indigenous organizations. However, some leaders of 
FCUNAE mismanaged the funds received from oil development projects. As a result, many 
communities decided that all community-oil company negotiations should be done at the level of 
the community, without the intervention of FCUNAE, which was seen as “corrupt.” This 
resolution created many issues for FCUNAE; I witnessed how it lost political agency and 
influence. FCUNAE’s loss of representation, political leadership - political agency dynamics- 
can also be seen at FOIN, with the presence of PSB. 
In the Napo Province, the previous experience replicates why communities such as 
Wamaní had to “negotiate” participation in a program such PSB, without the participation of its 
“mother” organization as FOIN. As a program that was not built “from below”, PSB bypassed 
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FOIN and negotiated directly with organization communities such as Wamaní (Patricio 
Shiguango, personal interview, January 29, 2019). Some FOIN communities were afraid to 
participate in PSB while other communities chose to participate. While communities affiliated 
with FOIN participate in PBS, for their leaders, “communities don’t know what our future will 
be” (Rosa Cerda, personal interview, January 29, 2019). According to Rosa Cerda, Vice-
president of FOIN, PSB was not socialized with local communities or with indigenous 
organizations (personal interview, January 29, 2019). It did not have an analysis and discussion, 
either for understanding participation or the creation of the program. Before the State’s policies, 
“we used to live happy and nobody told us anything,” argues Rosa Cerda. However, today, “they 
persecute us” with the implementation of programs such as PSB. According to indigenous 
leaders, some communities “no longer have areas for crops” because areas inside the community 
have been assigned for PBS and “cannot use the forest for timber” (Rosa Cerda, personal 
interview, January 29, 2019). In sum, the MAE is controlling timber, and fishing. However, 
people need funds, so they do these activities clandestinely.  
Moreover, according to FOIN leaders, the increase of alcoholism, drug addiction, rape, 
among others, are not accounted into the impacts of the MAE, such as PSB. “Communities 
participate in PSB to obtain economic resources” and because it was a “popular project,” states 
Rosa Cerda (personal interview, January 29, 2019). The “proposals have to be negotiated” and 
speculate “why do foreigners come to propose to take care of nature, but if they are the ones that 
pollute the most?” “No one should come to tell us what to do. They tie our hands.” Also, 
according to this leader, the implementation of PSB in reality is due to the actions of some male 
chauvinist (machista) community leaders. “Now we [women] are the most affected at home” 
because due to the conditionalities of PSB, women cannot create crops which means that our 
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income is diminished, while just males are benefited (Rosa Cerda, personal communication, 
January 29, 2109). This view of women, was corroborated when I approached them for an 
interview. Women, responded “I do not know much about Socio Bosque, my husband knows 
more about it.” (Delia Chimbo, personal communication, February 23, 2109). In this sense, I feel 
a little bit disappointed because as soon as I approach a woman their husbands also approached. 
So, I think a more profound research about PSB from the lens of Napo Runa women will be 
necessary. Which means that male are the ones that take decision on PSB matters. However, 
women are the most affected ones because they are the ones who provide food from chacra or 
crops (Perreault, 2005). In other words, PSB does not entail an equity process in which women 
also be benefited with the incentive and not just their males.    
How PSB can be improved: attention to subtle acts of repetition 
PSB can be improved in several areas. Monitoring processes can include indigenous 
knowledge, not only in terms of maps to control vegetation variation, but also in terms of 
territorialities or the indigenous conceptions of property (which I discuss in the next chapter). 
Indigenous peoples perceive the forest in terms of their intrinsic socioenvironmental relations, 
the connection with beings, sacred areas, hunting and fishing sites, etc. The delimitation of ABC 
for the program has to include those socioenvironmental dynamics, and according to the 
community logics. For PBS, the idea of voluntary, means that the program did not pressured the 
delimitation of ABCs. However, in the view of the community, even though they were not 
pressured to define the ABC, they were still pressured to quickly define the ABC to fit PBS’s 
time framework and participate in the program. In other words, PSB can benefit if a more 
participative and communal approach is used, not a standardized one, but one that recognizes and 
accounts for indigenous organizational dynamics. In this context, community members argue 
90 
 
that PSB include the ABC in terms of ecological corridors, indigenous territorialities, and rescue 
the chacra15 system. 
In terms of incentives and motivations, a PSB local representative argued that “there is no 
clarity in terms of concepts by PSB officials and donors” (Manuel Shiguango, personal 
interview, January 28, 2019).  For example, for a local PSB technician, the incentive is a 
recognition to landowners who preserve the natural state of the forest. A clearer and unified use 
of the concepts can be beneficial to the practitioners. This in some way is reflected in the 
discursive embeddedness of PES and how practitioners and policymakers have to navigate it. 
Wamaní socios inquire in terms of benefits (in their own perspective) and about the guarantees to 
achieve those benefits transparently without being trapped in a subtle act of repetition.  
Community members consider that the ABC should be designed according to 
territorialities, land uses, and thus won’t be dissociated from their traditional management. In the 
case of Wamaní, each socio has to designate at least 30% of its own parcel as conservation area 
(Juan Shiguango, personal interview, February 12, 2019). The proposal is that areas already 
designed for conservation in each parcel can be part of the ABC (Figure 8). Moreover, in order 
to reorient people from hunting in the ABC’s, some local PSB’s technicians created hunting 
protocols to use sustainable hunting practices (Manuel Shiguango, personal interview, January 
28, 2019).   
Finally, in this chapter, I have shown how at the local, communities, such as the Wamaní 
have tension with Programa Socio Bosque. However, those tensions have to be understood in 
terms of community motivations, strategies, adaptations, and appropriation of external programs 
to achieve internal goals. In this context, Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) have to 
                                                          
15 Traditional indigenous crops 
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contextualized in terms of local cultural, geographical, and economic realities. Indigenous 
people, such as the Napo Runa understand and transform external concepts into “images” that 
are familiar to them and understood in their own terms. This means that PES is being 
appropriated, shifted, challenged or changed according the local socioenvironment.  























Community A with PSB (current) Community B with PSB (proposed 
by members of Wamaní) 
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CHAPTER 3: (NEO) COLONIAL PRACTICES OF LAND APPROPRIATION AND PSB 
 
Introduction 
When I was doing my undergraduate studies at USFQ (Universidad San Francisco de 
Quito) in Ecuador, I had a small discussion with a professor about territorial rights of Napo Runa 
in the Ecuadorian Amazon. He argued that Indigenous Peoples are not able to claim territorial 
rights because their land-life relations and exchanges are not sufficient legal evidence to base 
their claims on those territories. To be recognized as having a sense of property, he suggested, 
requires being codified as landowners under settler law. In the dominant Ecuadorian society, this 
would translate into ‘Napo Runa don’t have a sense of property.’ To me, this moment signaled 
that among educated, policy makers, and Ecuadorian society, it is still difficult to recognize that 
the original territory of what is known as Ecuador today was built over the violent appropriation 
of lands that belonged to indigenous peoples. Also, as that professor argued, people seem to see 
property only in terms of the law, diminishing previous and current forms of seeing property in 
terms of territoriality (Lu, 2001; Whyte, 2018). However, as property scholars all note that 
property is fundamentally about social relations about and with things, and the ‘law’ is only one 
of many possible ways of codifying property (Macpherson, 1978; Peluso, 2005; C. M. Rose, 
1990).  
I start with this moment of misrecognition and misreading of Indigenous Peoples notions 
of property (Lu, 2001) because I believe it is important for understanding the contemporary 
experience of the Napo Runa with Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs such as 
93 
 
Programa Socio Bosque (PSB). I believe that PSB functions the way it does not because Napo 
Runa are unfamiliar with property ideas but because they understand the coloniality of property, 
formalization, and settlement all too well. PSB is dependent on the history of land settlement in 
the Amazon (Dall’Alba, 1992; T. Macdonald, 1999), and is now part of the processes of 
reconfiguring the fight for ancestral territory among Napo Runa. In other words, the PSB 
replicates and offers a simplification of property, generating new forms of "violence" and 
tensions to the complex relationships and definitions of property (Mansfield, 2008; Whyte, 2018) 
in the Northern Ecuadorian Amazon. 
My starting place for this analysis is the idea of property through the lens of the Napo 
Runa. First, I draw on property scholarship to provide a genealogy of the role of property has 
operated as a scheme of land appropriation in the Ecuadorian Amazon. I use a historical 
geography approach to map how property has been changing or adapting its meaning to 
historical, cultural, political and environmental contexts in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Then, I 
reflect on how these settlement schemes shape the settlement of the Napo Runa. Finally, I turn to 
how technical environmental narratives and requirements associated with PSB are 
operationalized through historical practices of enclosure, control, and spatial reconfiguration 
(Heynen et al., 2007). I argue that conservation programs such as Program Socio Bosque (PSB) 
reproduce the colonial relations of power over indigenous lands and its people. In the case of 
PSB, Ecuadorian government policies continuously reproduce (neo) colonial legacies that 
promote individual property relations in indigenous communities, which undermines 
assemblages of communal rights (Van Hecken, Bastiaensen, & Windey, 2015) and converts its 
participants into disciplined capitalist subjects (Heynen et al., 2007).  
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Property and the settlement of the Ecuadorian Amazon 
As Nancy Peluso (2005, p. 9) argues, “tensions are emerging between new and old 
practices, between territorial and non-territorial forms of claiming and new ways of seeing 
property.”  This is indeed the case in the Ecuadorian Amazon, where different frontiers of 
capitalist accumulation over the last 500 years have introduced a variety of relations schemes to 
organize how Indigenous Peoples and settlers live together on the land (Lu, Silva, Villeda, & 
Sorensen, 2015; T. Macdonald, 1999; Valdivia, 2005). Among the most important processes of 
resistance among Amazonian peoples today are the fights for land tenure rights and for access to 
and control over ancestral territories. The history of these fights is long in Latin America, dating 
back to the Conquest Doctrine used by the Spaniards to claim and take possession of territories 
that belonged to indigenous peoples. This Doctrine both declared Europeans victorious over the 
“pagan”, “inferior”, and “primitive” civilizations and gave them the right to take possession of 
indigenous ancestral territories (Horna, 2001; Schacherreiter, 2009). From the colonial period to 
the modern Ecuadorian state, Amazonian peoples have continued to resist the reconfiguration 
and taking of their ancestral territories. Among these, the Napo Runa (or human beings of Napo), 
descendants of ancestral peoples who lived along the Napo River (Archidonans, Quijos, 
Cocamas, Andoas, among others), have inherited these multi-generational struggles over land 
(Macdonald, 1999; Muratorio, 1991; Uzendoski, 2005). This fight has redefined their cultural 
identity; some of them have become farmers and cattle ranchers in order to be “recognized” as 
subjects with rights in the eyes of the settler state (Erazo, 2008; T. Macdonald, 1999; Perreault, 
2002).  
Prior to the arrival of the Spaniards, the northern Ecuadorian Amazon was known as the 
region of the Quijos, ruled in the form of Cacicazgos (chieftains) by indigenous peoples such as 
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the Quijos, Yumbos, Cocas, Huimas, Cofanes, Encabellados, Záparos (Gutiérrez, 2002; 
Villavicencio, 1858). Between 1534 (the year of the foundation of Ciudad de Quito, the current 
capital of Ecuador) and 1563, the conquistadores founded four towns in this region: Baeza, 
Ávila, Archidona and San Juan de Los Dos Ríos de Tena, ruled under the Governorship of 
Quijos, Sumaco and La Canela (Muratorio, 1991). Next, I describe a number of landed systems 
of rule and subjectivities that have been established since the Conquest. These systems built on 
each other and at times are superimposed on each other, repeating practices of settlement that 
alienate indigenous peoples from ancestral relations with territory.  
The encomienda 
The encomienda was one of the most significant settlement systems put in place by the 
Spanish. It awarded the Spaniards the right to use labor and extract tribute from indigenous 
peoples as a return for services to the Spanish crown, but not the right to land (Ramirez, 2007).  
The subjugation of Indigenous Peoples under the encomienda system worked through the 
separation of people from the land, socially, ideologically and ontologically. Under the 
encomienda, Indigenous peoples were considered a source of labor. The Conquistadors re-
organized how Indigenous Peoples lived on the landscape, congregating and settling them in 
reducciones, spaces to convert them into Christianity, teach them Quichua as a lingua franca, and 
turn them into a source of labor under the management of the Missions (Muratorio, 1991; 
Villavicencio, 1858). Indigenous peoples resisted these colonial settlement practices imposed on 
them. One way to minimize this resistance was the creation of parcialidades, an administrative 
system that mimicked indigenous social practices, dividing diverse indigenous peoples according 
to geographic location, the name of the leader of the indigenous group or the characteristics 
(hunters, fishermen, or harvesters) (Gutiérrez, 2002). Each parcialidad had a ruling indigenous 
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authority, such as the yachak  (pende or shaman), which in turn were subject to the rule of the 
encomenderos (Muratorio, 1991).  
The encomenderos used Lockean ideas of property - as an infinite right of (only white 
European) individuals through labor- and race to destabilize not only indigenous people’s 
property regimes but also their socioenvironmental relations. In the 1540s, a hierarchical 
organization of access and control over land became established through ideologies of race, 
becoming a key factor in the transmission of property, and in the separation of indigenous, 
mestizos, and mulattos from each other and from the white population (Federici, 2004, p. 108). 
Through this racialized project of separation, the nature and the body of an indigenous person 
became an object (a commodity), reinforced by the idea of acquiring dominium over it, or the 
“rule over things by the individual” (Cohen, 1927, 156). Ultimately, the land and the indigenous 
person became marketable and “ownable”.  
From before the raise of the haciendas until the late 18th century, white settlers managed 
indigenous peoples through a variety of credit or patron-peon relations (Tejada, 2015). However, 
indigenous peoples did not always obey the systems imposed and preferred to return to live in 
the forest (Muratorio, 1991), where they could continue reproducing ancestral ways of existing 
with the land. Riots and rebellions were not uncommon; some groups decided to even to 
collectively die by suicide as cultures rather than to surrender to the Spanish rule during the 
colony (Gutiérrez, 2002). In the process, some towns founded during the colony became merely 
names in maps abandoned or inhabited by few Spaniards and by indigenous peoples (Esvertit, 
2008; Muratorio, 1991) and the governance of this territory became a form of wandering 
government16 (Villavicencio, 1858), even during the early modern Ecuadorian State. The 
                                                          
16 This refers that the Spaniards had an itinerant government, meaning they moved their governance where 
indigenous peoples moved.  
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Northern Ecuadorian Amazon thus was not completely dominated by the conquistadores, 
merchants, hacendados, and missionaries. 
Though Ecuador gained independence from Spain in 1830, the colonial system of 
administrating Indigenous Peoples remained in place in the Oriente - the lands to the east of the 
seat of government in Quito (Villavicencio, 1858). To secure personal contribution to the state 
by Indigenous Peoples, another system was created, the repartos (forced apportionments of 
goods to the indigenous peoples) by the whites (Muratorio, 1991). After the independence, the 
whites lost their privileges, thus, the white colonists became merchants to maintain some of their 
colonial privileges. In 1846, to promote colonization, communication systems, and reduce 
resistance by Indigenous Peoples, the National Congress abolished the colonial system of 
encomiendas and forced repartos and work without remuneration (Esvertit, 2008). The National 
Congress assumed that if only that particular tribute was removed, the indigenous peoples of the 
Oriente –including those not yet converted to Christianity –would be easily settled (Muratorio, 
1991). The Ecuadorian constitutions of 1845, 1851 and 1852, established that the Oriente would 
be ruled under special laws (Esvertit, 2008). However, the weak presence of the government and 
the pacts among local authorities, and merchants impeded the application of the law (Muratorio, 
1991; Villavicencio, 1858).  
By 1870, President García Moreno commissioned Indigenous Peoples as labor for Jesuit 
Missions (from 1870 to 1875) (Muratorio, 1991). The project of the Jesuit Missions was to 
Christianize indigenous peoples but also to implant an economy based on agriculture and cattle 
ranching, expecting indigenous peoples to be settled in permanent towns, and not according to 
their ancestral ways of moving across the landscape. According to Esvertit (2008) the 
Ecuadorian state promoted and regulated the colonization process in remote lands including the 
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Oriente through the Ley de Tierras Baldías (vacant lands law) in 1865, which considered the 
region as tierras baldías or vacant lands available for colonization. The concession of lands and 
planned colonies included areas where Napo Runa had their chacras (crops), tambos (lodges) 
and the reducciones. Later, due to the increase of quinine exploitation (1861-1885), the Law of 
1875 recognized the right of settled indigenous peoples to property in the form of communal 
dominium. However, this law was never fulfilled. In Archidona for example, father Gaspar 
Tovía denounced the following:  
“Each one grabs the land he wants without any formality, and without saving anything 
for the procedures and formalities established by the law for the disposal of empty land: these 
lands are not empty, but communally owned, each town ... so that these are gradually losing their 
land, and soon they will have to emigrate, or be reduced to slavery with the name of “conciertos” 
[...] In Archidona, three quarters of the circumference that forms the Egido from the town, they 
are already taken by four whites and by the governor's son. It is to be noted that of these whites 
none have property rights, nor for the occupation of these lands has preceded complaint, or 
tender, or the other formalities prescribed by law.” (Cited in Esvertit, p. 157). 
 
The Ley del Oriente 
The rubber boom (between 1880 – 1920), renewed attention to the Oriente (Esvertit, 2008; 
Tejada, 2015). Ecuador’s intentions were to claim territorial dominion over pending delimited 
zones against the physical advancement of neighbor’s countries in the lowlands Oriente 
(Esvertit, 2008). In 1885, Congress approved the Ley de Oriente (Law of Eastern lands). This 
Law reproduced the spirit of previous laws that promoted colonization and “civilization” of 
indigenous peoples by Catholic Missions. This law prohibited the forced repartos and the system 
of debts. Congress in 1894 made reforms to the Ley de Oriente of 1885, establishing that any 
person, national of foreign, can settle the Oriente, except for the reducciones. A settler (families 
or individuals) would be allowed a maximum of 200 hectares. Gratuity of land acquisition was 
established to honored people from other parts of Ecuador to stimulate settling the Oriente, with 
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economic incentives for coffee, rubber, and cacao plantations (Esvertit, 2008). The 1894 reform 
to the Ley de Oriente, allowed the governors and political leaders (jefe político) to trace lands for 
the establishment of future towns.  
However, the law was only partly fulfilled. In 1894, local elites requested an easier 
process for the appropriation of lands and the abolition of imposed land regulations. Local social 
dynamics among merchants, colonists and indigenous peoples influenced in this decision. They 
also requested more contact with indigenous peoples to supposedly “civilize” them; in reality, 
they aimed to capture their labor. The expansion of rubber extraction motivated the request of 
multiple lands which was in the hands of the governor of the Oriente, where corruption and 
favoritism prevailed (Esvertit, 2008).  
In 1896, President Eloy Alfaro expelled the Jesuit Missions from the region, keeping only 
secular priests, because they were seen as interfering with the process of control and occupation 
of space for political and economic matters (Muratorio, 1991). In 1899, Eloy Alfaro exempted all 
Ecuadorian indigenous peoples from the territorial tax and subsidiary work, and recognized them 
as Ecuadorian citizens for education and legal protection through a reformulated Ley de Oriente 
(T. Macdonald, 1999). However, the parcialidades system, originated during colonial times, still 
persisted, and was used to subdue indigenous peoples by allowing the existing hierarchy of rule 
to remain. In the process of state-market-community’s relations, after indigenous peoples 
became legal Ecuadorian citizens, they also got the recognition to the “free flow of goods, to 
freely sell and exchange their labor power and things” (Muratorio, 1991, p. 69).  
Padronazgo 
The Ecuadorian government continued sponsoring colonization and resource extraction 
in the Oriente through the early 1900s (Esvertit, 2008). During this period, as in the colonial 
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period, violent processes of control subsumed indigenous peoples under the prevalent system of 
patron-client (peon) relations (Dall’Alba, 1992). This system, a modification of the repartos 
created in the colony, centered socieconomic relations between white settlers and indigenous 
peoples through padronazgo which was more notorious between 1910 and 1930 (Tejada, 2015). 
Padronazgo was an informal and flexible form of patron-peon practices in which the patron used 
“persuasive” strategies to control the indigenous people’s workforce through the obligations 
associated with debt. For example, indebted Napo Runa had to work for their patrones to pay 
infamous debts, only being free after the death of the patrones (Muratorio, 1991). For 
Macdonald (1999, p. 52), the patrón-peón system is better understood in terms of a “moral 
economy” (Scott, 1976) that  
includes a broad set of relationships that carry a complex frame for interpreting 
relationships and creating patterns of interaction that define norms and rules of 
reciprocity regarding rights to land, resources and the fruits of production. Though 
imbalanced and exploitative, the “whole person,” face-to-face nature of patron-client ties 
structured and guided interaction, and thus framed a symbiotic social order generally 
perceived as acceptable.  
 
International demand for rubber led to a “rubber boom” between 1880 - 1920 in the 
Oriente, which brought more white settlers to the Oriente, particularly to the Napo River, a 
fluvial transportation system for rubber trees that easily connected to Iquitos (a commercial 
rubber town in Perú) and to the global markets. Also, previous hacienda patrones of the Oriente 
switched to the rubber economy, becoming the new rubber patrones (Barclay, 1998). Indigenous 
peoples worked in rubber extraction; among these, the Napo Runa were considered more 
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“civilized,” easy to manage, as they were already subsumed under the system debts (Dall’Alba, 
1992). Indigenous peoples (including Napo Runa) who were not part of the debt system were 
forcedly and violently captured, through actions known as correrías, to serve as peons 
(Muratorio, 1991), and also forced into the debt system. Later, as the demand for indigenous 
labor increased, rubber bosses used “debt transfer” known as seducción, to trade indigenous 
labor, between 1907 and 1925 (Barclay, 1998). Napo Runa families and individuals were 
violently moved across rubber regions in Colombia, Perú and Bolivia under this system of 
seducción, while others mobilized voluntarily to escape from rubber bosses. These bosses living 
in settlements along the Middle of the Napo river, were known rivereños patrones (Barclay, 
1998). Here it is important to mention that old and new settlements copied the Andean hacienda 
land management. Albeit this system, in the Oriente, mostly consisted of an opening in the forest 
with few buildings and some indigenous tambo (lodges) scattered around it (Tejada, 2015).  
The hacienda 
By the end of the rubber boom, haciendas became the dominant socioeconomic system in 
the Northern Ecuadorian Amazon. The hacienda was a powerful socioeconomic system (gold 
production, rubber, fishing, coffee, cotton, aguardiente  and as basic shop store) (Dall’Alba, 
1992) and became the center of socioeconomic activities in the Ecuadorian Amazon until the 
1940s (Tejada, 2015). The power of the hacendados was huge, so much so that even the 
Ecuadorian government had to encourage patrones to provide land grants and authorize labor 
contracts to the workforce. However, while the patrones imagined the dominium of large 
territorial tracks, that dominium was fragile as it depended on the presence and labor of 
indigenous peoples. In the area of Tena-Archidona, civil authorities conflicted with patrones’s 
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imagined land extensions. For them, while “in Quito you fight for a span of land. Here 
everything you've seen these days is mine” (Dall’Alba, 1992, p. 183).  
In the times of the hacienda, some indigenous peoples left to settle elsewhere. Others did 
not have any other options and stayed with haciendas, as the hacienda provide them work and 
goods (Dall’Alba, 1992; Tejada, 2015). Some schools were created by the haciendas (although 
some patrones resisted giving this benefit, as they wished to keep indigenous children illiterate). 
The Napo Runa were free to leave, according to the law, but some descendants were born in the 
haciendas and worked there without any chance to leave. Also, the debt system made them feel 
chained to a new form of hereditary slavery. During the hacienda, still following traditional form 
of control, Napo Runa leaders were named as Capitán imparting instructions of the patrón. The 
Capitán was named after the leadership of the yachak (shaman) and organized according to last 
names or characteristics of the muntun (kin and other affiliations), such as Dahua, Shiguango, 
Grefa, Tapuy among others. Close to the hacienda, they maintained their chakra, or forest 
gardens. When hacienda’s cattle and pigs invaded Napo Runa’s chacra, patrones gave them pigs 
as a form of payment (Tejada, 2015). In this sense, some patrones recognized some form of 
property among the Napo Runa, which reflects property as social relation.  
The value of the haciendas was not based on the land itself but on the numbers of peones-
deudores (Tejada, 2015). Some state authorities were also patrones, as the Ecuadorian 
government named civil authorities to those powerful hacendados (Dall’Alba, 1992). In other 
words, the power of the hacendados did not come from the government title but from their social 
relations as patrones (Tejada, 2015). Indigenous peoples related to the haciendas changed their 
traditional agriculture system for rice plantation, becoming this activity as a source of food for 
the locals and also for their patrones to pay their debts obtained as credits during the “rubber 
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boom” in the Center of the Rubber Boom – Iquitos, Peru (Tejada, 2015). Also, along the Napo 
river, indigenous peoples became raising cattle, an activity unknown before 1900s (Dall’Alba, 
1992). In this sense, the haciendas were in some way the center of the new towns, as today, many 
towns still denote the former haciendas names. The system of haciendas lost their output power 
relation over indigenous peoples in the Oriente only when new economic opportunities such as 
oil industry and also geopolitics became more evident between Ecuador and Perú (Dall’Alba, 
1992; Tejada, 2015).  
Agrarian colonies 
By the 1950s, the Ecuadorian government sponsored numerous colonization’s programs 
such as the colonia. One of these were the Colonia Velasco Ibarra, in which the new colony was 
conceded rights by the government over the rights of lands of indigenous peoples and also on 
lands of the hacendados specially around the areas of the Upper Napo river (Esvertit, 2008). 
Also, some haciendas, after the death of the patron, were sold or parceled by other colonos. Few 
of these colonias were promoted by previous colonial settlers who knew the area, and due to 
lobby with other local politicians and contacts in Quito, they were able to get audiences to get 
permits and land titling for the colonia projects (Dall’Alba, 1992). The process of the colonias 
were propitious for people in search of lands, just to get land titling and later to sell it. However, 
some colonias failed to achieve their objectives and were dismantled due to the lack of members 
or because members did not pay the rights to get land titling in hands of the IERAC (Instituto de 
Reforma Agraria y Colonización). Others failed because not all haciendas patrones had land 
titling from the government.  
Later land reforms and colonization policies (1964 and 1973) sponsored by the 
Ecuadorian land titling agency IERAC, promoted agricultural colonization of the Ecuadorian 
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Amazon (Erazo, 2008; Rogers, 1996). These programs sought to distribute only tierras baldías 
(Figure 9) to alleviate growing social and economic problems in other regions (Sawer, 1997). As 
a result, ancestral territories of indigenous peoples were continuously appropriated by settlers. 
Land reform required that 50% of each parcel of land should be converted to farming activities 
(Assies, et. al. 2001). Thus, more than 16% of the Amazon region was colonized, and this 
number continues to rise.  
Also around this time, Ecuador began to promote biodiversity conservation. Ecuador has 
only 5% of the Amazon rainforest, but it is one of the most biologically diverse areas in the 
world (Bass et al., 2010). Its high biodiversity and endemism required strong environmental 
conservation policies. Conservation has been done mostly through the creation of national parks 
and biodiversity reserves, including the Yasuní National Park, The Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve, 
National Park Sumaco-Napo-Galeras and Limoncocha Biological Reserve, which are mainly 





Figure 9. Ecuadorian Government’s settlement map in 1963. Source: (Southgate, Wasserstrom, 
& Reider, 2009). 
Thus far, with this summary of land appropriation in the Ecuadorian Amazon, it might 
seem like the Napo Runa had no idea of property but were subject to imposed property regimes 
to which they adapted. This is not true. Rather, the point is that there are different forms of 
seeing property (informal or customary property), what I call Indigenous Property Regimes 
(discussed in Chapter 4), that operate under the idea of social practices and territorialities, and 
which sustain social life and cultural expressions of the Napo Runa. However, they are not 
always valued or translated; they cannot be encapsulated within the narrow grammar of how 
property is understood by the colonial logics of land settlement.  
Property as a guarantee of Napo Runa livelihoods? 
The above description is framed within the process of converting land into a production 
tool, through processes of generating ownership. However, as it was seen, from the point of view 
of the Napo Runa, their ancestral lands were appropriated or stolen over generations, by the 
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Spanish, colonizers, merchants, missionaries, and later by the Ecuadorian state. All these 
processes and their property arrangements, such as encomiendas, reducciones and parcialidades, 
haciendas, agrarian colonies, protected areas, and conservation areas, have both created 
dependence and instability and attracted and seduced indigenous peoples by promising improved 
livelihoods (through access to jobs, markets, and resources).  
In this context, the Ecuadorian government’s efforts to incorporate the Oriente to the 
national body was irregular but persistent (Esvertit, 2008), working through geopolitical 
strategies to control space and through the occupation of lands for economic purposes. 
Moreover, the law favored local elites, merchants, and hacendados because they were able to 
formalize larger lands for their own purposes. While some aspects of the law could have 
protected indigenous peoples’ right to land, these were not fulfilled. Some forms of property 
were recognized by the law, such as areas where indigenous peoples lived. However, the 
formalization of property of ancestral lands of indigenous peoples was not considered in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon. 
Even though indigenous peoples acquired some constitutional rights, for example, 
citizenship, and were exempt from land taxes and forced parcialidades, throughout history, poor 
planning and development policies were implemented in the Ecuadorian Amazon. The Napo 
Runa’s citizenship as Ecuadorians has brought many problems, such as the loss of their ancestral 
lands, the erosion of their culture, the materialization of spiritual relationships, and the adoption 
of the idea that nature is an object that can be commodity. There is research in this regard on the 
complex problems that the Napo Runa face (Grefa, 2014; Muratorio, 1991; Uzendoski, 2005; 
Whitten, 1975, 1985). In response to these projects, the indigenous people of the Ecuadorian 
Amazon have used some strategies to secure their survival and be visible as Ecuadorian subjects 
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(Valdivia, 2009). These are actions of resurgence. I have witnessed those resurgence strategies 
among the Napo Runa, which focused on: 1) Promoting and strengthening their own cultural 
practices in indigenous territories, 2) Adapting the “Comuna” land system as a model of 
governance in indigenous territories, 3) Legalizing ancestral indigenous territories through 
national government agreements, 4) Promoting traditional practices, 5) And promoting and 
assuring Napo Runa existence through a process of cooperation with Western culture.  
Indigenous peoples such as the Napo Runa witnessed the appropriation of their ancestral lands. 
They were “forced” to adopt the “Comuna” administrative system as a way to formalize 
ownership of their own ancestral land (Cronkleton & Larson, 2015). Others decided to form 
Indigenous Cooperatives (a form of privately owned lands by indigenous and non-indigenous 
people) (T. Macdonald, 1999; Perreault, 2002). Local Napo Runa populations “claimed hunting, 
fishing, and gardening territories as their own and to defend their claims to that property, 
ensuring the availability to accommodate the shifting cultivation, hunting and fishing that they 
practiced” (Erazo, 2013, p. 98). Moreover, in the Amazon region, there are many indigenous 
territories that are not yet legalized as ancestral lands. Their land is considered private property, 
and is therefore taxable and easy prey for the real estate market. I have witnessed and 
experienced as other Runa living in lands under private property schemes, despite the conditions 
that this entails, as a way to ensure rights as the colonos. Next, I offer a concrete example of the 
complex dynamics of land tenure among the Napo Runa. 
The Settlement of Huiruno: comunas and the formalization of indigenous lands 
When I was child, I used to live in a small house in a lot bought by my parents in the 
growing town of Coca (formally known as City of Francisco de Orellana). At age of 9, my 
parents joined a newly formed “Comuna,” Comuna Ávila-Huiruno, close to the town of Loreto, 
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in the foothills of the Sumaco Volcano. My parents told me that across that Ávila-Huiruno, a 
new state road was being built to connect Coca-Loreto and from there to Tena and Quito 
(Ecuador’s Capital). Once this road was built, I used to travel by bus and car across many 
different “Comunas” and “campesinos” (non-indigenous peoples living in rural areas) lands 
among the Northern Ecuadorian Amazonian landscapes and witnessed the change on landscape, 
due to the permanent presence of new settlements.  
According to my mother, who later become a leader in her comuna of Ávila-Huiruno, in 
1984, my aunt Sarita Andi told her that she had just joined a new Runa community and that there 
were still open slots for new members. The requirements to be member of Ávila-Huiruno were 
that candidate must not be member of another comuna. The socios or members of the comuna 
had to be male. They were assigned parcels of about 50 hectares, but that at least 50% of the land 
parcel had to be converted into agriculture. They also had to settle permanently in the assigned 
slot and participate in comuna life. Finally, the socios had to follow a westernized governance 
system, a directorate elected in general assemblies and following internal regulations created for 
the good governance of the “Comuna”.  
The organization of Ávila-Huiruno began at the end of the 1970s, when indigenous 
peoples felt concerned by how the state road (Vía Interoceánica or Inter-Ocean Road) would 
enhance colonization, appropriation of indigenous ancestral lands, and generate culture change. 
They believed that they had to adopt the “comuna” schemes of social organization because it was 
an instrument that would allow them to protect and secure their lands (Cronkleton & Larson, 
2015). In other words, they didn’t see themselves as having another option. The formation of the 
comunas changed their muntun or kin group; under the comuna, the muntun encompassed a 
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broader affinity group with different groups coming together to secure access to ancestral lands 
and become visible subjects with rights (Erazo, 2013; Rogers, 1996).  
Under the figure of the comuna, the Napo Runa held lands in the form of “posesión” –
possession or under customary norms, but did not have legal land titles. So, this means that 
holdings were recognized within the community, but not by the state. Also, my mother stated 
that some members of Ávila-Huiruno allowed colonos (settlers) to be part of the comuna, 
supposedly because of their easy grasp of Spanish language, mobility between the community 
and the city, and because they understood the legal requirements and made lobbying to formalize 
the social organization easier. For example, when I was attending the local school, I had non-
indigenous classmates. The assigned lots for colonos where stablished outside of the comuna 
polygon, specifically in the “reserve” area. I remember that this reserve area was assigned to a 
few colonos, but I was also told that the area was designated to be distributed for future members 
or for specific activities such as hunting, fishing and harvesting for the benefit of the whole 
community.  
The problem in Ávila-Huiruno is that even though they were able to receive communal 
land titling, the process of colonization by force cast a long shadow. According to my mother, 
global land titling did not secure the possession of lands. As in previous experiences of the Napo 
Runa, mentioned in previous sections, my mother and others realized that the government 
favored the protection of private property for economic purposes over communal property 
interests. She argues that members of the Comuna Ávila-Huiruno were informed that a large 
monoculture project was looking for space to implement – palma africana (oil palm plantation) 
in the foothills of the Sumaco Volcano. Thus, they though that only by accessing private 
property in the form of individual landowners they could maintain their ancestral lands. Thus, 
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they followed colono strategies; they “bought” the lands from the government then acquired 
private property titles. In other words, private land titling was seen as a way to secure rights over 
lands and prevent land invasion by colonos or any project led by the government. Property, for 
indigenous peoples, was understood as the result of social relations and as an instrument to 
secure ancestral lands (Cronkleton & Larson, 2015).  
In the next section I provide an analysis of how PSB is repeating these same acts of 
property securitization to push local communities to consider formalization of property as a way 
to secure lands, but without considering that the formalization of lands represents legacies of 
land appropriation and this ignoring how indigenous see property.  
 
PSB and property 
The primary strategy to take lands was, and continues to be, the establishment of tenure 
systems that respond to ideals of exclusive ownership (Cronkleton & Larson, 2015). “Land 
tenure systems are made up of social relations, including property rights in favor of individuals, 
communities, organizations or the state; these relationships influence who gets access to and 
exercises control over land and forest resources” (Corbera, Estrada, May, Navarro, & Pacheco, 
2011, p. 302). Land tenure plays a critical role in Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) as it is 
the base of efficiency and legality. Those schemes not only respond to these ideals of land tenure 
systems, they both rely on the continuity of and reproduce these already existing complex 
systems of land tenure in the Ecuadorian Amazon. 
PSB valuation technologies emerged as an alternative to extractive practices. PBS 
attributes monetary value for forest preservation in part by maintaining western notions of 
property logics (Corbera et al., 2011). How do the territorial rights claims and property logics 
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associated with PSB affect Napo Runa identity? What are the specific logics, spatiotemporal 
schemes, and valuation metrics of PSB and how do the Napo Runa understand these? For 
instance, who is identified as the “right” kind of landowner, and how are agreements carried out? 
What are the responsibilities and rights of PSB and individuals under these agreements? Do 
indigenous peoples’ input change the way in which PSB is implemented? Those are some 
questions that PSB brings as a new actor that promotes conservation as in the case of indigenous 
territories. 
Property rights define who is the landowner and who has the rights in forest assets, and 
establishes accountabilities of the incentives and its forests management to accomplish agreed 
outcomes (Corbera et al., 2011; Heynen et al., 2007). However, the simplification of property 
creates issues and “violences” on different social arrangements especially related to conservation 
and resources management (Mansfield, 2008). As a crucial requirement of PSB, solicitants 
entering into the program need to show evidence that they are the landowner of said territories. 
This creates what Schloegel calls “program winners” for participants on PBS (2012), while the 
losers are the rejected participants. In a way, this is the result of how the structures of the state 
continue to favor people who are already in favored positions, over others, reflecting the longer 
history of violent property regimes in Ecuador’s history. When I was working as undersecretary 
for the Ecuadorian government from 2008 to 2012, I witnessed the difficulty of investing or putting 
public money into areas that are not legally recognized as property, because the Contraloría (The 
Audit Office) can accuse the public authority of embezzlement of public funds. On the signing of 
the agreement (firma de convenio de ejecución) between the landowner and the Ministry of 
Environment (MAE), the landowner agrees to strictly conserve the “area under conservation” 
(área bajo conservación-ABC), which severely limits other uses on it. The logic behind these 
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requirements is one of enforcement: limiting formal land titling and customary land tenure will 
lead to more effective forest conservation and management, and the curtailment of illegal logging 
(Corbera et al., 2011).  
In PSB’s perspective, Ecuador’s ecologically native forests account for 10 million ha in a 
total area of 26 million ha (de Koning et al., 2011). These forests include forest with native 
species, old forests and restored secondary forests. The territorial landscape of indigenous 
peoples such as the Napo Runa fall into this category; they are considered ecologically native 
forest. But this category ignores their property regime dynamics, which have shaped these very 
forests. These ecological forest imaginaries –endless, pristine, conservation-worthy forests, 
under the view of modern conservation - reflect the Western notion that nature is separate from 
humans, and as that, that nature needs to be protected to continue reproducing its function as 
Ecosystem Services provider (Braun, 2002). In other words, PSB assumes that forests (nature) 
are best conserved when people don’t interact with them—they need to be disassociated from 
people.  
PBS requires that program participants (individual or communal) legalize property. PSB 
only works with legally recognized lands, which is necessary to ensure that state funds are 
managed “properly.”  At the core of PES programs is the “landowner,” a universal subject 
category that does not take into account the intersectional forces that shape indigenous 
experiences today: racialized histories; cycles of poverty in the Amazon; or socioenvironmental 
embeddedness of Amazonian peoples in forest spaces, all of which influence how the Napo Runa 
participate in conservation projects. In addition, the centrality of property rules for monetary 
compensation and the value schemes of PES programs change how indigenous peoples relate to 
and make a living with the natures covered by the program. PSB requires that if a landowner 
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enters into the agreement, his/her or the entire community use of the land is restricted to use 
categories defined by the contract with PES programs.  
There are other issues related to PSB that entangle property in indigenous territories. For 
example, some members of Wamaní, the main case study in my research, expressed concern 
about the way that the Áreas Bajo Conservación (ABC) were determined. Some ABC’s area 
overlap in assigned lot community’s members, known as socios afectados (affected community 
members). For that reason, some socios afectados had to lease internally some lands for crops, 
which means they had to pay to maintain them and are not getting individual benefits. In order to 
avoid this, some members of Wamaní suggested that ABC’s needed to follow the internal 
process of land use and territorialities. For example, each member, in their assigned lots, as the 
internal regulation, they have to assign at least 30% for conservation. So, ABC’s can conform the 
30% of the conservation area in each parcel and the assigned benefits can be distributed equally. 
Similarly, during a community assembly, I witnessed that members were discussing to provide a 
special fund to these socios afectados, so they can invest PSB funds to improve their living 
conditions. 
In this sense, PSB works with indigenous lands that already have land titles but refrains 
from  incorporating the participation of informal land owners (Schloegel, 2012). This suggests 
that for PSB, land titling is more important than Ecosystem Services preservation and its 
outcomes. Also, the way that PSB operates is based in the old failing and controversial system of 
1960s and 1970s land reforms, which created insecurities and conflicts among different informal 
landowners. So, even though some indigenous people as the Napo Runa decided to opt for land 
titling as the option to safeguard or govern indigenous territories (Erazo, 2013), still other 
communities are in the legalizing process to protect that status.  
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In the case of Wamaní, there are still several land tenure problems. As some members 
explained, there is some territory that is under legal investigation because a foreigner 
“supposedly” bought some lands that overlapped with the lands that are claimed by the Wamaní 
community. So, the question is not only about property, but about how to legitimize the 
exclusive right to that property. The State supports “the owner,” but who can be the owner, and 
what kind of owner is supported? Property cannot be reduced to a specific space, there are other 
configurations that, as I discussed in previous sections, emerge and reconfigure. In the case of 
PSB, Wamaní and FOIN leaders are concerned with whether the ABC’s still belong to the 
community or whether it becomes a new form of status, separated from their legitimate 
dominium and control, and subsumed under the logics of Western conservations efforts. Thus, in 
Wamaní, members believe that the ABC is no longer their forest; it is a campo minado (a 
minefield) because if they do not comply with the signed agreement, they will be punished, 
perhaps in ways that shape land tenure in these spaces. This creates insecurities about the PSB 
cultural and claims outcomes. The government can claim ownership over PSB in participating 
areas, and can potentially prosecute them because they failed to fulfill their compromises 
(discussed in Chapter 1). What kind of future property regime is emerging or can emerge with 
the discourse of Market-based conservation logics?  
Subtle acts of repetition 
Problems of land titling or land tenure under PES also can be understood in terms of 
displacement, colonial practices and power dynamics (Corbera et al., 2011). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, in the last 300 hundred years, extractive activities that commodify nonhuman natures, 
have been expanding and transforming the everyday environments of Amazonian indigenous 
peoples. These capitalistic practices have redefined access and rights according to production-
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centered metrics, specifically favoring the accumulation of wealth for capitalist entrepreneurs. 
However, Indigenous mobility, customary norms where legal codified rules are not yet operative, 
and indigenous values or sacha runa and territorialities are not incorporated into PSB program.  
These problems of land titling and rules of settler property strip indigenous communities 
from their values through what I call subtle acts of repetition: the repetitive and sustained waves 
of property regime arrangements (which include codes, legal visibility, relations of co-
dependence) that continue to be superimposed over generations of settlement, under the promise 
of seduction and attraction to improve indigenous people’s livelihoods (I this discuss in detail in 
Chapter 4). Amazonian peoples thus are pressed to respond and resurge: they have changed their 
subsistence activities, incorporating production activities into their livelihoods in order to be 
recognized as productive actors that are competitive in relation to other economic uses of the 
land, as well as have engaged in political fights to defend and preserve their right to land, food, 
wood, and local resources (Erazo, 2008; Rogers, 1996; Valdivia, 2005). These kind of actions, 
represent signs for vibrancy rather than decay (Braun, 2002). This reiterates what I mentioned in 
previous chapters about integrating Napo Runa socioenvironmental values, or sacha runa, into a 
system where they don’t have an equal voice or power, and where they do not see themselves as 
having other options but to participate or die. In the next chapter, I discuss this in greater depth, 
where I discuss indigenous socioenvironmental values or sacha runa, and how they play a 






CHAPTER 4: DISENTANGLING NARRATIVES OF SACHA RUNA 
 
In this chapter, I use Napo Runa ways of seeing and being in the world, or runascha, to 
interpret the workings of Programa Socio Bosque (PSB), specifically, and to contribute to the 
emerging scholarship on alternatives conceptualizations of PES, more generally. The chapter 
moves away from a critique of the singular Ecosystem Service Metaphor based on monetary 
evaluations, as explored in previous chapters, and towards recognizing Napo Runa valuation 
schemes that take into account the complexity of human and nonhuman interrelationships 
(Nicolás Kosoy & Corbera, 2010; Norgaard, 2010). The chapter further develops the concept 
acto sutil de repetición or “subtle act of repetition,” to discuss how PSB works, and discusses 
how the Napo Runa understand property in terms of “indigenous property regimes” and finally, 
discusses muntun as a politics of resurgence.  
Methodologically, I use the practice of storytelling to illustrate a Napo Runa conception 
of how PSB works. Amazonian historiographers have been documenting and recording Napo 
Runa stories about boas, toucans, jaguars, snakes, etc., for centuries, referring to these multiple 
and shape-shifting stories as ways to describe indigenous philosophies, ontologies, and sense of 
place (Santos, 1976). I use this practice to tell stories about how the Napo Runa understand and 
work with PSB. Some of these stories have been collected by others, for example, 
anthropologists such as Eduardo Kohn. Other stories are come from my own experience. And yet 
other stories are stories told to me by my parents and grandparents. I use these stories to propose 
analogies to broaden the scope of my analysis, and to highlight the importance of the emergence 
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of multiplicities of identities and dynamics of the Napo Runa sacha runa (socioenvironment). 
These stories tell us about how PSB works from a Napo Runa world.  
The Stick (suni caspi) metaphor 
The Napo Runa people base territorial control and access on traditional costumes, traditional 
tales transmitted by storytelling from generations to generations in which mountains, rivers, 
specific places are mentioned, called “the grandfather’s times” or Unai (time-space) (Muratorio, 
1991; Uzendoski & Calapucha-Tapuy, 2012). The Unai is important as it points to possibilities 
for Napo Runa life, which have been spreading out their life in Northern Ecuadorian Amazon 
(Dall’Alba, 1992). As a Napo Runa descendant and educated in Western spaces, I am in a 
position to understand grandfather’s time as well as Western conceptualization of the world. To 
begin explaining how the Napo Runa make sense of place with their environment, thinking, and 
feeling –sumac causna, I start with a myth of the Napo Runa of Ávila, captured by Kohn (2013, 
p. 97): 
“It begins with a hero on top of his roof patching it. When a man-eating jaguar approaches, the 
hero calls out to him, “Son-in-law, help me find holes in the thatch by poking a stick through 
them.” From the vantage point of someone inside a house it is quite easy to spot leaks in the 
thatch because of the sunlight that shines through them. However, because roofs are so high, it is 
impossible, from this position, to patch these. A person on the roof, on the other hand, can easily 
patch the holes but cannot see them. For this reason, when a man is patching his roof he will ask 
someone inside to poke a stick through the holes. This has the effect of aligning inside and 
outside perspectives in a special way; what can only be seen from the inside suddenly becomes 
visible to the person on the outside who, seeing these two perspectives as part of something 
greater, can now do something. Once the jaguar is inside, the hero slams the door shut and the 
structure suddenly turn into a stone cage that traps him.” 
 
How do I see this Napo Runa myth connect with PSB? The stick in this story is both 
recognition of different worlds and a moment of connection between them that brings forth a 
new state of being (not the erasure of previous ones). Ultimately, using the stick facilitates a new 
relationship which can be sumac causana (respect for each other and cooperation). They need to 
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cooperate because both are in danger, the leaks can destroy the man’s house, and the strong 
bright sunlight affects the eyes of the jaguar. In the story, the new reality is the “entrapment” of 
the jaguar inside the house, which becomes a container that “captures.” But this is not the end of 
the story. It is a moment of creating new possibilities where the prey-predator relationship, one 
that is fundamental to forest societies (Castro, 2004; Kohn, 2013), can be altered. In other words, 
the jaguar becomes human and the human becomes jaguar, and both create a third, and that third 
create any possibilities of relationship. I see this story as relevant to show how PSB and the Napo 
Runa are from different worlds that are seeking to connect with each other by seeking to contain 
each other within the obligations and responsibilities of their own worlds. To enable this 
connection between worlds, both the Napo Runa and non-indigenous peoples must shed their 
particular perspectives; they will try to use the language, customs, and knowledge they have 
about each other to bring themselves closer to the other. In order to align the two perspectives 
(the man on the roof and the jaguar inside the room), they need something that “connects” them. 
That something is the work of the “stick.” The stick aligns inside and outside perspectives. It 
turns both perspectives as one.  
In this connection, the “stick” itself becomes a new perspective for capture and 
entrapment, one that generates multiple possibilities of existence. That is what Viveiros de 
Castro calls “perspectivism” (Castro, 2004; Nuckolls & Swanson, 2014), how both human and 
animal lose or shed their perspective in order to create a new being (not human, not animal, but a 
third). Perspectivism is the continuity and the difference of something, against the common 
world (Blaser, 2013). In Kohns’ words, “[I]t allows one to linger in that space where, like a 
shaman, one can be simultaneously aware of both viewpoints as well as how they are connected 
by something greater that, like a trap springing shut, suddenly encompasses them. The attention 
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people in Ávila give to such moments of awareness is a signature of Amazonian multinatural 
perspectivalism (p. 96). 
Recalling the idea of multinatural perspectivism, as a Napo Runa, I am aware of how 
programs such as PSB entail a dominant, singular form of understanding the world. I am aware 
that the program “sheds” some of its characteristics –e.g., conditionalities, payment scales, 
modes of recognizing partnership and participation-- to be more suitable to the lens of 
indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, some of its core principles and ontologies, such as the use of 
monetary equivalence with restriction of use, remain unchanged. As previous chapters suggested, 
the Napo Runa will work with these ontologies of value, but they will also adapt and change 
them so that they are not fully captured by them. As a Napo Runa, I also see the story of the stick 
as useful to describe my own research: I see my research doing the work of the stick in the story. 
It seeks to connect two or multiple worlds by naming interactions, tracing their philosophies and 
sense of the world across time, and seeking to understand how they connect to and transform 
each other. 
The boa of the Napo River 
In 2004, I worked with an oil company, EncanaEcuador, later Andes Petroleum. I was 
assigned to the Environment, Health, Safety and Community Affairs Department. One of my 
tasks was to work with a community called Indillama. My role was to socialize and get permits 
for an exploratory well-site drilling project called “Batata.” To “socialize” means to introduce 
the project that the company hopes to do in the community, to talk about how the project will 
work, and to describe what will be offered in exchange for allowing the company to work within 
the community’s territory. The goal of socialization is to, first, obtain the community’s 
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permission to enter their territory and, second, to assure that the community will allow the 
company to do the work without harm to workers or equipment.  
One day, our team, headed by my supervisor, visited Indillama to talk with its president. I 
greeted the president and other members. Later the president approached to me and told me: 
“Ah, you are working with the boa [anaconda] of the Napo River.” I was curious about this 
reference. After the meeting, I approached the president and asked: “why do you call him the boa 
of the Napo River?” He replied: “don’t you know? He ‘eats’ all communities.”  
Later, in the hotel, the headquarters of my working group, during dinner, I asked my 
supervisor: Why do they call you the boa of the Napo River?” He laughed and didn’t say much 
more. Later, however, he told us a story about how, years earlier, he had entered to work as a 
community affairs specialist. He used to work as a doctor for another company and his job was 
to give support to community health programs. One of the goals of providing these services was 
to show that oil companies can serve community needs too. At that time, the community he 
worked with was El Edén, was one of the communities that was opposed to giving permission to 
the company to enter their territories (Grefa, 2014). He said that the company that he worked for 
was losing faith; it had used all efforts available to convince the community to negotiate with it 
and to allow the company’s presence in El Edén’s territory. The company wanted to enter 
because its studies suggested the presence of profitable crude oil deposits in those lands. One 
day, he visited El Edén, supposedly to carry out a health campaign. Community people opposed 
to his actions were not happy to see the company’s doctor. Nobody wanted to approach the 
campaign site. However, after repeated visits to carry out the health campaign, members of the 
community started approaching him, though still not trusting him. When they started coming to 
him, he began to learn about the community’s health needs and he started targeting his activities 
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towards these. On a later occasion, his oil-funded medical campaign also evacuated community 
members to Quito for urgent medical intervention. This is the story of how the company, subtly 
seduced and strategically attracted El Edén community to talk with the oil company. With that 
strategy, repeatedly and subtlety, the company gained permission to enter not only El Edén but 
also other reluctant communities. That is why community members used to know my supervisor 
as “the boa of the Napo River.”  
How does the figure of the anaconda (boa) fit in this story? During the wayusa morning 
ritual (discussed in the introduction chapter), close to the fire, my grandparents used to tell 
stories that make this connection clearer. One of these stories is about a hunter in the forest that 
suddenly falls into a form of hypnosis. Under the effect of the hypnosis of a nearby boa, the 
hunter starts walking in circles and, if he doesn’t realize it, he brings himself closer to the boa 
and eventually enters its mouth. Under the hypnotic effect of the boa, the hunter thinks he is 
going straight home, as if walking through a clear and defined path. However, if another person 
looks from the distance at the hunter’s actions, who is under the hypnosis of the boa, the other 
person would see the hunter walking in circles in the dense jungle, and hurting himself. That is 
why the boa is a sacred and respected being, and people have to be aware of this in the forest. A 
person has to pinch themselves; they have to pay attention when they start seeing the same parts 
of the forest over and over again. According to the yachak (shaman), the power of the anaconda 
is based on its hypnotic capacity, to subtly trick the animal or person by attraction and seduction 
(Kohn, 2013) so that the trapped person follows the boa and not their original path.  
The analogy of the boa with the company is an example of how the Napo Runa use a 
‘familiar image’ to tell a tale that encompasses the complex forms of seeing and being in the 
world. Like the oil company’s case, PSB’s act is analogous to the anaconda in the forest. It 
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subtly seduces and attracts its “prey” (communities) to agree to participate by using the promise 
for a bright future in monetary terms. PSB is not the first boa, however. It repeats what other 
programs and policies before it have been doing and continue to do in the northern Ecuadorian 
Amazon.  
While the stick metaphor describes the moment of connection, and the philosophy of a 
relationship of prey-predator in making connections between worlds, I see the story of the boa as 
a way to understand how this philosophy is put into practice and with what consequences. As the 
stories about the jaguar and the house and boa of the Napo River suggest, two worlds seek to 
connect but, in connecting, there is also a power struggle over the terms of recognition, capture, 
and entrapment in the process of continuity.  
I propose the term “subtle act of repetition” or acto sutil de repetición to describe how 
dominant outsiders (e.g., the Ecuadorian State, hacendados, oil companies) use the actions of the 
boa, to subtly seduce and attract, through various repetitive modes of rule, in different scales, 
times, and places. In other words, the subtle act of repetition insidiously reproduces imperialist, 
colonialist, and paternalistic structures that capture and entrap indigenous ways of knowing the 
world. PSB is one such mechanism of subtle repetitions that invisibilize (in cumulative, 
ensnaring, and harmful ways) and negate the histories, cultures, capacities, autonomy, and 
brilliance of the Napo Runa people who have lived and existed in this place for millennia.  
In previous chapters, I provided examples of how PSB embeds in indigenous 
communities through subtle acts of repetition: through the negotiation of the terms of 
participation, the payment scales, the distribution of incentives, and so on. In order to connect 
with that complexity, I have used the stick metaphor, in which the Napo Runa connects with 
PSB. However, the same communities create socioenvironmental dynamics to “escape” and be 
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“aware” of these subtle acts of repetition, which can also be interpreted as resurgence. Next, I 
explore these forms of resurgence and continuity of Napo Runa ways of life through the notions 
of Indigenous Property Regimes and political actions through muntun.   
INDIGENOUS PROPERTY REGIMES 
Property scholar Carol Rose (1994) believes it is necessary to disentangle historical 
narratives – narratives transmitted over generations- expressed in songs, arts, and new forms of 
cultural manifestations to gain insight into indigenous people’s claims about their territorialities. 
In other words, historical narratives constitute a form of “seeing” property. I argue that 
Indigenous Peoples do have a sense of property, what I call Indigenous Property Regimes, 
defined in terms of relations with nature and its mobile capacities, which are kept going through 
intergenerational storytelling.  
Historical experiences of living under colonialism are embedded in Napo Runa myths 
and legends, which are transmitted orally; sometimes they are expressed as riots, flight, sabotage, 
and open rebellion; and other times as symbolic practices replicated in daily life (Muratorio, 
1991; Perreault, 2002; Uzendoski, 2005; Whitten, 1975). With the increasing presence of settlers 
in what is now the Ecuadorian Amazon, new property regimes were put in place to replace 
indigenous ones. These property regimes were enacted through particular figures of settlement: 
towns, haciendas, encomiendas, reducciones, for example (explored in Chapter 3). These forms 
of settlement became the spaces of interaction between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. 
They were “icon places,” that is, they represented the presence of settlement and the possibility 
of engagement (attraction, capture, entrapment) with colonial regimes. Amazonian peoples who 
rejected containment and settlement fled deeper into the forest as a form of rebellion, and to 
escape the death associated with epidemics or abuses in the hands of the encomenderos in the 
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Tena-Archidona area. As Amazonian peoples fled or hid, there were fewer peoples to enslave 
and contain in the encomiendas (Muratorio, 1991). This also led to a decrease in Spanish 
encomenderos who depended on the indigenous work force. However, beyond those icon spaces, 
indigenous peoples felt they still owned vast forests.  
Even though indigenous peoples “lost” property rights to ancestral territories when 
Spanish conquistadores took the land, they continued their traditional practices of 
territorialization –what I call Indigenous property regimes. For them, property is about complex, 
mobile socio cultural relationships among people and nature. As with other Amazonian peoples, 
territory is understood in both spatial and temporal terms. Spaces ‘move’ with seasons: rivers 
overflow banks, trees in lowlands areas bear fruit at different times of the year than trees on 
higher ground, and thus hunting prey move with this seasonality as well. Seasonality does not 
refer to the commonly used categories of four seasons (summer, winter, fall, spring), but to how 
annual environmental changes affect the obligations and responsibilities of the forest society: 
harvesting, monitoring, storing, and consuming of the forest, among others. Animals have 
territories too, where they hunt and where they eat. The Napo Runa develop responsibilities and 
obligations towards these territories as well. As mobile societies, they depend on finding places 
with plenty of food for hunting, fishing, and harvesting, but also places to escape from slavery, 
illness and control. Social responsibilities and attachments are oriented towards securing this 
continuity. Similar observations about Indigenous understanding of time and space have been 
made by Hatfield, Marino, Whyte, Dello, & Mote (2018), who argue that seasonalities are alike 
cycles of events that bound together illustrate the sensitivity with which relationships among 




Napo Runa notions of property are based on such temporal and spatial interrelationships with 
non-humans in terms of sacha runa. Hunting narratives, transmitted orally, offer examples for 
understanding these territorialities. In some communities, people talk about hunting narratives: 
“the body acquires the smell of the forest, man becomes forest and animal don’t flee” 
(Muratorio, 1991, p. 64). In many hunting narratives, human beings are part of nature, they adopt 
its smell to trespass the territorialities in the forest, and thus the Napo Runa become beings of the 
forest (Kohn, 2013). Similarly, for those who live along the banks of rivers such as Misahualli 
and Napo, flooding forces them to move their homes to higher ground, on the hills. For them, 
flooding is how nature reclaims space, and thus, is a form of sensing territoriality.  
History and storytelling support the continuity of life. Stories showcase that 
territorialization is part of the Napo Runa cosmology. Some of these stories are about forms of 
organizing territory long before the Spanish Invasion. For example, the Napo Runa had a form of 
government, under the leadership of the yachak (shamans), and had warlords that prevailed for 
several centuries, even after the Conquest (Muratorio, 1991). The Kichwa (Quichua), which is 
today spoken by the Napo Runa, was already spreading in the Ecuadorian Amazon region, long 
before the Inca conquest from southern Perú (Uzendoski & Whitten, 2014). Other stories 
emphasize rebellion and resistance to the Spanish. For example, they tell of how shamans used 
natural and supernatural powers to exercise dominion over specific geographic areas, bordered 
by rivers, mountains, lagoons and sacred stones, among others (Kohn, 2013; Muratorio, 1991; 
Uzendoski, 2005; Whitten, 1975). Their leadership was so predominant that, around 1578-1579, 
shamans such as Beto from Archidona, Guami and Imbate from Ávila, banded with different 
groups to fight against their common enemies (Gutiérrez, 2002), the Spanish Conquistadores.   
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During the 19th and early 20th centuries, many foreign travelers visited the Oriente 
(Dall’Alba, 1992; Villavicencio, 1858). They needed to carry official letter of introduction issued 
by the ministry of the interior to secure assistance from local authorities (Muratorio, 1991). In 
many cases, these travelers were in the hands of indigenous people’s guides, and sometimes, 
literally traveled on and on the backs of indigenous guides (Villavicencio, 1858). These travelers 
witnessed many territorial practices. For example, the path from the Andes to the Amazon 
connected the towns of Quito-Tumbaco-Papallacata-Baeza-Cosanga-Archidona. On this path, 
between Cosanga and Archidona, are the Huacamayos Mountain. Osculati17 reports that “the 
superstitious Indians were quite terrified of this mountain, believing it to be a center where the 
spirits gathered. An Indian would not dare to make this trip alone for any urgent reason because 
of the spells involved or because of the wild animals that abounded in its caves” (cited in 
Muratorio, 1991, p. 26). In this story, as other stories narrated among the Napo Runa, caves or 
mountains are considered sacred areas to be respected (Kohn, 2013; Uzendoski, 2005). Sacred 
areas create territorialities; they shape the fate of people, and people have to avoid trespassing.  
At the end of 18th and early 19th century, the Ecuadorian Amazon was integrated into the 
national economy by colonization programs sponsored by the national government and due to 
the quinine boom of rubber and economic systems (Muratorio, 1991). These programs 
established new forms of property territorialization, negotiated through formalization of the 
property regimes over ancestral indigenous territories (discussed in Chapter 3). During the 
twentieth century, traditional indigenous peoples’ property regimes mixed with the new forms of 
property stablished by the colonizers, landowners, the national government and the missioners. 
The property regime was based on the exchange of forest products-manufactured goods among 
                                                          
17 An Italian traveler, who visited the Oriente in 1854, and wrote extensive descriptions of his travels. 
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them and non-indigenous peoples. The indigenous socioeconomic relations were based on the 
chacra (considered as mobile horticulture) and multiple seasonal hunting, fishing expeditions as 
with extractive economy to provide goods to white merchants by supplying gold, quinine and 
pita18 (Esvertit, 2008). 
As previously mentioned, some haciendas, such as the hacienda Ila, one of the first 
haciendas along the Upper Napo, were created on lands that where first occupied by the Napo 
Runa people from the Archidona-Tena area (Dall’Alba, 1992). They used those lands for fishing, 
hunting and harvesting, which they called caru tambo (a small seasonal outpost). In those caru 
tambo, a temporal chacra was created, as a way to take over the land, followed with sowing 
chonta (a palm tree) to delimit territoriality and claim ownership to the land where they used to 
mobilize during festivities or to escape the patrones. From there, the Napo Runa entered to other 
areas deeper in the Ecuadorian Amazon lowlands to the areas of Shandia, Arajuno and Curaray, 
in search of other areas for hunting and fishing (T. Macdonald, 1999). Those incursions were 
limited by encounters with other indigenous groups, such as the Huaorani19 and Sápara.  
Even though colonial and republican settler societies sought to discipline indigenous 
peoples as a labor force -in encomiendas, parcialidades, patrón-peón and haciendas- Napo Runa 
relationships with nature have been maintained via stories. Even when the Ecuadorian state, 
through its land reform agency, IERAC20, gave individual lands to indigenous peoples as private 
lots, many agreed to participate in the program because they were looking for lands where they 
could fulfill obligations and responsibilities of traditional hunting, fishing and harvesting 
                                                          
18 It is a natural fiber to make ropes. 
19 Pejoratively referred to as Aucas, which translates to “savage” in Kichwa. 
20 Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization. 
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(Dall’Alba, 1992; Rogers, 1996). Some Runa sold their lands and moved to other, more remote 
places, such as the Napo River lowlands or deep into the forest, like my grandparents. My 
mother also mentioned that indigenous peoples did not want to have contact with colonists, as 
they felt ashamed that the colonist would intimidate them. Hunting, harvesting, fishing, and the 
relationship with nature through sacred and spiritual sites have not been taken away from the 
deep thinking of the Napo Runa life. How the Napo Runa see property or territoriality has been 
changing over time and is the result of social interrelationship with environment, and later, as a 
result of interaction with modernism and government policies.  
Sacha Kawsay 
I now wish to explain my personal understanding of Napo Runa space-time as a form of 
territoriality that is mobile and has different scales, time, and intensity. As a child, when I used to 
visit with my grandparents, I didn’t learn about property. I learned about spaces of interaction in 
the forest, where my family and relatives moved. I visited some parts of the Amazonian 
landscapes and experienced the life of the forest, sacha kawsay. My grandparents took me to the 
forest to learn about different spaces of interaction between human and non-human beings, or 
territorialities. They also told me about these places and relationships during storytelling. These 
narratives and visions did not explicitly mention property regimes, but in revisiting and 
disentangling those narratives and spaces of interactions, I am able to understand different 
meanings of property used by the Napo Runa (Rogers, 1996). If as Rose (1994) claims, “the 
ways that people see property relations -from pictures to maps to metaphors -the depiction 
speaks to a viewer’s imagination and attempts to persuade” (285), then what I experienced were 




During school vacation, I used to visit my grandparents. My mother’s parents lived in 
Puerto Murialdo, a small island at the meeting of the Napo and Suno rivers. According to my 
mother, her father (my grandfather), José Andi, and his family were among the first who settled 
permanently in this area, around 1970. My grandfather had left the life close to the haciendas in 
the Upper Napo and wandered through many places across the Napo river, finally settling there. 
My grandparents originally lived in the sector of Tzatzayacu, along the Anzu River21, in a land 
given to them by my grandparent’s relatives, where they used to live for many years. With the 
construction of a road connecting to the town of Puyo in 1963, colonos arrived to the sector 
(Dall’Alba, 1992). Some Napo Runa moved to the lowland parts of the Napo River. In 
Tzatzayacu, a colono showed my grandparents documents stating that the land belonged legally 
to him. At that time, my grandparents didn’t speak or read Spanish, but my grandfather didn’t 
want to argue and just abandoned that land. He received a dynamite bar for his crops in 
exchange. After that, he moved to a place called Piokulin, supposedly to live in an area that 
belonged to his grandfather, where he established cattle ranching. Not much later, another colono 
named Leonidas Rueda came to my grandfather and asked him to leave the land because it 
belonged to him. The land belonged to my grandfather under consuetudinary norms or by labor, 
but those did not guarantee him any rights to maintain those lands. The problem here was not 
property but how to claim property and legitimize that claim. According to my mother, who 
witnessed all these accounts, in Puerto Murialdo some colonos and the Catholic Church also 
settled years later. Unfortunately, similar issues of property as those experienced in Tzatzayacu 
and Piokulin plagued this place. A colono told my grandfather that those lands belonged to him. 
At that time my grandfather grabbed his gun and said “the colonos have rights why not me? I 
                                                          
21 This river is in the Napo Province. 
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will use this gun to defend my territory, my family.” Taking this different stance, he was able to 
maintain his lands. Years later he received land titling.  
Stories about colono appropriation of indigenous lands represent the histories of 
colonialism and displacement that have affected the life of the Napo Runa. They have been 
wandering and mobilizing across the Ecuadorian Amazon landscapes to secure their ancestral 
territories, and in some way escaping from modernity, where they feel free to continue 
reproducing their way of life and spaces of interactions. For colonos, property referred to legal 
possession recognized by the government, and appropriation by force was repeatedly used to 
take land. For the Napo Runa, property represented spaces of interactions among human and 
non-humans encompassing past, present and future contexts. I explore this idea next. 
Property as interaction 
My grandfather, José Andi, was a yachak (shaman) famously known as Charau. When I 
visited with him, he used to trace an imaginary safe territory (territoriality) for his relatives. He 
used to tell us that we needed to walk between spaces where he was able to control some 
negative forces that otherwise could harm his family and relatives. He would point to some big 
trees, the river shoreline, and specific spaces that were safer for us. He used to say that he was a 
person who help people recover from chunta pala (palm’s spear) –a form of negative energy that 
can kill or produce illness to people. Other yachak would send the chunta pala to try to kill him. 
Safe spaces were those in which his relatives could perform daily activities such as fishing, 
harvesting, hunting, cropping, or mobilizing to visit other friends and relatives. In this sense, my 
grandfather was producing territoriality, which according to his knowledge, moved beyond 
Western property dimensions.  
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The forms of property described by my grandfather might be seen as a relation between 
people and things but also the relation of things (nature and the spiritual expressions) over 
people. The materiality that makes the property regime in his example can be sensed as death or 
illness of those who enter the dominion of a yachak, or the dominion of certain sacred places, 
such as caves or mountains (T. Macdonald, 1999; Rogers, 1996), or sacred places in the forest. 
The consequences of trespassing can take the form of floods, ant invasions, lightning, etc. In 
Rose’s (1994) words, “the physical characteristics of the resource frame the kinds of actions that 
human beings can take toward a given resource, and these in turn frame ‘jural relations’ that 
people construct about their mutual uses and forbearances with respect to that resource” (269).  
For the Napo Runa sense of territory, there is no division between human beings and 
nature (Kohn, 2013; Uzendoski, 2005; Whitten, 1975), which differs from the nature/society 
dualism dominant in Western society. Sacha runa erase that fictitious divide.  I recall 1980, 
when I visited my grandparents from my father’s side that illustrates this observation. During 
June 1980s, after school was out, we traveled long ways away from towns, and along the 
Tiputini River, in Orellana Province. I first had to travel with my parents by ranchera22 from 
Coca city to the Tiputini River, along the Auca road. Once we reached the meeting point on the 
Tiputini River, my relatives waited for us in canoes propelled by outboard motor. After some 
hours traveling downstream the Tiputini River, all canoes stopped at a large flat area close to 
hills, on a curve along the riverbank. Soon after we left the canoes, my relatives began clearing 
the forest. My father began preparing fishing lines, while other relatives entered deep into the 
forest for hunting. Meanwhile, other women and men prepared the food and others were making 
a camp site. My father caught a medium catfish and we heard the people who went hunting fire 
                                                          
22 It is a special vehicle transportation used still nowadays in rural areas 
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their shotguns. There were a lot of mosquitos everywhere. Kids didn’t have any place to play, we 
could only be near our mothers. My grandfather liked that place, and we remained there for the 
rest of our vacation.  
After some years, my father took us to visit our grandfather on the Tiputini River again, 
the place later was named Pindo. The place looked different when we returned. There was a two 
story Napo Runa traditional house. Around the house were crops of manioc, corn, plantains, and 
also fruit trees and grass for cattle. Across the river, my aunt Elvia also settled. The place where 
we had arrived years earlier was not the same. It had become inhabited by my relatives. I knew 
that my grandfather invited his relatives to live there and created a Comuna23. Taking advantage 
of the state land reforms, discussed in earlier chapters, they made formal claims over traditional 
lands. Years later, I asked my mother: “why they go to live so far away?” She said that Napo 
Runa people are not accustom to living close to the colonos or close to modernity. People 
traveled from different parts, especially from places in the Upper Napo such as Tena, Archidona, 
Cotundo, Puerto Napo to areas where they could feel free, where they could hunt, fish, harvest 
and nobody bothers them, because the forest is their home. Muratorio (1991, p. 75) refers to this 
historical flight into the forest to attain freedom as a continuity of resistance: “for them 
[indigenous people], tropical forest was a familiar and safe environment, a refuge where they 
could ensure both their own material and spiritual existence.” The forest is the Napo Runa’s 
home, their mobility is wherever they wanted to go, but the territoriality had to be defined in 
terms of use, dominion of the shaman, respect to sacred spaces, and avoid natural claims as 
flooding areas. This mobility is still being reproduced; people still travel elsewhere, for hunting, 
                                                          
23 Known as Centro Kichwa Río Tiputini 
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or visiting their friends or family to continue reproducing their old territorialities and creating 
new ones.   
My grandparents and relatives were able to create the Comuna Centro Río Tiputini taking 
advantage of the government property regimes, because they did not have another option. 
However, some forms of territoriality co-exist with this strategy, replicating some traditional 
forms of seeing property. For example, the Tiputini River used to flood during raining seasons. 
My relatives needed to move their living spaces to the hills. Similarly, during storytelling my 
relatives mentioned that close to my grandparents’ home there was a cocha brava” (haunted 
lake). When entering there, they experienced lightning, the area became dark and windy in just 
minutes, and they were able to see anacondas and jaguars. So, when we used to travel close to 
those lakes, they used to point them out and told everyone not to enter. These are forms of 
recognizing property not as fixed by as mobile, dependent on the flow of the river, on sacred 
areas, or on presence of meat or the blooms of trees. In other words, indigenous property regime 
is always changing, moving and reinventing according their sacha runa. These complex forms of 
seeing property by the Napo Runa is what PSB is not taking into account in its design, metrics, 
and values. 
MUNTUN 
The continued existence of the Napo Runa is evidence of resistance but also as 
resurgence in relation to the subtle acts of repetition described earlier in this chapter. Runa 
resistance and resurgence can take different entangled and assembled expressions. In this 
context, I agree with Doreen Massey’s (1994) proposition that ideas about place can be 
challenged and reworked. The idea that place is the result of a social, historical and network 
process refuses static and defensive notions of place on debates of globalization hegemony. Place 
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is about the formation of social relations, the creation of public realm and the vitality of political 
life (Featherstone & Painter, 2013). For Massey (1994), place is processual, porous, and 
endowed with multiple identities; theories about place need to move beyond the ‘realm of human 
social relations” (pg. 12). Her conceptualizations of place can be used to understand indigenous 
peoples’ conceptualizations of space, especially those linked to territory. On this terms, I argue 
for the need to move beyond the romantic view of the Napo Runa culture linked exclusively with 
nature and as a homogenous and static subject. Indigenous peoples are not battling modernity to 
be in a pre-modern status (Braun, 2002). Territorial space is important and the Napo Runa have 
been able to manage forms of territorialities external to their ancestral ways. In this sense, I argue 
that the multiplicity of identities and strategic actions that the Napo Runa have used to protect 
their claims to territory can be understood through the concept of the Muntun as resurgence as a 
political action. Where does the idea of muntun come from? 
In order to understand muntun let me provide a general overview of the concept and how 
it can fit in my proposal as a political term. Napo Runa people are descendants of ancient peoples 
who have lived in what is now the Northern Ecuadorian Amazon (Kohn, 2013; Muratorio, 1991; 
Uzendoski, 2005). The social relations that the Napo Runa (my people) have developed to 
survive and continue existing are important to analyze (T. J. Macdonald, 1979). Though some 
authors argue that indigenous peoples like the Napo Runa are able to continue practicing their 
traditional forms of social life because of environmental determinants, others argue that 
adaptation and the reconfiguration of external social forces and dynamics are crucial to survival 
(Whitten, 1976; Muratorio, 1991; Perreault, 2003). Amazonian anthropologists have been doing 
research to capture the Napo Runa social relations. Macdonald (1999, p. 26), defines muntun in 
terms of “cluster” which “is a residential group generally composed of several overlapping 
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kindreds (i.e., a kin group that is oriented in terms of the individual rather than, for example, 
through a lineage or clan).” Uzendoski (2005), defines muntun as ayllu in terms of the sharing 
and being via territory. In other words, for Uzendosky, to explain muntun, we have to consider 
what he calls Andean-Amazonian kinship which is about 1) consanguinity or substance, 2) 
affinity, or relations of marriage, through “auya24” and 3) residence or where you live (personal 
communication, October 10, 2017). Using those concepts and interchanged, dynamic and 
multidimensional, I use the concept of muntun as a resurgence political project which 
assemblages the multiplicity of affinities, identities, intentionalities that connect the callary uras 
to provide a continual resurgence, as a form of “continuity” of what the Zapatistas call, “a world 
where many worlds fit.” Below I provide an historical genealogy of how muntun has been 
defined. 
The Napo Runa were organized in “muntun” (sub-groups of family akin determined by 
socioenvironmental interactions) during the colony (Muratorio, 1991) which later became known 
as Napo Runa parcialidades (parties or groups) which are colonial administrative units, 
designated after Independence was achieved (discussed in Chapter 3). Muntun represents a 
geographic place, for example: The Pano (river) muntun, the Archidona muntun, etc. It can also 
represent the nickname or last name of the chief or captain of a group, for example: The Andi’s 
muntun. It can also take the physical or specific characteristics of a group, such as the Pendes 
(Shaman) muntun, the Curista (gold washers) muntun, or the Crucitos (group of fishers) muntun 
(Muratorio, 1991). In this respect, I argue that due to the parcialidades system, new forms of 
territorialized organization emerged, based specifically in the characteristics of its members, 
                                                          
24 Parents in-law 
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such as hunters, fishers, yachak (shamans), bearers, Christianity’s converted, among others. So, 
the muntun represents a dimension of contestation to the coloniality of power.  
Muntun-parcialidades connection, is an example that shows muntun as a social 
organization practice that assembles the socioenvironmental collective according to both 
affinities and coercion. When the parcialidades system was created, it was not necessarily the 
same as the ayllu, because different groups were mixed together to be managed under the control 
of the Spaniards encomenderos. But they had a familiarity. Similarly, the muntun has a 
familiarity with the parcialidades, but they are not the same. Each muntun has a name, usually a 
nickname or last name of the chief or captain of a group, or of their physical or specific 
characteristics. For example, in the area of Archidona, the social organization during the colony 
was managed by several muntun, such as Partido25 Alto, Partido Tostado, Lucián, Tabaco, 
Ismusinga (rotten nose). Each muntun-parcialidades had their own leadership called Capitán or 
Varayuk (with cane) which was obligated to report to the patrón (Dall’Alba, 1992). Later, when 
the haciendas arrived, the Napo Runa muntun used to live scattered in a tambo, a form of lodge 
where 3 or 4 families lived together. They worked for the haciendas where the patron assigned 
work activities to each parcialidad for example, the Dahua was working in gold washing, the 
Alvarado the grasslands, the Grefa the rice, and the Pauchi the crops (Dall’Alba, 1992). In this 
sense, different indigenous groups respected their muntun-parcialidades boundaries, not only in 
the villages, but also within the church, being rivalries among them (Villavicencio, 1858). 
Sometimes, the rivalry among these parcialidades was so deep that different parties refused to 
form one village (Tena-Archidona). Coming together sometimes was only possible by coercion 
(Muratorio, 1991).  
                                                          




The Muntun as an idea to understand identity, politics and the Napo Runa possibilities 
Muntun is a philosophy of affiliation that exists in addition to commune membership. In 
this research, I contextualize it in terms of political resurgence and as assembly figure that has 
intentionality and connection with the Runa callary uras. It exists under the Napo Runa view of 
its own world. Because of its particular elements, it becomes part of the multiplicity of ideas, or 
what the Zapatistas call a “un mundo donde quepan muchos mundos” (a world where many 
worlds fit) (Reyes & Kaufman, 2011; Schacherreiter, 2009). 
I propose the idea of muntun as an element of analysis and to generate new possibilities 
for interpretation and proposals. It could be an alternative to the ideas or power-geometry 
criticized by Massey (1994) – which is fundamentally about patterns of unequal relationships as 
proposed by Pickles (2017). As mentioned earlier, the muntun refers to the Napo Runa 
grandfather’s identities or characteristics according to their sacha runa (socioenvironmental 
relations). For example, there existed the muntun of yachak (shamans); the muntun of jaguar 
hunters; the muntun of catfish fishermen; the muntun cultivators of certain forest species as the 
chonta (a tree of palm); the muntun specialized on pottery, the muntun to work the land; the 
muntun of bearers, etc. These “skills” or adapted characteristics are very important to emphasize, 
because are also what I encountered during my research in Wamani and also among Napo Runa 
communities.  
Additionally, the Napo Runa’s grandfathers were skilled politicians. Sometimes they 
made agreements of political cooperation with the representatives of the government, with the 
landowners, with the missionaries, with the same indigenous groups, and so on (Muratorio, 
1991) as strategies of survivance. It is thus, by assembling the idea of the muntun, the skills, the 
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adaptations to internal and external pressures, that it is possible to think that those actions were 
strategically elaborated to defend the territory, the life and the existence of the Napo Runa today. 
For some, it does not make sense that the Napo Runa allied with oppressors (The Spaniards 
Conquistadores, the priests, of the landowners). I propose that perhaps that kind of action itself 
has allowed the Napo Runa to continue to exist, through living and adapting strategies - muntun. 
How do we make sense of these strategies, or muntun, nowadays in Amazonian settings? 
The same muntun explained earlier continues to replicate and accentuate even more. In some 
conversations with Napo Runa leaders, some of them complained that certain leaders allied 
themselves with the bankers, or with the ecologists, with the teacher’s unions, with the Left, or 
with the Right-wing extremists. Many of them proposed the unity of the Indigenous Movement, 
as an alternative to ensure that Ecuador has a new process of strong recognition of the rights of 
indigenous peoples and nationalities, recognizing them as nations within the Ecuadorian state. 
However, whether through multiple indigenous organizations, partisan political alliances 
processes, territorial-political practices would possibly promote the “real” plurinational and 
intercultural state goals? 
Place is always strategic, not universal (Massey, 2001), and because of its complexity, 
place offers no guarantees (always in change in different dimensions and having contestations) 
(Pickles, 2017). In this context, I consider that Napo Runa actions to defend territory are not just 
forms of resistance but some sort of resurgence in terms of muntun or estrategias de vida (life 
strategies) that allowed them to have opportunities to continue existing and practicing their 
traditional life. As mentioned before, rebellions, multiplicity of alliances, language learning, 
using the dominant laws to gain access to defend ancient territories has allowed possibilities of 
life. It is necessary to understand these possibilities in the measure of the knowledge that 
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indigenous leaders have tended, sometimes making strong difficult decisions, such as accepting 
oil exploitation in their territories, although for others this is not the way out. With the previous 
ideas, I propose that muntun is like a wave of life that forms itself in different identities, scales, 
dimensions, possibilities, and entangles with the internal and externals pressures for Napo Runa 
existence. The muntun exists in the Napo Runa social life—the muntun is one aspect of Napo 
Runa sociality-- it has different forms or asymmetries, associations, possibilities, realities. It 
allows the spaces of life to move throughout different negotiations and contestations. The 
muntun is malleable, adaptable, strategic, controversial, dynamic, appears and disappears. It 
draws on the past (the grandfather’s time), without ignoring the future. The muntun generates 
possibilities of life for the Napo Runa to contest the subtle acts of repetition.  
Finally, what is the connection between muntun and Socio Bosque? It is a political action 
to contest but also the resurgence against PSB values and implications discussed in this research. 
The various forms of action, which muntun provides, explain how Napo Runa communities are 
coupled or assembled according to their political action interests. It is a particular understanding 
from Napo Runa ways of knowing, that strategically align with PSB to achieve objectives that 
can be a temporary alignment, for capacity building, secure and regulate land tenure, among 
others. PSB in Wamaní has a presence of 10 years, the community has assembled the image as 
socio to the program to continue conserving the forest in terms of PSB, but also has its other 
assemblages that seeks in terms of commercial improvement, secure sacha runa values, 
improvement of its water systems, schooling, etc. It also allows community to look other forms 
of assemblages at the regional level, when the communities that participate within Socio Bosque 
are promoting to create a regional entity to secure long terms funding. So, muntun in political 
140 
 




CONCLUSION: CAUSANCHIMI (We live and exist) 
My mother cries and her feelings capture me when she sings a part of a song in Kichwa: 
“Imashna rashata kawsachinanga ñukanchi rukuguna kawsaita. Yakugunas chakirishka, 
sachagunas chakirishka.”   
“How to renew the way of living of our ancestors? The waters are being dry, the jungles 
also being dry.”  
There is no doubt that human actions are leading our planet to a catastrophic process. As 
my mother says, my grandfather who was a shaman, years ago, in a ceremony drinking 
ayuahuasca, envisioned “sacha mana cuirasha cay tuta mi tucurin.” (if we don’t take care of the 
forest, this becomes dark end). Global actions somehow seek to reduce the effects of 
deforestation, environmental pollution, mixed with processes to provide improvement in the 
living conditions of poor populations. In this sense, ecosystem services have entered into a view 
of seeing metaphorically nature as a service provider for the development of human life. To the 
processes of drastic changes on the planet as a product of environmental pollution, market-based 
environmental protection initiatives have been taken seriously within the spheres of global 
environmental policies, which are implemented mainly in the so-called developing countries. At 
first glance it seems like a great bet, that all beings in the world put our grain of sand to take care 
of our house, the Earth. The process of caring for and respecting the earth, however, should not 
be done lightly, because behind it there are many peculiarities that, when not included in the 
analysis, obscure, generalize by creating violence, injustices, subtle acts that repetitively go 
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stripping of local conceptions life and space where they inhabit, as is the case of the Napo Runa 
people. 
Within this process of knowing, the global interest of conserving the forest and for what 
purposes, in this dissertation I have explored, how market-based conservation programs, such as 
Payments for Ecosystem Services, are implemented by governments, and that are mixed with 
political processes of “alternative” construction of fairer societies and that involve political 
decisions such as giving rights to nature, and therefore respect for the environment, as is the case 
in Ecuador. As I have shown in this dissertation, the Socio Bosque program originated as an 
adaptation policy proposal to show a new environmental conservation face, in which the 
communities become partners or socios. I consider it important to understand how and why the 
Napo Runa communities, such as Wamaní, located in the province of Napo in the North of the 
Amazon of Ecuador, enters into a dialectic between the “traditional” and the “modern,” but 
contextualizing its historical past, the exhibitions to which indigenous communities have been 
subjected as products of waves of colonization, immersing themselves in geopolitical processes 
within the nation-making, and now within the webs of global capital, increasingly entangle life in 
the forest. But this understanding must also be analyzed from a positionality of what the forest 
means for the Napo Runa, and how these intrinsic values have been maintained and transformed 
not only as a process of response to “outside agents,” but as elements of resurgence, which 
allows life, and ensuring access to ancestral lands. 
Different PES scholars have been arguing in the need to have a deeper understanding of 
place and its internal-external dynamic to better understand how PES is adapted to fit local 
dynamics. For market-based initiatives as Payments for Ecosystem Services program such as 
Programa Socio Bosque, the Amazonian forest become propitious to protect due to provision of 
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said ecosystem services. In this dissertation, I frame around how a regional leader as Juan Carlos 
Jintiach worries on how PSB provide opportunities and benefits for indigenous. This dissertation 
amplifies these concerns by engaging with the life of the Napo Runa people of Comuna Wamaní. 
This dissertation thus analyzes how the intrinsic value of the forest has influenced Napo Runa 
ways of living, and how sacha runa (socioenvironmental) values resist or are being molded or 
transformed to work with PSB. Still, several indigenous communities of the Ecuadorian Amazon 
have participated in PES programs, which target territories held by these indigenous nationalities 
have native forests that meet PSB’s criteria: 1) communally-owned lands, 2) threat of 
deforestation, 3) ecosystem services provision of carbon storage, water cycle regulation and 
habitat for biodiversity; and 4) high poverty levels (de Koning et al., 2011).  
The PSB is a single-payer, government-operated monetary incentive that began in 2008. 
PSB has sought to enroll different indigenous peoples, with the aim to contribute to the 
protection and conservation of the forest and also improving their livelihoods (de Koning et al., 
2011). However, while much attention has focused on the effects of neoliberal ideas of value and 
property of PSB on indigenous communities, less has been said about how the Napo Runa 
positionality, their experiences with Ecuadorian nation-making, and their struggles for survival 
within (and despite) settler systems of assimilation and dispossession, matter to the workings of 
PSB. As I shown in this dissertation, the Napo Runa is not a static, ahistorical category, but one 
forged through a long history of colonial encounters. As I furthered my study, I found out that 
how PSB works is also challenged by Napo Runa socioenvironmental values, or sacha runa. In 
other words, PSB is as a much a result of ideas of market integration and neoliberal valuation as 
of how communities use their collective vision of forest life to challenge the terms and 
mechanisms of engagement, incorporation, and participation. The PSB implementation assumed 
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a top-down approach, due to internal political pressure (especially from President Correa) that 
launched the program without a consulting and participative process from affected communities. 
It was established as a program with good intentions and with the idea of making adjustments in 
the process, in other words flexible and adaptable. Flexibility and adaptability of PSB means that 
the program? navigates the socio-political space in which the program is situated.  
In communities were PSB is already established, socios (comuna associates) are 
concerned with how to make sense of market values and Napo Runa values. In the community of 
Wamaní, for example, socios discuss how to use the PSB’s incentives. Socios were urged to 
think about benefits in terms of the whole community, not only on individual terms. Similarly, 
others were concerned with the loss of communal rights. For Wamani, areas under conservation 
or áreas bajo conservación (ABC) of Socio Bosque are categorized now as “prohibited” or 
“restricted,” meaning that those areas no longer belong to them but must comply with PSB’s 
contributors. In other words, the attentive relationship Wamani have with the environment 
through the ongoing process of signifying and interpreting beings is being separated. Yet, for 
other socios, the PSB is a welcomed opportunity. With money-incentives of USD $26,905 
annually, the community livelihoods improvement in terms of water infrastructure, education, 
entrepreneurships, capacity-building, among others. As political program, PSB entangles PSB 
conceptualization, with carefully incorporating rights of nature, alternative to “development” 
discourses of Buen Vivir, and plurinationalism. To avoid criticism, and PSB incorporated terms 
such as “voluntary” and “incentive”. However, I argue that environmental discourses and moral 
ecologies tie these colonial histories to environmental management programs, shaping how PSB 
is established and managed, and ultimately adapted to the local socioenvironmental dynamics of 
Napo Runa communities.  
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As I have shown in this dissertation, I argue that PSB is not built to recognize how the 
Napo Runa value kinship and respect as a way of ‘seeing’ nonhuman natures. The Napo Runa 
often feel they have to adopt other forms of relating with nature, i.e., other identities, to generate 
spaces for survival. They might also feel that they must contest these and forge other identities 
and forms of social empowerment and persuasion, to secure access to resources, and secure 
lands. My dissertation is sympathetic with the proposal that local socio-political processes shape 
how PES contributes to the consolidation of existing or emerging social transformations (Van 
Hecken, Bastiaensen, & Huybrechs, 2015) that promote cultural self-determination, but also 
cautions against westernized conservationist approaches that foster geographies of power that 
erase local views of life and socioenvironments.   
Resurgence as muntun signals community sacha runa (socioenvironment) and how they 
understand PSB in their own terms. In other words, it fosters not only a Community-Forest 
relationship incorporating various ontological human-environment relationships, but also 
recognizes the support for life that communities “provide.” I argue that Indigenous peoples in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon have been changing and adapting to the “oportunidades que aparecen” 
(opportunities that “appear”), for example adapting the commune governance system and 
adapting to the PSB’s logic of use of space. Adaptation, however, does not mean abandonment 
of self-determination.  Adaptation is a strategy that has served the long-term objectives of 
individual communities. Community-level strategies can combine with national scale strategies, 
such as the coordinated efforts of organizations and the mobilizations of indigenous peoples for 
their rights, which have been influential in the development of new, more representative national 
politics. In my research, I found that Napo Runa evaluate and use strategies and their way of 
living to shape and create new alternatives for the life in the forest which also replicate global 
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processes, such as Payment for Ecosystem Services. Though the Runa configure external ideas 
according to their aims and objectives, indigenous leaders permanently remind us of the link to 
ancestral past, and of the importance of the idea of Nations to exercise indigenous traditional 
ways of life.  
Internally, the community is conflicted about whether the funds promote private 
enterprise initiatives over communal interests. To maintain the community figure and avoid its 
cracking by private initiatives, the community relies on particular strategies. For example, they 
transformed the definition of the PSB incentive into the figure of “donation.” In other words, it is 
possible to donate to existing socios’ private initiative but not to allocate a direct monetary 
deposit. The donation is in terms of materials, equipment or seeds bought by the community and 
donated to socios. For Wamaní this is a form of incentive. This is evidence of how the 
community appropriates the PSB incentive and translates it into something they know or 
something they want to achieve. This is what some scholars call “motivations”, which become 
the center piece for which the community decides to participate in the program (Nicolas Kosoy 
et al., 2008). Indigenizing the market illustrates the ways in which Runa positionality and PSB 
are negotiated is the appropriation of market ideas into Runa ways of knowing. My observations, 
informal conversations, and interviews suggest that the community considers PSB’s incentive an 
oportunidad, an opportunity for livelihood improvement, in other words, incentives are a 
motivation. However, the initiatives are based not only on the availability of an incentive, but 
also on what that incentive would facilitate. Also, there is an internal push towards indigenizing 
the incentive-motivation relationship. In order to minimize the figure of money as the primary 
form of relationship among community members, Wamaní appropriated not only the incentive 
but used terms they know, such as donación (donation) or minga, to redefine how the incentive is 
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invested. Wamaní resolved to not give socios cash transfers individually but rather to give 
support, stimulus, utensils, equipment, health access, food, among others. In other words, 
Wamaní relied on the philosophy of reciprocity and co-dependence to appropriate the PSB 
incentive. 
Property dimensions are a critical aspect of PSB. I argue that conservation programs such 
as Program Socio Bosque (PSB) reproduce the colonial relations of power over indigenous lands. 
PSB continuously reproduce (neo) colonial legacies that promote individual property relations in 
indigenous communities, still undermining assemblages of communal rights and converts its 
participants into disciplined capitalist subjects (Heynen et al., 2007). In this dissertation I found 
that land is a tool for “production,” through processes of generating ownership. All these 
processes and their property arrangements, such as encomiendas, reducciones and parcialidades, 
haciendas, agrarian colonies, protected areas, and conservation areas, have both created 
dependence and instability and attracted and seduced indigenous peoples by promising improved 
livelihoods (through access to jobs, markets, and resources). PSB enter in the access to property 
game, through process of simplification. Simplification of property means issues and “violences” 
on different social arrangements specially related to conservation and resources management 
(Mansfield, 2008). Moreover, as a crucial requirement of PSB, solicitants entering into the 
program need to show evidence that they are the landowner of said territories. This creates what 
Schloegel calls “program winners” for participants on PBS (2012), while the losers are the 
rejected participants. This means that the state continues to favor people who are already in 
favored positions, over others. In other words, “landowner,” a universal subject category that 
does not take into account the intersectional forces that shape indigenous experiences today: 
racialized histories; cycles of poverty in the Amazon; or socioenvironmental embeddedness of 
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Amazonian peoples in forest spaces, all of which influence how the Napo Runa participate in 
conservation projects. 
In PSB’s perspective, Ecuador’s ecologically native forests account for 10 million ha in a 
total area of 26 million ha (de Koning et al., 2011). These forests include forest with native 
species, old forests and restored secondary forests. The territorial landscape of indigenous 
peoples such as the Napo Runa fall into this category; they are considered ecologically native 
forest. But this category ignores their property regime dynamics, which have shaped these very 
forests. These ecological forest imaginaries –endless, pristine, conservation-worthy forests, 
under the view of modern conservation - reflect the Western notion that nature is separate from 
humans, and as that, that nature needs to be protected to continue reproducing its function as 
Ecosystem Services provider (Braun, 2002). In other words, PSB assumes that forests (nature) 
are best conserved when people don’t interact with them—they need to be disassociated from 
people, despite that the history of these forests includes the Napo Runa.  
While my mother cries remembering her life as during the grandfather’s time, I am 
saying her, “not all is lost.” So, I explore how Napo Runa ways of seeing and being in the world, 
or runascha, are challenging the work of Programa Socio Bosque (PSB), specifically, and to 
contribute to the emerging scholarship on alternatives conceptualizations of PES, more 
generally, and towards recognizing Napo Runa valuation schemes that take into account the 
complexity of human and nonhuman interrelationships (Nicolás Kosoy & Corbera, 2010; 
Norgaard, 2010). I introduced the acto sutil de repetición or “subtle act of repetition,” to discuss 
how PSB works to be attentive and work strategically in terms of “indigenous property regimes” 
and muntun as a politics of resurgence. In this sense, the analogy of the boa with the company is 
an example of how the Napo Runa use a ‘familiar image’ to be aware how PSB subtly seduces 
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and attracts communities to agree to participate by using the promise for a bright future in 
monetary terms. Although, PSB is not the first boa, it repeats what other programs and policies 
before it has been doing and continue to do in the northern Ecuadorian Amazon.  
While the stick metaphor describes the moment of connection, and the philosophy of a 
relationship of prey-predator in making connections between worlds. I have used the stick 
metaphor, in which the Napo Runa connects with PSB. However, the same communities create 
socioenvironmental dynamics to “escape” and be “aware” of these subtle acts of repetition, 
which can also be interpreted as resurgence. I see the story of the boa as a way to understand 
how this philosophy is put into practice and with what consequences. As the stories about the 
jaguar and the house and boa of the Napo River suggest, two worlds seek to connect but, in 
connecting, there is also a power struggle over the terms of recognition, capture, and entrapment 
in the process of continuity.  
Causanchimi! (We live and exist!) is a common salutation expression in Napo Runa 
communities. The continued existence of the Napo Runa is evidence of resistance but also as 
resurgence in relation to the subtle acts of repetition. Runa resistance and resurgence can take 
different entangled and assembled expressions connected to place. For Massey (1994), place is 
processual, porous, and endowed with multiple identities. On these terms, I argue for the need to 
move beyond the romantic view of the Napo Runa culture linked exclusively with nature and as 
a homogenous, static and ahistorical subject. Territorial space is important and the Napo Runa 
have been able to manage forms of territorialities external to their ancestral ways. In this sense, I 
argue that the multiplicity of identities and strategic actions that the Napo Runa have used to 
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